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Smartphones and tablets are increasingly ubiquitous, and many users rely on multiple mobile devices to
accommodate work, personal, and geographic mobility needs. Pervasive access to always-on mobile com-
puting has created new security and privacy concerns for mobile devices that often force users to carry
multiple devices to meet those needs. The volume and popularity of mobile devices has commingled hard-
ware and software design, and created tightly vertically integrated platforms that lock users into a single,
vendor-controlled ecosystem. My thesis is that lightweight mechanisms can be added to commodity operat-
ing systems to enable multiple virtual phones or tablets to run at the same time on a physical smartphone or
tablet device, and to enable apps from multiple mobile platforms, such as iOS and Android, to run together
on the same physical device, all while maintaining the low-latency and responsiveness expected of modern
mobile devices. This dissertation presents two lightweight operating systems mechanisms, virtualization
and binary compatibility, that enable multi-persona mobile computing. First, we present Cells, a mobile
virtualization architecture enabling multiple virtual phones, or personas, to run simultaneously on the same
physical cellphone in a secure and isolated manner. Cells introduces device namespaces that allow apps to
run in a virtualized environment while still leveraging native devices such as GPUs to provide accelerated
graphics. Second, we present Cycada, an operating system compatibility architecture that runs applica-
tions built for different mobile ecosystems, iOS and Android, together on a single Android device. Cycada
introduces kernel-level code adaptation and diplomats to simplify binary compatibility support by reusing
existing operating system code and unmodified frameworks and libraries. Both Cells and Cycada have been
implemented in Android, and can run multiple Android virtual phones, and a mix of iOS and Android apps
on the same device with good performance. Because mobile computing has become increasingly important,
we also present a new way to teach operating systems in a mobile-centric way that incorporates the concepts
of geographic mobility, sensor data acquisition, and resource-constrained design considerations.
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Smartphones and tablets are increasingly ubiquitous, and many users rely on multiple mobile devices to
accommodate work, personal, and geographic mobility needs. Pervasive access to always-on mobile com-
puting has give rise to two inter-related computing phenomena. First, the preferred platform for a user’s
everyday computing needs is shifting away from traditional desktop and laptop computers towards mobile
smartphone and tablet devices [131]. Second, mobile devices are changing the way that computing platforms
are designed. The separation of hardware and software concerns in the traditional PC world is shifting to
vertically integrated software and hardware platforms that lock users into a particular mobile ecosystem.
Both business and personal users are using their smartphone and tablet devices more than traditional
desktop devices. Business professionals rely on mobile devices for pervasive access to email, Web browsing,
contact management, and location specific information. These same functions as well as the ability to play
games, listen to music, watch movies, and read e-books also make modern mobile devices an ideal personal
computing platform. Hundreds of thousands of applications are available for both business and personal
users to download and try through various online application stores. The ease of downloading new software
imposes a risk on users as malicious software can easily access sensitive data with the risk of corrupting it or
even leaking it to third parties [142]. For this reason, companies often lock down the smartphones they allow
to connect to the company network, and at least require the ability to wipe clean such smartphones if they
are lost, hacked, or their respective owner leaves the company. The result is that many users have to carry
separate work and personal phones. Application developers also carry additional phones for development
to avoid having a misbehaving application prototype corrupt their primary phone. Parents sometimes wish
1
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they had additional phones when their children use the parent’s smartphone for entertainment and end up
with unexpected charges due to accidental phone calls or unintended in-app purchases.
In addition to shifting users’ preferred computing platform, mobile devices are changing the way that
computing platforms are designed. The separation of hardware and software concerns in the traditional PC
world is shifting to vertically integrated platforms. Hardware components are integrated together in com-
pact devices using non-standard interfaces. Software is customized for the hardware, often using proprietary
libraries to interface with specialized hardware. Applications are tightly integrated with libraries and frame-
works, and often only available on particular hardware devices. These design decisions and the maturity
of the mobile market can limit user choice and stifle innovation. Users who want to run iOS gaming apps
on their smartphones are stuck with the smaller screen sizes of those devices. Users who prefer the larger
selection of hardware form factors available for Android are stuck with the poorer quality and selection of
Android games available compared to the well-populated Apple App Store [52]. Android users cannot ac-
cess the rich multimedia content available in Apple iTunes, and iOS users cannot easily access Flash-based
Web content. Some companies release cross-platform variants of their software, but this requires developers
to master many different graphical, system, and library APIs, and creates additional support and mainte-
nance burden on the company. Many developers who lack such resources choose one platform over another,
limiting user choice. Companies or researchers that want to build innovative new devices or mobile soft-
ware platforms are limited in the functionality they can provide because they lack access to the huge app
base of existing platforms. New platforms without an enormous pool of user apps face the difficult, if not
impossible, task of end user adoption, creating huge barriers to entry into the mobile device market.
Both of these computing phenomena have been historically addressed on desktop and server computers
using binary compatibility and virtual machines. Previous binary compatibility work has focused on desktop
systems. While some user-level solutions have been successful [115], most have incurred high overhead,
and none have been complete or efficient enough for resource constrained mobile devices. Virtual machines
(VMs) are useful for desktop and server computers to isolate and separate software stacks, and also run
applications intended for one platform on a different platform [126; 104]. VM mechanisms have even
been proposed that enable two separate and isolated instances of a smartphone software stack to run on
the same ARM hardware [97; 28; 43; 69]. These approaches require substantial modifications to both user
and kernel levels of the software stack. Paravirtualization is used in most cases since the most prevalent
ARM architectures are not virtualizable and new ARM virtualization extensions are not yet widely available
2
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in hardware. While VMs are useful for desktop and server computers, applying these same virtualization
techniques to smartphones has two crucial drawbacks. First, smartphones are more resource constrained,
and running an entire additional operating system (OS) and user space environment in a VM imposes high
overhead and limits the number of instances that can run. High overhead and slow system responsiveness
are much less acceptable on mobile devices than on a desktop or laptop computer because smartphones and
tablets are often used for minutes or even seconds at a time. Second, mobile devices are tightly integrated
hardware platforms that incorporate a plethora of devices using non-standard interfaces. Applications expect
to be able to directly use devices such as GPS, cameras, and GPUs. Existing virtualization approaches
provide no effective mechanism enabling applications to directly leverage these hardware device features
from within VMs This severely limits performance, and makes existing VM-based approaches unusable on
mobile devices.
My thesis is that lightweight mechanisms can be added to commodity operating systems to enable
multiple virtual phones or tablets to run at the same time on a physical smartphone or tablet device,
and to enable apps from multiple mobile platforms, such as iOS and Android, to run together on the
same physical device, all while maintaining the low-latency and responsiveness expected of modern mo-
bile devices. This dissertation presents two such lightweight operating system mechanism, virtualiza-
tion and binary compatibility, that enable multi-persona mobile computing. Chapter 2 presents Cells [4;
42], a mobile virtualization architecture enabling multiple virtual phones, or personas, to run simultane-
ously on the same physical cellphone. In chapter 3 we refine the concept of a persona from a full virtual
phone to the execution mode of a single thread, and present Cycada [6], an operating system compatibil-
ity architecture that can run applications built for different mobile ecosystems, namely iOS and Android,
together on the same device. Chapter 4 presents a detailed application of the Cycada architecture in the
context of advanced graphics and GPU device support in a binary compatibility system. Chapter 5 presents
some experiences and lessons learned while building the Cycada OS compatibility solution. Finally, because
mobile computing has become increasingly important, we present a new way of teaching operating systems
in a mobile-centric way [5]. Chapter 6 presents the details of our approach that incorporates the concepts of





As the preferred platform for a user’s everyday computing needs has shifted from desktop and laptop com-
puters to mobile devices, the risk of malicious applications gaining access to sensitive data has increased.
Corporations lock down smartphones given to employees, forcing them to carry separate work and personal
phones. Similarly, application developers often use multiple devices to mitigate the risk of malicious or
buggy applications corrupting their personal phone, and parents wish for a separate device where their child
cannot incur unexpected in-app purchases or inadvertently expose personal data to a malicious person or
application.
Cells is a lightweight virtualization architecture for enabling multiple personas, or virtual phones (VPs),
to run simultaneously on the same smartphone hardware with high performance. Cells does not require
running multiple OS instances. It uses lightweight OS virtualization to provide virtual namespaces that can
run multiple VPs on a single OS instance. Cells isolates VPs from one another, and ensures that buggy
or malicious applications running in one VP cannot adversely impact other VPs. Cells provides a novel
file system layout based on unioning to maximize sharing of common read-only code and data across VPs,
minimize memory consumption and enable additional VPs to be instantiated with very little overhead.
Cells takes advantage of the small display form factors of smartphones, which generally display only
a single application at a time, and introduces a usage model having one foreground VP that is displayed
and one or more background VPs that are not displayed at any given time. This simple yet powerful model
enables Cells to provide novel kernel-level and user-level device namespace mechanisms to efficiently mul-
tiplex hardware devices across multiple VPs, including proprietary or opaque hardware such as the baseband
4
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processor, while maintaining native hardware performance. The foreground VP is always given direct access
to hardware devices. Background VPs are given shared access to hardware devices when the foreground VP
does not require exclusive access. Visible applications are always running in the foreground VP and those
applications can take full advantage of any available hardware feature, such as hardware-accelerated graph-
ics. Since foreground applications have direct access to hardware, they perform as fast as when they are
running natively.
Cells provides individual telephone numbers for each VP without the need for multiple SIM cards
through using a VoIP service. Incoming and outgoing calls use the cellular network, not VoIP, and are
routed through the VoIP service as needed to provide both incoming and outgoing caller ID functionality for
each VP. Cells uses this combination of a VoIP service and the cellular network to allow users to make and
receive calls using their standard cell phone service while maintaining per-VP phone numbers and caller ID
features. Cells leverages all of the standard call multiplexing available in standard cellular technologies for
handling multiple calls for a single phone to handle multiple calls across virtual phones. For example, if a
user switches the foreground VP into the background during a phone call, Cells can place the active call on
hold and allow the user to make another outgoing call from the new foreground VP. Wi-Fi connections and
the cellular network used for data connectivity are fully supported and network connections are completely
isolated between VPs.
We have implemented a preliminary Cells prototype that supports multiple virtual Android phones on
the same mobile device. Each VP can be configured the same or completely different from other VPs.
The prototype has been tested to work with multiple versions of Android, including the most recent open-
source version, version 4.3. It works seamlessly across multiple hardware devices, including Google Nexus
1 and Nexus S phones, and an NVIDIA developer tablet. Our experimental results, demonstrate that Cells
imposes almost no runtime overhead and only modest memory overhead. Cells scales to support far more
phone instances on the same hardware than VM-based approaches. Cells is the first virtualization system
that fully supports available hardware devices with native performance including GPUs, sensors, cameras,
and touchscreens, and transparently runs all applications in VPs without any modifications.
In this chapter, we present the design and implementation of Cells. Section 2.1 describes the Cells usage
model. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the system architecture. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe graphics
and power management virtualization, respectively, using kernel device namespaces. Sections 2.5 and 2.6
describe telephony and wireless network virtualization, respectively, using user-level device namespaces.
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Section 2.7 presents experimental results. Section 2.8 discusses related work. Finally, we present some
concluding remarks.
2.1 Usage Model
Cells runs multiple VPs on a single hardware device. Each VP runs a standard Android environment ca-
pable of making phone calls, running unmodified Android applications, using data connections, interacting
through the touch screen, utilizing the accelerometer, and everything else that a user can normally do on the
hardware. Each VP is completely isolated from other VPs and cannot inspect, tamper with, or otherwise
access any other VP.
Given the limited size of smartphone screens and the ways in which smartphones are used, Cells only
allows a single VP, the foreground VP, to be displayed at any time. We refer to all other VPs that are running
but not displayed as, background VPs. Background VPs are still running on the system in the background
and are capable of receiving system events and performing tasks, but do not render content on the screen. A
user can easily switch among VPs by selecting one of the background VPs to become the foreground one.
This can be done, for example, using a custom key-combination to cycle through the set of running VPs, or
using a swipe gesture on the home screen of a VP. Each VP also has an application that can be launched
to see a list of available VPs, and to switch any of these to the foreground. The system can force a new
VP to become the foreground VP as a result of an event, such as an incoming call or text message. For
security and convenience reasons, a no-auto-switch parameter can be set to prevent background VPs from
being switched to the foreground without explicit user action, preventing background VPs from stealing
input focus or device data. An auto-lock parameter can also be enabled forcing a user to unlock a VP using
a passcode or gesture when it transitions from background to foreground. Section 2.2 discusses how the
foreground-background usage model is fundamental to the Cells virtualization architecture.
VPs are created and configured on a PC and downloaded to a mobile device via USB. A VP can be
deleted by the user, but its configuration is password protected and can only be changed from a PC given the
appropriate credentials. For example, a user can create a VP and can decide to later change various options
regarding how the VP is run and what devices it can access. On the other hand, IT administrators can also
create VPs that users can download or remove from their devices, but cannot be reconfigured by users. This
is useful for companies that may want to distribute locked down VPs.
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Each VP can be configured to have different access rights for different devices. For each device, a VP
can be configured to have no access, shared access, or exclusive access. Some settings may not be available
on certain devices; shared access is, for example, not available for the framebuffer since only a single VP is
displayed at any time. These per device access settings provide a highly flexible security model that can be
used to accommodate a wide range of security policies.
No access means that applications running in the VP cannot access the given device at any time. For
example, VPs with no access to the GPS sensor would never be able to track location despite any user ac-
ceptances of application requests to allow location tracking. Users often acquiesce to such privacy invasions
because an application will not work without such consent even if the application has no need for such in-
formation. By using the no access option, Cells enables IT administrators to create VPs that allow users to
install and run such applications without compromising privacy.
Shared access means that when a given VP is running in the foreground, other background VPs can
access the device at the same time. For example, a foreground VP with shared access to the audio device
would allow a background VP with shared access to play music.
Exclusive access means that when a given VP is running in the foreground, other background VPs are
not allowed to access the device. For example, a foreground VP with exclusive access to the microphone
would not allow background VPs to access the microphone, preventing applications running in background
VPs from eavesdropping on conversations or leaking information. This kind of functionality is essential for
supporting secure VPs. Exclusive access may be used in conjunction with the no-auto-switch to ensure that
events cannot cause a background VP to move to the foreground and gain access to devices as a means to
circumvent the exclusive access rights of another VP.
In addition to device access rights, Cells leverages existing OS virtualization technology to prevent
privilege escalation attacks in one VP from compromising the entire device. Both user credentials and








Full Android user 
space
Virtual Phone 2












































































Figure 2.1: Overview of Cells architecture
2.2 System Architecture
Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the Cells system architecture. We describe Cells using Android since our
prototype is based on it. Each VP runs a stock Android user space environment. Cells leverages lightweight
OS virtualization [103; 32] to isolate VPs from one another. Each VP has its own private virtual namespace
so that VPs can run concurrently and use the same OS resource names inside their respective namespaces,
yet be isolated from and not conflict with each other. This is done by transparently remapping OS resource
identifiers to virtual ones that are used by processes within each VP. File system paths, process identifiers
(PIDs), IPC identifiers, network interface names, and user names (UIDs) must all be virtualized to prevent
conflicts and ensure that processes running in one VP cannot see processes in other VPs. The Linux kernel,
including the version used by Android, provides virtualization for these identifiers through namespaces [32].
For example: the file system (FS) is virtualized using mount namespaces that allow different independent
views of the FS and provide isolated private FS jails for VPs [80]. Cells uses a single OS kernel across
all VPs that virtualizes identifiers, kernel interfaces, and hardware resources such that several complete
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execution environments, each containing several processes each running in their own Dalvik VM, can exist
side-by-side in virtual OS sandboxes.
Cells is complementary to the use of the Dalvik process virtual machine (VM) in Android. The Dalvik
VM is similar to a Java VM in that it provides a platform-independent environment for executing Java-
like bytecodes. In Android, each application is run using a separate process with its own Dalvik VM
instance. Dalvik provides some level of process isolation for each application, but all applications share
a single smartphone environment. Dalvik provides no mechanism to support multiple smartphone environ-
ments. On the other hand, Cells provides an abstraction for the entire Android user environment to support
multiple complete and isolated virtual smartphone environments. Each environment has its own system set-
tings, installed applications, and application-specific settings. While Dalvik process virtualization focuses
on enabling platform-independence and application isolation, Cells OS virtualization focuses on enabling
multiple complete and isolated smartphone or tablet environments.
Basic OS virtualization is, however, insufficient to run a complete smartphone or tablet user space en-
vironment. OS Virtualization mechanisms have primarily been used in headless server environments with
relatively few devices, such as networking and storage, which can already be virtualized in commodity OSes
such as Linux. These mechanisms have been extended to desktop computers by virtualizing industry stan-
dard interconnection protocols such as PCI or USB. Smartphone applications, however, expect to be able to
directly interact with a plethora of hardware devices, many of which are physically not designed to be multi-
plexed. Furthermore, tightly integrated smartphone hardware is generally accessed through vendor-specific
memory-mapped control interfaces, not industry standard interconnection protocols. OS device virtualiza-
tion support is non-existent for these devices. For Android, at least the devices listed in Table 2.1 must be
fully supported, which include both hardware devices and pseudo devices unique to the Android environ-
ment. Three requirements for supporting devices must be met: (1) Support exclusive or shared access across
VPs. (2) Never leak sensitive information between VPs. (3) Prevent malicious applications in one VP from
interfering with device access by another VPs.
Cells meets all three requirements in the tightly integrated, and often proprietary, smartphone ecosystem.
It does so by integrating novel kernel-level and user-level device virtualization methods to present a complete
virtual smartphone OS environment. Kernel-level mechanisms provide transparency and performance. User-




Alarm* Wake-lock aware RTC alarm timer
Audio Audio I/O (speakers, microphone)
Binder* IPC framework
Bluetooth Short range communication
Camera Video and still-frame input
Framebuffer Display output
GPU Graphics Processing Unit
Input Touchscreen and input buttons
LEDs Backlight and indicator LEDs
Logger* Lightweight RAM log driver
LMK* Low memory killer
Network Wi-Fi and Cellular data
Pmem* Contiguous physical memory allocator
Power* Power management framework
Radio Cellular phone (GSM, CDMA)
Sensors Accelerometer, GPS, proximity
Table 2.1: Android devices
* custom Google drivers
that can be leveraged for virtualization. For proprietary devices with completely closed software stacks,
user-level virtualization is necessary.
2.2.1 Kernel-Level Device Virtualization
Cells introduces a new kernel-level mechanism, device namespaces, that provides isolation and efficient
hardware resource multiplexing in a manner that is completely transparent to applications. Figure 2.1 shows
how device namespaces are implemented within the overall Cells architecture. Unlike PID or UID names-
paces in the Linux kernel, which virtualize process identifiers, a device namespace does not virtualize iden-
tifiers. It is designed to be used by individual device drivers or kernel subsystems to tag data structures and
to register callback functions. Callback functions are called when a device namespace changes state. Each
VP uses a unique device namespace for device interaction. Cells leverages its foreground-background VP
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usage model to register callback functions that are called when the VP changes between foreground and
background state. This enables devices to be aware of the VP state and change how they respond to a VP
depending on whether it is visible to the user and therefore the foreground VP, or not visible to the user
and therefore one of potentially multiple background VPs. The usage model is crucial for enabling Cells to
virtualize devices efficiently and cleanly.
Cells virtualizes existing kernel interfaces based on three methods of implementing device namespace
functionality. The first method is to create a device driver wrapper using a new device driver for a virtual
device. The wrapper device then multiplexes access and communicates on behalf of applications to the real
device driver. The wrapper typically passes through all requests from the foreground VP, and updates device
state and access to the device when a new VP becomes the foreground VP. For example, Cells use a device
driver wrapper to virtualize the framebuffer device as described in Section 2.3.1.
The second method is to modify a device subsystem to be aware of device namespaces. For example,
the input device subsystem in Linux handles various devices such as the touchscreen, navigation wheel,
compass, GPS, proximity sensor, light sensor, headset input controls, and input buttons. The input subsystem
consists of the input core, device drivers, and event handlers, the latter being responsible for passing input
events to user space. By default in Linux, input events are sent to any process that is listening for them,
but this does not provide the isolation needed for supporting VPs. To enable the input subsystem to use
device namespaces, Cells only has to modify the event handlers so that, for each process listening for input
events, event handlers first check if the corresponding device namespace is in the foreground. If it is not,
the event is not raised to that specific process. The implementation is simple, and no changes are required
to device drivers or the input core. As another example, virtualization of the power management subsystem
is described in Section 2.4.
The third method of kernel-level device namespace virtualization is to modify a device driver to be aware
of device namespaces. For example, Android includes a number of custom pseudo drivers which are not
part of an existing kernel subsystem, such as the Binder IPC mechanism. To provide isolation among VPs,
Cells needs to ensure that under no circumstances can a process in one VP gain access to Binder instances in
another VP. This is done by modifying the Binder driver so that instead of allowing Binder data structures to
reference a single global list of all processes, they reference device namespace isolated lists and only allow
communication between processes associated with the same device namespace. A Binder device namespace
context is only initialized when the Binder device file is first opened, resulting in almost no overhead for
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future accesses. While the device driver itself needs to be modified, pseudo device drivers are not hardware-
specific and thus changes only need to be made once for all hardware platforms. In some cases, however, it
may be necessary to modify a hardware-specific device driver to make it aware of device namespaces. For
most devices, this is straightforward and involves duplicating necessary driver state upon device namespace
creation and tagging the data describing that state with the device namespace. Even this can be avoided
if the device driver provides some basic capabilities as described in Section 2.3.2, which discusses GPU
virtualization.
2.2.2 User-Level Device Virtualization
In addition to kernel-level device namespace mechanisms, Cells introduces a user-level device namespace
proxy mechanism that offers similar functionality for devices, such as the cellular baseband processor, that
are proprietary and entirely closed source. Cells also uses this mechanism to virtualize device configuration,
such as Wi-Fi, which occurs in user space. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 describe how this user-level proxy approach
is used to virtualize telephony and wireless network configuration.
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between VPs, kernel-level device namespaces, and user-level device
namespace proxies which are contained in a root namespace. Cells works by booting a minimal init envi-
ronment in a root namespace which is not visible to any VP and is used to manage individual VPs. The root
namespace is considered part of the trusted computing base and processes in the root namespace have full
access to the entire file system. The init environment starts a custom process, CellD, which manages the
starting and switching of VPs between operating in the background or foreground. Kernel device names-
paces export an interface to the root namespace through the /proc filesystem that is used to switch the
foreground VP and set access permissions for devices. CellD also coordinates user space virtualization
mechanisms such as the configuration of telephony and wireless networking which are discussed in Sec-
tions 2.5 and 2.6 respectively.
To start a new VP, CellD mounts the VP filesystem, clones itself into a new process with separate
namespaces, and starts the VP’s init process to boot up the user space environment. CellD also sets up the
limited set of IPC sockets accessible to processes in the VP for communicating with the root namespace.
The controlled set of IPC sockets is the only mechanism that can be used for communicating with the root
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namespace; all other IPC mechanism are internal to the respective VP. Cells also leverages existing Linux
kernel frameworks for resource control to prevent resource starvation from a single VP [79].
2.2.3 Scalability and Security
Cells uses three scalability techniques to enable multiple VPs running the same Android environment to
share code and reduce memory usage. First, the same base file system is shared read-only among VPs.
To provide a read-write file system view for a VP, file system unioning [135] is used to join the read-only
base file system with a writable file system layer by stacking the latter on top of the former. This creates
a unioned view of the two: file system objects, namely files and directories, from the writable layer are
always visible, while objects from the read-only layer are only visible if no corresponding object exists
in the other layer. Second, when a new VP is started, Cells enables Linux Kernel Samepage Merging
(KSM) for a short time to further reduce memory usage by finding anonymous memory pages used by the
user space environment that have the same contents, then arranging for one copy to be shared among the
various VPs [127]. Third, Cells leverages the Android low memory killer to increase the total number of
VPs it is possible to run on a device without sacrificing functionality. The Android low memory killer kills
background and inactive processes consuming large amounts of RAM. Android starts these processes purely
as an optimization to reduce application startup-time, so these processes can be killed and restarted without
any loss of functionality. Critical system processes are never chosen to be killed, and if the user requires the
services of a background process which was killed, the process is simply restarted.
Cells uses four techniques to isolate all VPs from the root namespace and from one another, thereby se-
curing both system and individual VP data from malicious reads or writes. First, user credentials, virtualized
through UID namespaces, isolate the root user in one VP from the root user in the root namespace or the root
user in any other VP. Second, kernel-level device namespaces isolate device access and associated data; no
data or device state may be accessed outside a VP’s device namespace. Third, mount namespaces provide
a unique and separate FS view for each VP; no files belonging to one VP may be accessed by another VP.
Fourth, CellD removes the capability to create device nodes inside a VP, preventing processes from gaining
direct access to Linux devices outside their environment, e.g., by re-mounting block devices. These isolation
techniques secure Cells system data from each VP, and individual VP data from other VPs. For example, a
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privilege escalation or root attack compromising one VP has no access to the root namespace or any other
VP, and cannot use device node creation or super-user access to read or write data in any other VP.
2.3 Graphics
The display and its associated graphics hardware are some of the most important devices in smartphones.
Applications expect to take full advantage of any hardware display acceleration or graphics processing unit
(GPU) available on the smartphone. In fact, modern mobile operating systems make heavy use of hard-
ware graphics acceleration for simple user interactions such as swiping between home screens or displaying
menus, and the smooth hardware-assisted graphics is crucial for a rich user experience. Android, for ex-
ample, uses a process called the SurfaceFlinger to compose application windows onto the screen. The
SurfaceFlinger process uses the GPU to efficiently blend, animate, or transition application windows for
display. Android also makes the GPU available to individual applications through the Open Graphics Li-
brary embedded systems API, or OpenGL ES. This library specifies a standard interface to accelerated 2D
and 3D graphics processing hardware.
Cells virtualizes the display and drawing hardware at two distinct yet interconnected layers: the Linux
framebuffer interface used for basic display rendering, and the GPU used by OpenGL for more advanced
drawing operations. The standard Linux framebuffer interface used by Android provides an abstraction to
a physical display device through a piece of memory called screen memory. Screen memory is dedicated
to and controlled exclusively by the display device, and its contents correspond exactly to pixels shown on
the display. For performance reasons, screen memory is mapped and written to directly by both user space
processes and GPU hardware. The GPU, however, is only manipulated by user space processes through an
OpenGL API, and while the API itself is open, its implementation is often proprietary. The performance
critical nature of graphics processing, direct memory mapping of screen memory to processes and kernel
drivers, and the use of proprietary drawing libraries present new challenges for virtualizing mobile devices.
2.3.1 Framebuffer
To virtualize framebuffer access in multiple VPs, Cells leverages the kernel-level device namespace and
its foreground-background usage model in a new multiplexing framebuffer device driver, mux fb, which
serves as a simple, device-independent wrapper to a hardware framebuffer driver. The mux fb driver regis-
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ters as a standard framebuffer device and multiplexes access to a single physical device. The foreground VP
is given exclusive access to the screen memory and display hardware while each background VP maintains
virtual hardware state and renders any output to a virtual screen memory buffer in system RAM, referred to
as the backing buffer. VP access to the mux fb driver is isolated through the VP’s associated device names-
pace such that a unique virtual device state and backing buffer is associated with each VP. The mux fb
driver currently supports multiplexing a single physical framebuffer device, but more complicated multi-
plexing schemes involving multiple physical devices could be accomplished in a similar manner.
In Linux, the basic framebuffer usage pattern involves three types of accesses: mmaps, standard control
ioctls, and custom ioctls. When a process mmaps an open framebuffer device file, the driver is
expected to map its associated screen memory into the process’ address space allowing the process to render
directly on the display. A process controls and configures the framebuffer hardware state through a set of
standard control ioctls defined by the Linux framebuffer interface which can, for example, change the
pixel format. Each framebuffer device may also define custom ioctls which can be used to perform
accelerated drawing or rendering operations.
Cells passes all accesses to the mux fb device from the foreground VP directly to the hardware driver.
This includes control ioctls as well as custom ioctls, allowing applications in the foreground VP to
take full advantage of any custom ioctls implemented by the physical device driver and used, for example,
to accelerate rendering. When an application running in the foreground VP mmaps an open mux fb device,
the mux fb driver simply maps the physical screen memory controlled by the hardware driver. This creates
the same zero-overhead pass-through to the screen memory as on native systems.
Cells does not pass any accesses to the mux fb driver from background VPs to the hardware back end,
ensuring that the foreground VP has exclusive hardware access. Standard control ioctls are applied to
virtual hardware state maintained in RAM. Custom ioctls, by definition, perform non-standard functions
such as graphics acceleration or memory allocation, and therefore accesses to these functions from back-
ground VPs must be at least partially handled by the hardware driver which defined them. Instead of passing
the ioctl to the hardware driver, Cells uses a new notification API that allows the hardware driver to ap-
propriately virtualize the access. If the hardware driver does not register for this new notification, Cells can
handle custom ioctls in one of two ways. One way would be to simply return an error code. Another way
would be to block the calling process when the custom ioctl is called from a background VP; the process
would be unblocked when the VP is switched into the foreground, allowing the ioctl to be handled by
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the hardware driver. Returning an error code was sufficient for both the Nexus 1 and Nexus S systems. If
returning an error code causes the background VP to become unstable, Cells can block the calling process
allowing the ioctl to be handled by the hardware driver once the VP is switched into the foreground. When
an application running in a background VP mmaps the framebuffer device, the mux fb driver will map
the appropriate backing buffer into the process’ virtual address space. This gives applications running in
background VPs zero-overhead access to virtualized screen memory.
Not only do background VPs have zero-overhead access to virtual screen memory, but Cells also pro-
vides each background VP direct access to drawing hardware when it is switched into the foreground.
Switching the display from a foreground VP to a background VP is accomplished in four steps, all of which
must occur before any additional framebuffer operations are performed:
1. Screen memory remapping.
2. Screen memory deep copy.
3. Hardware state synchronization.
4. GPU coordination.
Screen memory remapping is done by altering the page table entries for each process which has mapped
framebuffer screen memory, and redirecting virtual addresses in each process to new physical locations.
Processes running in the VP which is to be moved into the background have their virtual addresses remapped
to backing memory in system RAM, and processes running in the VP which is to become the foreground
have their virtual addresses remapped to physical screen memory. The screen memory deep copy is done by
copying the contents of the screen memory into the previous foreground VP’s backing buffer and copying the
contents of the new foreground VP’s backing buffer into screen memory. This copy is not strictly necessary
if the new foreground VP completely redraws the screen. Hardware state synchronization is done by saving
the current hardware state into the virtual state of the previous foreground VP and then setting the current
hardware state to the new foreground VP’s virtual hardware state. Because the display device only uses
the current hardware state to output the screen memory, there is no need to correlate particular drawing
updates with individual standard control ioctls; only the accumulated virtual hardware state is needed
thus avoiding costly record/replay of framebuffer ioctls. GPU coordination, discussed in Section 2.3.2,
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involves notifying the GPU of the screen memory address switch so that it can update any internal graphics
memory mappings.
To better scale the Cells framebuffer virtualization, backing buffers in system RAM could be reduced
to a single memory page which is mapped into the entire screen memory virtual address region of back-
ground VPs. This optimization not only saves memory, but also eliminates the need for the screen memory
deep copy. However, it does require the VP’s user space environment to redraw the entire screen when it
becomes the foreground VP. Fortunately, redraw overhead is minimal, and Android conveniently provides
this functionality through the fbearlysuspend driver discussed in Section 2.4.1.
In our testing, we found that the Android gralloc library (used to allocate graphics memory for appli-
cations) used framebuffer device identification information, such as the name of the driver, to enable or
disable graphics functionality. In some cases, the gralloc library would generate errors when unexpected
values were returned by the framebuffer driver. To solve this problem, the mux fb driver replicates the
identifying information of the hardware driver. Thus, to all user space programs, the device looks exactly
like the underlying physical device which is being multiplexed.
2.3.2 GPU
Modern smartphone users expect a smooth, responsive, and highly polished experience from the user inter-
face. Poor quality graphics or clunky animations give users an out-dated or “old” experience, e.g., the lock
screen should not simply disappear, it should smoothly transition to a home screen or application perhaps by
making icons appear to “fly” onto the screen. Smartphone manufacturers use dedicated graphics processing
units, GPUs, to efficently render these complicated animations. Applications running on the smartphone
can also expect to use the GPU to render application specific graphics such as scenes in a video game, or
custom animations such as a paper-like page curl in a document reader. This means that all VPs running
on the smartphone require simultaneous, isolated access to the computational power of the GPU. However,
virtualization of graphics resources is an extremely challenging problem for two primary reasons.
First, there is no standard operating system interface to the GPU. A user space application interacts with
the GPU solely through a graphics API such as OpenGL. GPU hardware vendors provide an implementation
of the OpenGL library which interacts with the physical graphics hardware through often proprietary or
opaque interfaces. Details of the GPU hardware and OpenGL library implementation are kept as closely
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guarded industry secrets. Graphics driver integration with existing operating system kernel mechanisms such
as memory management are generally obfuscated by the closed nature of both the hardware and software
using the OS. This leads to unnecessarily duplicated or overlapping functionality in the driver and user space
libraries.
Second, graphics APIs such as the OpenGL API guarantee processes graphics memory isolation; one
process may not access the graphics memory of another process. Modern GPUs accomplish this using their
own hardware memory management unit (MMU) to translate “device virtual addresses” into physically
addressable RAM. Memory allocated for graphics processing must therefore be accessible by three different
systems, the OS kernel, the user space process, and the GPU, in four different address spaces, user virtual,
GPU device virtual, kernel linear, and physical addresses. While it is a primary task of the operating system
to manage memory, the closed nature of graphics hardware and software forces GPU device driver and
graphics library developers to write custom memory management infrastructures with knowledge of the
device specifics. In some cases, small pieces of software run directly on the GPU to handle hardware
events such as IRQs and memory page faults [70]. This autonomy from core operating system management
infrastructure creates a challenging virtualization problem.
Cells solves these challenges, and virtualizes the GPU by leveraging the existing graphics API and GPU
hardware isolation mechanisms in combination with screen memory virtualization similar to the framebuffer
virtualization described in Section 2.3.1. Because each VP is essentially an isolated collection of processes
running on the same operating system kernel, a VP can be given direct pass-through access to the GPU
device. The graphics API, such as OpenGL used in Android, utilizes GPU hardware isolation mechanisms,
through the single OS kernel driver, to run each process in its own graphics context. Entire VPs are isolated
from one another through these graphics contexts, and therefore no further GPU isolation is required. How-
ever, each VP requires isolated screen memory on which to compose the final scene displayed to the user,
and in general the GPU driver requests and uses this memory directly from within the OS kernel.
Cells solves this problem by leveraging its foreground-background usage model to provide a virtual-
ization solution similar to framebuffer screen memory remapping. The foreground VP uses the GPU to
render directly into screen memory, while background VPs will use the same GPU, through the previously
discussed isolation mechanisms, to render into their respective backing buffers. When switching the fore-
ground VP, the GPU driver locates all GPU virtual addresses allocated by the current foreground VP and
mapped to the screen memory, and remaps them to point to the VP’s backing buffer. Correspondingly,
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the GPU driver locates GPU addresses allocated by the selected background VP and mapped to its back-
ing buffer, and remaps them to point to screen memory. To accomplish this remapping, Cells provides a
callback interface from the mux fb driver that provides source and destination physical addresses on each
foreground VP switch. This allows the driver to properly locate and switch GPU virtual address mappings.
While this technique necessitates a certain level of access to the GPU driver, it does not preclude the
possibility of using a proprietary driver so long as it exposes three basic capabilities. Any driver which
implements the Cells GPU virtualization mechanism must provide the ability to:
1. Remap GPU device virtual addresses to specified physical addresses.
2. Safely reinitialize the GPU device or ignore re-initialization attempts as each VP running an unmodi-
fied user space configuration will attempt to initialize the GPU on startup.
3. Ignore device power management and other non-graphics related hardware state updates, making it
possible to ignore such events from a user space instance running in a background VP.
Some of these capabilities were already available in the Adreno GPU driver, used in the Nexus 1, but not
all. We added a modest number of lines of code to the Adreno GPU driver and PowerVR GPU driver, used in
the Nexus S, to implement these three capabilities. For the Linux kernel version 2.6.35 used with Android
version 2.3.3, We added or changed less than 200 lines of code in the Adreno GPU driver and less than 500
lines of code in the PowerVR GPU driver. These are relatively small changes, given that the Adreno GPU
driver is almost 6,000 lines of code and the PowerVR GPU driver is almost 50,000 lines of code.
While most modern GPUs include an MMU, there are some devices which require memory used by the
GPU to be physically contiguous. For example, the Adreno GPU can selectively disable the use of the MMU.
For Cells GPU virtualization to work under these conditions, the backing memory in system RAM must be
physically contiguous. This can be done by allocating the backing memory either with kmalloc, or using
an alternate physical memory allocator such as Google’s pmem driver or Samsung’s s3c mem driver.
2.4 Power Management




1. background VPs should not be able to put the device into a low power mode
2. background VPs should not prevent the foreground VP from putting the device into a low power mode
We apply these principles to Android’s custom power management, which is based on the premise that
a mobile phone’s preferred state should be suspended. Android introduces three interfaces which attempt to
extend the battery life of mobile devices through extremely aggressive power management: early suspend,
fbearlysuspend, and wake locks, also known as suspend blockers [137].
The early suspend subsystem is an ordered callback interface allowing drivers to receive notifications
just before a device is suspended and after it resumes. Cells virtualizes this subsystem by disallowing back-
ground VPs from initiating suspend operations. The remaining two Android-specific power management
interfaces present unique challenges and offer insights into aggressive power management virtualization.
2.4.1 Frame Buffer Early Suspend
The fbearlysuspend driver exports display device suspend and resume state into user space. This allows user
space to block all processes using the display while the display is powered off, and redraw the screen after
the display is powered on. Power is saved since the overall device workload is lower and devices such as
the GPU may be powered down or made quiescent. Android implements this functionality with two sysfs
files, wait for fb sleep and wait for fb wake. When a user process opens and reads from one of
these files, the read blocks until the framebuffer device is either asleep or awake, respectively.
Cells virtualizes fbearlysuspend by making it namespace aware, leveraging the kernel-level device
namespace and foreground-background usage model. In the foreground VP, reading these two sysfs files
functions exactly as a non-virtualized system. Reads from a background VP always report the device as
sleeping. When the foreground VP switches, all processes in all VPs blocked on either of the two files
are unblocked, and the return values from the read calls are based on the new state of the VP in which the
process is running. Processes in the new foreground VP see the display as awake, processes in the formerly
foreground VP see the display as asleep, and processes running in background VPs that remain in the back-
ground continue to see the display as asleep. This forces background VPs to pause drawing or rendering
which reduces overall system load by reducing the number of processes using hardware drawing resources,





Power management in Android is predicated on the notion that the base state of the smartphone device should
be low-power mode. Processes or kernel drivers must explicitly request that the device remain active. This
is accomplished through wake locks, or suspend blockers [136; 137], and a corresponding kernel subsystem
that uses a timer to opportunistically suspend the device even if processes are still running.
Wake locks are a special kind of OS kernel reference counter with two states: active and inactive. When
a wake lock is “locked”, its state is changed to active; when “unlocked,” its state is changed to inactive. A
wake lock can be locked multiple times, but only requires a single unlock to put it into the inactive state.
The Android system will not enter suspend, or low power mode, until all wake locks are inactive. When
all locks are inactive, the suspend timer is started. If the timer expires without an intervening lock then the
device is powered down.
Wake locks in a background VP interfering with the foreground VP’s ability to suspend the device
coupled with their distributed use and initialization make wake locks a challenging virtualization problem.
Wake locks can be created statically at compile time or dynamically by kernel drivers or user space. They
can also be locked and unlocked from user context, kernel context (work queues), and interrupt context (IRQ
handlers) independently, making determination of the VP to which a wake lock belongs a non-trivial task.
Cells leverages the kernel-level device namespace and foreground-background usage model to maintain
both kernel and user space wake lock interfaces while adhering to the two virtualization principles specified
above. The solution is predicated on three assumptions. First, all lock and unlock coordination in the trusted
root namespace was correct and appropriate before virtualization. Second, we trust the kernel and its drivers,
i.e., when a lock or unlock is called from interrupt context, we perform the operation unconditionally. Third,
the foreground VP maintains full control of the hardware.
Under these assumptions, Cells virtualizes Android wake locks using device namespaces to tag lock and
unlock operations. Multiple device namespaces can independently lock and unlock the same wake lock, and
power management operations are only initiated based on the state of the set of locks associated with the
foreground VP. The solution comprises the following set of rules:
1. When a wake lock is locked, a namespace “token” is associated with the lock indicating the context
in which the lock was taken. A wake lock token may contain references to multiple namespaces if the
lock was taken from those namespaces.
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2. When a wake lock is unlocked from user context, remove the associated namespace token.
3. When a wake lock is unlocked from interrupt context or the root namespace, remove all lock tokens.
This follows from our explicit trust of the kernel and its drivers.
4. After a user context lock or unlock, adjust any suspend timeout value based only on locks acquired in
the foreground VP’s device namespace.
5. After a root namespace lock or unlock, adjust the suspend timeout based on the foreground VP’s
device namespace.
6. When the foreground VP changes, reset the suspend timeout based on locks acquired in the device
namespace of the new foreground VP. This requires per-namespace bookkeeping of suspend timeout
values.
One additional mechanism is necessary to implement the Cells wake lock virtualization. The set of rules
given above implicitly assumes that, aside from interrupt context, the lock and unlock functions are aware
of the device namespace in which the operation is being performed. While this is true for operations started
from user context, it is not the case for operations performed from kernel work queues. To address this issue,
we introduce a mechanism which executes a kernel work queue in a specific device namespace.
2.5 Telephony
Cells provides each VP with separate telephony functionality enabling per-VP call logs, and independent
phone numbers. We first describe how Cells virtualizes the radio stack to provide telephony isolation among
VPs, then we discuss how multiple phone numbers can be provided on a single physical phone using the
standard carrier voice network and a single SIM.
2.5.1 RIL Proxy
The Android telephony subsystem is designed to be easily ported by phone vendors to different hardware
devices. The Android phone application uses a set of Java libraries and services that handle the telephony
state and settings such as displaying current radio strength in the status bar, and selection of different roaming






























Figure 2.2: Cells Radio Interface Layer
Radio Interface Layer (RIL) Daemon (RilD). RilD dynamically links with a library provided by the phone
hardware vendor which in turn communicates with kernel drivers and the radio baseband system. The left
side of Figure 2.2 shows the standard Android telephony system.
The entire radio baseband system is proprietary and closed source, starting from the user-level RIL
vendor library down to the physically separate hardware baseband processor. Details of the vendor library
implementation and its communication with the baseband are well-guarded secrets. Each hardware phone
vendor provides its own proprietary radio stack. Since the stack is a complete black box, it would be difficult
if not impossible to intercept, replicate, or virtualize any aspect of this system in the kernel without direct
hardware vendor support. Furthermore, the vendor library is designed to be used by only a single RilD and
the radio stack as a whole is not designed to be multiplexed.
As a result of these constraints, Cells virtualizes telephony using our user-level device namespace proxy
in a solution designed to work transparently with the black box radio stack. Each VP has the standard An-
droid telephony Java libraries and services and its own stock RilD, but rather than having RilD communicate
directly with the hardware vendor provided RIL library, Cells provides its own proxy RIL library in each
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VP. The proxy RIL library is loaded by RilD in each VP and connects to CellD running in the root names-
pace. CellD then communicates with the hardware vendor library to use the proprietary radio stack. Since
there can be only one radio stack, CellD loads the vendor RIL library on system startup and multiplexes
access to it. We refer to the proxy RIL library together with CellD as the RIL proxy. The right side of Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the Cells Android telephony system, which has three key features. First, no hardware vendor
support is required since it treats the radio stack as a black box. Second, it works with a stock Android
environment since Android does not provide its own RIL library but instead relies on a hardware-specific,
vendor-provided RIL implementation. Third, it operates at a well-defined interface, making it possible to
understand exactly how communication is done between RilD and the RIL library it uses.
Cells leverages its foreground-background model to enable the necessary multiplexing of the radio stack.
Users can only make calls from the foreground VP, since only its user interface is displayed. Therefore
CellD allows only the foreground VP to make calls. All other forms of multiplexing are done in response to
incoming requests from the radio stack through CellD. CellD uses the vendor RIL library in the same manner
as Android’s RilD, and can therefore take full advantage of the well-defined RIL API. CellD uses existing
RIL commands to leverage existing network features to provide call multiplexing among VPs. For example,
standard call multiplexing in Android allows for an active call to be placed on hold while answering or
making another call. Since CellD intercepts incoming call notifications and outgoing call requests, it can
forward an incoming call notification to a background VP even while there is an active call in the foreground
VP. CellD can then place the foreground call on hold by issuing the same set of RIL commands that the
Android phone application would normally issue to place a call on hold, switch the receiving background
VP to the foreground, and let the new foreground VP answer the call. In the same way, if a user switches
a foreground VP to the background, and the system is configured to place active foreground calls on hold
when this happens, CellD can allow the new foreground VP to place a new call while the existing call is on
hold in the background.
The RIL proxy needs to support the two classes of function calls defined by the RIL, solicited calls
which pass from RilD to the RIL library, and unsolicited calls which pass from the RIL library to RilD.
The interface is relatively simple, as there are only four defined solicited function calls and two defined
unsolicited function calls, though there are a number of possible arguments. Both the solicited requests and
the responses carry structured data in their arguments. The structured data can contain pointers to nested data





ForegroundSet Screen State Solicited
Set Radio State Solicited
SIM I/O Solicited Initialization
Signal Strength Unsolicited Radio Info
Call State Changed Unsolicited
Phone CallsCall Ring Unsolicited
Get Current Calls Solicited
Table 2.2: Filtered RIL commands
implementation assumption in Android that the RIL vendor library is normally loaded in the RilD process
so that pointers can be passed between the RIL library and RilD. In Cells, the RIL vendor library is loaded
in the CellD process instead of the RilD process and the RIL proxy passes the arguments over a standard
Unix Domain socket so all data must be thoroughly packed and unpacked on either side.
The basic functionality of the RIL proxy is to pass requests sent from within a VP unmodified to the
vendor RIL library and to forward unsolicited calls from the vendor RIL library to RilD inside a VP. CellD
filters requests as needed to disable telephony functionality for VPs that are configured not to have tele-
phony access. However, even in the absence of such VP configurations, some solicited requests must be
filtered from background VPs and some calls require special handling to properly support our foreground-
background model and provide working isolated telephony. The commands that require filtering or special
handling are shown in Table 2.2 and can be categorized as those involving the foreground VP, initialization,
radio info, and phone calls.
Foreground commands are allowed only from the foreground VP. The Dial Request command represents
outgoing calls, Set Screen State is used to suppress certain notifications like signal strength, and Set Radio
State is used to turn the radio on or off. Set Screen State is filtered from background VPs by only changing
a per-VP variable in CellD that suppresses notifications to the issuing background VP accordingly. Dial
Request and Set Radio State are filtered from all background VPs by returning an error code to the calling
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background VP. This ensures that background VPs do not interfere with the foreground VP’s exclusive
ability to place calls.
Initialization commands are run once on behalf of the first foreground VP to call them. The SIM I/O
command is used to communicate directly with the SIM card, and is called during radio initialization (when
turning on the device or turning off airplane mode), and when querying SIM information such as the IMSI.
The first time a VP performs a SIM I/O command, CellD records an ordered log of commands, associated
data, and corresponding responses. This log is used to replay responses from the vendor RIL library when
other VPs attempt SIM I/O commands. When the radio is turned off, the log is cleared, and the first fore-
ground VP to turn on the radio will be allowed to do so, causing CellD to start recording a new log. CellD
also records the radio state between each SIM I/O command to properly replay any state transitions. The
record/replay implementation properly virtualizes SIM I/O commands by initializing the proprietary base-
band stack only exactly when needed and by simulating expected behavior to background VPs that perform
SIM I/O initialization commands.
Radio Info commands are innocuous and are broadcast to all VPs. Signal Strength is an unsolicited
notification about the current signal strength generated by the vendor library. CellD re-broadcasts this infor-
mation to all VPs with one exception. During initialization, a VP cannot be notified of the signal strength
since that would indicate an already initialized radio and generate errors in the VP running the initialization
commands.
The Phone Call commands, Call State Changed, Call Ring, and Get Current Calls, notify a VP of
incoming calls and call state changes. When an incoming call occurs, a Call State Changed notification is
sent, followed by a number of Call Ring notifications for as long as the call is pending. CellD inspects each
notification and determines the VP to which it should forward the notification. However, this is somewhat
complicated since the notifications are independent and neither notification contains a phone number. When
there is an incoming call on an unmodified phone, RilD also receives the Call State Changed and Call Ring
notifications, but issues a Get Current Calls command to retrieve the caller ID and display caller information
to the user. CellD mirrors this behavior by queueing the incoming call notifications and by issuing the Get
Current Calls to receive a list of all incoming and active calls. Using tagging information encoded in the
caller ID as discussed in Section 2.5.2, CellD determines the target VP and passes the queued notifications
into the appropriate VP. When a VP subsequently issues a Get Current Calls request, CellD simply forwards
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the request (which can be issued multiple times) to the vendor library, but intercepts the data returned from
the vendor library and only returns data from calls directed to, or initiated from the requesting VP.
CellD’s architecture supports a highly configurable implementation, and there are many valid security
configuration scenarios. For example, if the user switches the foreground VP during a call, CellD can either
drop the call and switch to the new VP, keep the call alive and switch to a new VP (handling the active
call in a background VP), or, deny switching to a new VP until the call is ended by the user. Under all
configurations, Cells provides strict isolation between every VP by not allowing any information pertaining
to a specific VP to be revealed to another VP including incoming and outgoing call information and phone
call voice data.
2.5.2 Multiple Phone Numbers
While some smartphones support multiple SIM cards, which makes supporting multiple phone numbers
straightforward, most phones do not provide this feature. Since mobile network operators do not generally
offer multiple phone numbers per SIM card or CDMA phone, we offer an alternative system to provide a
distinct phone number for each VP on existing unmodified single SIM card phones, which dominate the
market. Our approach is based on pairing Cells with a VoIP service that enables telephony with the standard
cellular voice network and standard Android applications, but with separate phone numbers.
The Cells VoIP service consists of a VoIP server which registers a pool of subscriber numbers and pairs
each of them with the carrier provided number associated with a user’s SIM. The VoIP server receives
incoming calls, forwards them to a user’s actual phone number using the standard cellular voice network,
and passes the incoming caller ID to the user’s phone appending a digit denoting the VP to which the call
should be delivered. When CellD receives the incoming call list, it checks the last digit of the caller ID
and chooses a VP based on that digit. Cells allows users to configure which VP should handle which digit
through the VoIP service interface. CellD strips the appended digit before forwarding call information to the
receiving VP resulting in correctly displayed caller IDs within the VP. If the VP is not available, the VoIP
service will direct the incoming call to a server-provided voice mail. We currently use a single digit scheme
supporting a maximum of ten selectable VPs, which should be more than sufficient for any user. While it
is certainly possible to spoof caller ID, in the worst case, this would simply appear to be a case of dialing
the wrong phone number. Our VoIP service is currently implemented using an Asterisk [26] server as it
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provides unique functionality not available through other commercial voice services. For example, although
Google Voice can forward multiple phone numbers to the same land line, it does not provide this capability
for mobile phone numbers, and does not provide arbitrary control over outgoing caller ID [60].
The caller ID of outgoing calls should also be replaced with the phone number of the VP that actually
makes the outgoing call instead of the mobile phone’s actual mobile phone number. Unfortunately, the
GSM standard does not have any facility to change the caller ID, only to either enable or disable showing
the caller ID. Therefore, if the VP is configured to display outgoing caller IDs, Cells ensures that they are
correctly sent by routing those calls through the VoIP server. CellD intercepts the Dial Request, dials the
VoIP service subscriber number associated with the dialing VP, and passes the actual number to be dialed
via DTMF tones. The VoIP server interprets the tones, dials the requested number, and connects the call.
Note that Cells only leverages a VoIP service for multiple phone number support. It does not use VoIP
from the smartphone itself. All incoming and outgoing calls from the smartphone are regular calls placed
on the cellular network. As a result, Cells provides the same kind of call quality and reliability of regular
cell phones, especially in geographic locations in which data network coverage can be poor.
2.6 Networking
Mobile devices are commonly equipped with an IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN (WLAN) adapter and cellular
data connectivity through either a GSM or CDMA network. Each VP that has network access must be
able to use either WLAN or cellular data depending on what is available to the user at any given location.
At the same time, each VP must be completely isolated from other VPs. Cells integrates both kernel and
user-level virtualization to provide necessary isolation and functionality, including core network resource
virtualization and a unique wireless configuration management virtualization.
Cells leverages previous kernel-level work [117; 118] that virtualizes core network resources such as
IP addresses, network adapters, routing tables, and port numbers. This functionality has been largely built
in to recent versions of the Linux kernel in the form of network namespaces [32]. Virtual identifiers are
provided in VPs for all network resources, which are then translated into physical identifiers. Real network
devices representing the WLAN or cellular data connection are not visible within a VP. Instead, a virtual
Ethernet pair is setup from the root namespace where one end is present inside a VP and the other end is in
the root namespace. The kernel is then configured to perform Network Address Translation (NAT) between
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the active public interface (either WLAN or cellular data) and the VP-end of a virtual Ethernet pair. Each
VP is then free to bind to any socket address and port without conflicting with other VPs. Cells uses NAT
as opposed to bridged networking since bridging is not supported on cellular data connections and is also
not guaranteed to work on WLAN connections. Note that since each VP has its own virtualized network
resources, network security mechanisms are isolated among VPs. For example, VPN access to a corporate
network from one VP cannot be used by another VP.
However, WLAN and cellular data connections use device-specific, user-level configuration which re-
quires support outside the scope of existing core network virtualization. There exists little if any support
for virtualizing WLAN or cellular data configuration. Current best practice is embodied in desktop virtu-
alization products such as VMware Workstation [126] which create a virtual wired Ethernet adapter inside
a virtual machine but leave the configuration on the host system. This model does not work on a mobile
device where no such host system is available and a VP is the primary system used by the user. VPs rely
heavily on network status notifications reflecting a network configuration that can frequently change, mak-
ing it essential for wireless configuration and status notifications to be virtualized and made available to each
VP. A user-level library called wpa supplicant with support for a large number of devices is typically
used to issue various ioctls and netlink socket operations that are unique to each device. Unlike virtual-
izing core network resources which are general and well-defined, virtualizing wireless configuration in the
kernel would involve emulating the device-specific understanding of configuration management which is
error-prone, complicated, and difficult to maintain.
To address this problem, Cells leverages the user-level device namespace proxy and the foreground-
background model to decouple wireless configuration from the actual network interfaces. A configuration
proxy is introduced to replace the user-level WLAN configuration library and RIL libraries inside each VP.
The proxy communicates with CellD running in the root namespace, which communicates with the original
user-level library for configuring WLAN or cellular data connections. In the default case where all VPs
are allowed network access, CellD forwards all configuration requests from the foreground VP proxy to
the user-level library, and ignores configuration requests from background VP proxies that would adversely
affect the foreground VP’s network access. This approach is minimally intrusive since user space phone
environments, such as Android, are already designed to run on multiple hardware platforms and therefore
cleanly interface with user space configuration libraries.
To virtualize Wi-Fi configuration management, Cells replaces wpa supplicant inside each VP with
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a thin Wi-Fi proxy. The well-defined socket interface used by wpa supplicant is simple to virtualize.
The Wi-Fi proxy communicates with CellD running in the root namespace, which in turn starts and com-
municates with wpa supplicant as needed on behalf of individual VPs. The protocol used by the Wi-Fi
proxy and CellD is quite simple, as the standard interface to wpa supplicant consists of only eight func-
tion calls each with text-based arguments. The protocol sends the function number, a length of the following
message, and the message data itself. Replies are similar, but also contain an integer return value in addition
to data. CellD ensures that background VPs cannot interfere with the operation of the foreground VP. For
instance, if the foreground VP is connected to a Wi-Fi network and a background VP requests to disable
the Wi-Fi access, the request is ignored. At the same time, inquiries sent from background VPs that do not
change state or divulge sensitive information, such as requesting the current signal strength, are processed
since applications such as email clients inside background VPs may use this information to, for example,
decide to check for new email.
For virtualizing cellular data connection management, Cells replaces the RIL vendor library as described
in Section 2.5, which is also responsible for establishing cellular data connections. As with Wi-Fi, CellD
ensures that background VPs cannot interfere with the operation of the foreground VP. For instance, a
background VP cannot change the data roaming options causing the foreground VP to either lose data
connectivity or inadvertently use the data connection. Cellular data is configured independently from the
Wi-Fi connection and VPs can also be configured to completely disallow data connections. Innocuous
inquiries from background VPs with network access, such as the status of the data connection (Edge, 3G,
HSPDA, etc.) or signal strength, are processed and reported back to the VPs.
2.7 Experimental Results
We have implemented a preliminary Cells prototype using Android, and demonstrated its complete func-
tionality across different Android devices, including the Google Nexus 1 [58] and Nexus S [59] phones. The
prototype has been tested to work with multiple versions of Android, including the most recent open-source
version, version 4.3. However, all of our experimental results are based on Android 2.3.3, which was the
latest open-source version available at the time of our experiments. In UI testing while running multiple
VPs on a phone, there is no user noticeable performance difference between running in a VP and running
natively on the phone. For example, while running 4 VPs on a Nexus 1 device using Android 2.3.3, we
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simultaneously played the popular game Angry Birds [114] in one VP, raced around a dirt track in the Reck-
less Racing [109] game on a second VP, crunched some numbers in a spreadsheet using the Office Suite
Pro [90] application in a third VP, and listened to some music using the Android music player in the fourth
VP. Using Cells we were able to deliver native 3D acceleration to both game instances while seamlessly
switching between and interacting with all four running VPs.
2.7.1 Methodology
We quantitatively measured the performance of our unoptimized prototype running a wide range of appli-
cations in multiple VPs. Our measurements were obtained using a Nexus 1 (Qualcomm 1 GHz QSD8250,
Adreno 200 GPU, 512 MB RAM) and Nexus S (Samsung Hummingbird 1 GHz Cortex A8, PowerVR GPU,
512 MB RAM) phones. The Nexus 1 uses an SD card for storage for some of the applications; we used a
Patriot Memory class 10 16 GB SD card. Due to space constraints on the Nexus 1 flash device, all Android
system files for all Cells configurations were stored on, and run from, the SD card.
The Cells implementation used for our measurements was based on the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) version 2.3.3, the most recent version available at the time our measurements were taken. Aufs
version 2.1 was used for file system unioning [96]. A single read-only branch of a union file system was
used as the /system and /data partitions of each VP. This saves megabytes of file system cache while
maintaining isolation between VPs through separate writable branches. When one VP modified a file in
the read-only branch, the modification is stored in its own private write branch of the file system. The
implementation enables the Linux KSM driver for a period of time when a VP is booted. To maximize the
benefit of KSM, CellD uses a custom system call which adds all memory pages from all processes to the set
of pages KSM attempts to merge. While this potentially maximizes shared pages, the processing overhead
required to hash and check all memory pages from all processes quickly outweighs the benefit. Therefore,
CellD monitors the KSM statistics through the procfs interface and disables shared page merging after the
merge rate drops below a pre-determined threshold.
We present measurements along three dimensions of performance: runtime overhead, power consump-
tion, and memory usage. To measure runtime overhead, we compared the performance of various applica-
tions running with Cells versus running the applications on the latest manufacturer stock image available for
the respective mobile devices (Android 2.3.3 build GRI40). We measured the performance of Cells when
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running 1 VP (1-VP), 2 VPs (2-VP), 3 VPs (3-VP), 4 VPs (4-VP), and 5 VPs (5-VP), each with a fully
booted Android environment running all applications and system services available in such an environment.
Since AOSP v2.3.3 was used as the system origin in our experiments, we also measured the performance of
a baseline system (Baseline) created by compiling the AOSP v2.3.3 source and installing it unmodified.
We measured runtime overhead in two scenarios, one with a benchmark application designed to stress
some aspect of the system, and the other with the same application running, but simultaneously with an
additional background workload. The benchmark application was always run in the foreground VP and if a
background workload was used, it was run in a single background VP when multiple VPs were used. For
the benchmark application, we ran one of six Android applications designed to measure different aspects
of performance: CPU using Linpack for Android v1.1.7; file I/O using Quadrant Advanced Edition v1.1.1;
3D graphics using Neocore by Qualcomm; Web browsing using the popular SunSpider v0.9.1 JavaScript
benchmark; and networking using the wget module in a cross-compiled version of BusyBox v1.8.1 to
download a single 400 MB file from a dedicated Samsung nb30 laptop (1.66 GHz Intel Atom N450, Intel
GMA 3150 GPU, 1 GB RAM). The laptop was running Windows 7, providing a WPA wireless access point
via its Atheros AR9285 chipset and built-in Windows 7 SoftAP [89] functionality, and serving up the file
through the HFS [65] file server v2.2f. To minimize network variability, a location with minimal external
Wi-Fi network interference was chosen. Each experiment was performed from this same location with the
phone connected to the same laptop access point. For the background workload, we played a music file from
local storage in a loop using the standard Android music player. All results were normalized to 1.0 against
the performance of the manufacturer’s stock configuration without the background workload.
To measure power consumption, we compared the power consumption of the latest manufacturer stock
image available for the respective mobile devices against that of Baseline and Cells in 1-VP, 2-VP, 3-VP,
4-VP, and 5-VP configurations. We measured two different power scenarios. In the first scenario, the
device configuration under test was fully booted, all VPs started up and KSM had stopped merging pages,
then the Android music player was started. In multiple VP configurations, the music player ran in the
foreground VP, preventing the device from entering a low power state. The music player repeated the same
song continuously for four hours. During this time we sampled the remaining battery capacity every 10
seconds. In the second power scenario, the device configuration under test was fully booted, and then the
device was left idle for 12 hours. During the idle period, the device would normally enter a low power
state, preventing intermediate measurements. However, occasionally the device would wake up to service
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timers and Android system alarms, and during this time we would take a measurement of the remaining
battery capacity. At the end of 12 hours we took additional measurements of capacity. To measure power
consumption due to Cells and avoid having those measurements completely eclipsed by Wi-Fi, cellular,
and display power consumption, we disabled Wi-Fi and cellular communication, and turned off the display
backlight for these experiments.
To measure memory usage, we recorded the amount of memory used for the Baseline and Cells in 1-VP,
2-VP, 3-VP, 4-VP, and 5-VP configurations. We measured two different memory scenarios. First, we ran a
full Android environment without launching any additional applications other than those that are launched
by default on system bootup (No Apps). Second, we ran the first scenario plus the Android Web browser,
the Android email client, and the Android calendar application (Apps). In both scenarios, an instance of
every application was running in all background VPs as well as the foreground VP.
2.7.2 Measurements
Figures 2.3a to 2.3f show measurement results. These are the first measurements we are aware of for running
multiple Android instances on a single phone. In all experiments, Baseline and stock measurements were
within 1% of each other, so only Baseline results are shown.
Figures 2.3a and 2.3b show the runtime overhead on the Nexus 1 and Nexus S, respectively, for each of
the benchmark applications with no additional background workload. Cells runtime overhead was small in
all cases, even with up to 5 VPs running at the same time. Cells incurs less than than 1% overhead in all
cases on the Nexus 1 except for Network and Quadrant I/O, and less than 4% overhead in all cases on the
Nexus S. The Neocore measurements show that Cells is the first system that can deliver fully-accelerated
graphics performance in virtual mobile devices. Quadrant I/O on the Nexus 1 has less than 7% overhead in
all cases, though the 4-VP and 5-VP measurements have more overhead than the configurations with fewer
VPs. To isolate the impact of VPs on I/O, we configured the Quadrant I/O benchmark to use the internal
flash storage for its measurements on the Nexus 1 instead of using the SD card, as the internal flash storage
is used for the Baseline system. Experiments using the SD card instead of internal flash for the Quadrant I/O
benchmark show that this configuration results in roughly 20% overhead compared to using internal flash.
The Network overhead measurements show the highest overhead on the Nexus 1 and the least overhead
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differences here are not reflective of any significant differences in performance as much as the fact that
the results of this benchmark were highly variable; the variance in the results for any one configuration
was much higher than any differences across configurations. While testing in a more tightly controlled
environment would provide more stable numbers, any overhead introduced by Cells was consistently below
Wi-Fi variability levels observed on the manufacturer’s stock system and should not be noticeable by a user.
Figures 2.3c and 2.3d show the runtime overhead on the Nexus 1 and Nexus S, respectively, for each of
the benchmark applications while running the additional background music player workload. All results are
normalized to the performance of the stock system running the first scenario without a background workload
to show the overhead introduced by the background workload. As expected, there is some additional over-
head relative to a stock system not running a background workload, though the amount of overhead varies
across applications. Relative to a stock system, Neocore has the least overhead, and has almost the same
overhead as without the background workload because it primarily uses the GPU for 3D rendering which is
not used by the music player. Linpack and SunSpider incur some additional overhead compared to running
without the background workload, reflecting the additional CPU overhead of running the music player at the
same time. Network runtime overhead while running an additional background workload showed the same
level of variability in measurement results as the benchmarks run without a background workload. Cells
network performance overhead is modest, as the variance in the results for any one configuration still ex-
ceeded the difference across configurations. Quadrant I/O overhead was the highest among the benchmark
applications.
Comparing to the Baseline configuration with an additional background workload, Cells overhead re-
mains small in all cases. It incurs less than 1% overhead in all cases on the Nexus 1 except for Network and
Quadrant I/O, and less than 4% overhead in all cases on the Nexus S except for Quadrant I/O, although the
majority of benchmark results on the Nexus S show nearly zero overhead. Quadrant I/O on the Nexus 1,
while running an additional background workload, incurs a maximum overhead of 7% relative to Baseline
performance. Quadrant I/O on the Nexus S has less than 2% overhead for the 1-VP configuration when
compared to the Baseline configuration. However, configurations with more than 1 VP show an overhead of
10% relative to the Baseline due to higher I/O performance in the Nexus S baseline compared to the Nexus 1.
The higher absolute performance of the Nexus S accentuates the virtualization overhead of running multiple
VPs.
Figure 2.3e shows power consumption on the Nexus 1 and Nexus S, both while playing music with the
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standard Android music player for 4 hours continuously, and while letting the phone sit idle for 12 hours
in a low power state. In both scenarios, the background VPs were the same as the foreground VP except
that in the second scenario the music player was not running in the background VPs. Note that the graph
presents normalized results, not absolute percentage difference in battery capacity usage, so lower numbers
are better.
The power consumption attributable to Cells during the 4 hours of playing music on the Nexus 1 in-
creased while running more VPs, which involved scheduling and running more processes and threads on the
system and resulted in a higher power supply load variation. The nonlinearity in how this variation affects
power consumption resulted in the 4-6% overhead in battery usage for 1-VP through 3-VP, and the 10-20%
overhead for 4-VP and 5-VP. In contrast, the Nexus S showed no measurable increase in power consumption
during the 4 hours of playing music, though the the noisy measurements had some slight variation. Because
the Nexus S is a newer device, the better power management may be reflective of what could be expected
when running Cells on newer hardware.
Nexus 1 power consumption after 12 hours of sitting idle was within 2% of Baseline. Similarly, Nexus
S measurements showed no measurable increase in power consumption due to Cells after the 12 hour idle
period. When the device sat idle, the Android wake lock system would aggressively put the device in a
low power mode where the CPU was completely powered down. The idle power consumption results hold
even when background VPs are running applications which would normally hold wake locks to prevent the
device from sleeping such as a game like Angry Birds or the Android music player. This shows that the
Cells’ wake lock virtualization makes efficient use of battery resources.
Figure 2.3f shows memory usage on the Nexus 1 and Nexus S. These results show that by leveraging the
KSM driver and file system unioning, Cells requires incrementally less memory to start each additional VP
compared to running the first VP. Furthermore, the 1-VP configuration uses less memory than the Baseline
configuration, also due to the use of the KSM driver. Cells device memory use increases linearly with the
number of VPs running, but at a rate much less than the amount of memory required for the Baseline.
The Nexus 1 memory usage is reported for both memory scenarios, No Apps and Apps, across all six
configurations. The No Apps measurements were taken after booting each VP and waiting until CellD
disabled the KSM driver. The Apps measurements were taken after starting an instance of the Android
Web browser, email client, and calendar program in each running VP. Leveraging the Linux KSM driver,
Cells uses approximately 20% less memory for 1-VP than Baseline in the No Apps scenario. The No
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Apps measurements show that the memory cost for Cells to start each additional VP is approximately 55
MB, which is roughly 40% of the memory used by the Baseline Android system and roughly 50% of the
memory used to start the first VP. The reduced memory usage of additional VPs is due to Cells’ use of
file system unioning to share common code and data as well as KSM, providing improved scalability on
memory-constrained phones.
As expected, the No Apps scenario uses less memory than the Apps scenario. Starting all three appli-
cations in the 1-VP Apps scenario consumes 24 MB. This memory scales linearly with the number of VPs
because we disable the KSM driver before starting the applications. It may be possible to reduce the mem-
ory used when running the same application in all VPs by periodically enabling the KSM driver, however
application heap usage would limit the benefit. For example, while Cells uses 20% less memory for 1-VP
than Baseline in the No Apps scenario, this savings decreases in the Apps scenario because of application
heap memory usage.
The Nexus S memory usage is reported under the same conditions described above for the Nexus 1.
The memory cost of starting a VP on the Nexus S is roughly 70 MB. This is higher than the Nexus 1 due
to increased heap usage by Android base applications and system support libraries. The memory cost of
starting all three apps in the 1-VP Apps scenario is approximately the same as the Nexus 1, and also scales
linearly with the number of running VPs.
However, the total memory usage for the Nexus S shown in Figure 2.3f does not continue to increase
with the number of running VPs. This is due to the more limited available RAM on the Nexus S and the
Android low memory killer. The Nexus S contains several hardware acceleration components which require
dedicated regions of memory. These regions can be multiplexed across VPs, but reduce the total available
system memory for general use by applications. As a result, although the Nexus 1 and Nexus S have the
same amount of RAM, the RAM available for general use on the Nexus S is about 350 MB versus 400 MB
for the Nexus 1. Thus, after starting the 4th VP in the No Apps scenario, and after starting the 3rd VP in the
Apps scenario, the Android low memory killer begins to kill background processes to free system memory
for new applications. While this allowed us to start and interact with 5 VPs on the Nexus S, it also slightly




Virtualization on embedded and mobile devices is a relatively new area. Bare-metal hypervisors such as
OKL4 Microvisor [97] and Red Bend’s VLX [113] offer the potential benefit of a smaller trusted computing
base, but the disadvantage of having to provide device support and emulation, an onerous requirement
for smartphones which provide increasingly diverse hardware devices. For example, we are not aware
of any OKL4 implementations that run Android on any phones other than the dated HTC G1. A hosted
virtualization solution such as VMware MVP [28] can leverage Android device support to more easily run
on recent hardware, but its trusted computing base is larger as it includes both the Android user space
environment and host Linux OS. Xen for ARM [69] and KVM/ARM [43] are open-source virtualization
solutions for ARM, but are both incomplete with respect to device support. All of these approaches require
some level of paravirtualization, and require an entire OS instance in each VM adding to both memory
and CPU overhead. This can significantly limit scalability and performance on resource constrained mobile
devices. For example, VMware MVP is targeted to run just one VM to encapsulate an Android virtual work
phone on an Android host personal phone. Attempts have been made to run a heavily modified Android
in a VM without the OS instance [66], but they lack support for most applications and are problematic to
maintain.
User-level approaches have also been proposed to support separate work and personal virtual phone
environments on the same mobile hardware. This is done by providing either an Android work phone
application [51] that also supports other custom work-related functions such as email, or by providing a
secure SDK on which applications can be developed [133]. While such solutions are easier to deploy, they
suffer from the inability to run standard Android applications, and use an inherently weaker security model.
Efficient device virtualization is a difficult problem on user-centric systems such as desktops and phones
that must support a plethora of devices. Most approaches require emulation of hardware devices, impos-
ing high overhead [138]. Dedicating a device to a VM can enable low overhead pass-through operation,
but then does not allow the device to be used by other VMs [93]. Bypass mechanisms for network I/O
have been proposed to reduce overhead [87], but require specialized hardware support used in high-speed
network interfaces not present on most user-centric systems, including phones. GPU devices are perhaps
the most difficult to virtualize. For example, VMware MVP simply cannot run graphics applications such
as games within a VM with reasonable performance [VMware, personal communication]. There are two
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basic GPU virtualization techniques, API forwarding and back-end virtualization [47]. API forwarding adds
substantial complexity and overhead to the TCB, and is problematic due to vendor-specific graphics exten-
sions [75]. Back-end virtualization in a type-1 hypervisor offers the potential for transparency and speed,
but unfortunately most graphics vendors keep details of their hardware a trade secret precluding any use of
this virtualization method.
2.9 Conclusions
Cells is the first OS virtualization solution for mobile devices. Our solution enables a single mobile device
to use multiple personas through isolated and secure virtual instances of a mobile operating system. As the
preferred platform for everyday computing trends away from desktop computers, multiple personas on a
single mobile device can reduce the number of physical devices a user must carry to maintain the isolation,
privacy, and security required by different aspects of the user’s life.
Mobile devices have a different usage model than traditional computers. Using this observation, Cells
provides two new virtualization mechanisms, device namespaces and device namespace proxies, that lever-
age a foreground-background usage model to isolate and multiplex mobile device hardware with near zero
overhead.
Device namespaces provide a kernel-level abstraction that is used to virtualize critical hardware devices
such as the framebuffer and GPU while providing fully accelerated graphics. Device namespaces are also
used to virtualize Android’s complicated power management framework, resulting in almost no extra power
consumption for Cells compared to stock Android. Cells proxy libraries provide a user-level mechanism to
virtualize closed and proprietary device infrastructure, such as the telephony radio stack, with only minimal
configuration changes to the Android user space environment. Cells further provides each virtual phone
complete use of the standard cellular phone network with its own phone number and incoming and outgoing
caller ID support through the use of a VoIP cloud service.
We implemented a Cells prototype that runs the latest open-source version of Android on the most
recent Google phone hardware, including both the Nexus 1 and Nexus S. We implemented a Cells prototype
that runs on the Nexus 1, Nexus S, and Nexus 7 devices. The system can use virtual mobile devices to
run standard unmodified Android applications downloaded from the Android market. Applications running
inside VPs have full access to all hardware devices, providing the same user experience as applications
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running on a native phone. Performance results across a wide-range of applications running in up to 5 VPs
on the same Nexus 1 and Nexus S hardware show that Cells incurs near zero performance overhead, and
human UI testing reveals no visible performance degradation in any of the benchmark configurations.
We have provided a public, open source release of the Cells prototype for the Nexus 7 tablet. The code





Mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones are changing the way that computing platforms are de-
signed, from the separation of hardware and software concerns in the traditional PC world, to vertically
integrated platforms. Hardware components are integrated together in compact devices using non-standard
interfaces. Software is customized for the hardware, often using proprietary libraries to interface with spe-
cialized hardware. Applications (apps) are tightly integrated with libraries and frameworks, and often only
available on particular hardware devices.
These design decisions and the maturity of the mobile market can limit user choice and stifle innovation.
For example, users who want to run iOS gaming apps on their smartphones are stuck with the smaller
screen sizes of those devices. Users who prefer the larger selection of hardware form factors available for
Android are stuck with the poorer quality and selection of Android games available compared to the well
populated Apple App Store [52]. Android users cannot access the rich multimedia content available in
Apple iTunes, and iOS users cannot easily access Flash-based Web content. Some companies release cross-
platform variants of their software, but this requires developers to master many different graphical, system,
and library APIs, and creates additional support and maintenance burden on the company. Many developers
who lack such resources choose one platform over another, limiting user choice. Companies or researchers
that want to build innovative new devices or mobile software platforms are limited in the functionality they
can provide because they lack access to the huge app base of existing platforms. New platforms without
an enormous pool of user apps face the difficult, if not impossible, task of end user adoption, creating huge
barriers to entry into the mobile device market.
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While virtual machines (VMs) are useful for desktop and server computers to run apps intended for one
platform on a different platform [126; 104], using them for smartphones and tablets is problematic for at least
two reasons. First, mobile devices are more resource constrained, and running an entire additional operating
system (OS) and user space environment in a VM just to run one app imposes high overhead. High overhead
and slow system responsiveness are much less acceptable on a smartphone than on a desktop computer
because smartphones are often used for just a few minutes or even seconds at a time. Second, mobile
devices are tightly integrated hardware platforms that incorporate a plethora of devices, such as GPUs, that
use non-standardized interfaces. VMs provide no effective mechanism to enable apps to directly leverage
these hardware device features, severely limiting performance and making existing VM-based approaches
unusable on smartphones and tablets.
To address these problems, we present Cycada (formerly known as Cider [6]), an OS compatibility
architecture that can run apps written and compiled for different mobile ecosystems, namely iOS and An-
droid, simultaneously on the same smartphone or tablet. Cycada runs domestic binaries, those developed
for a given device’s OS, the domestic OS, and foreign binaries, those developed for a different OS, the for-
eign OS, together on the same device. For example, in our prototype, Android is the domestic OS, running
domestic Android apps, and iOS is the foreign OS. We use the terms foreign and iOS, and domestic and An-
droid interchangeably. Cycada refines the definition of a persona from a full virtual phone to an execution
mode assigned to each thread on the system, identifying the thread as executing either foreign or domestic
code: using a foreign persona or domestic persona, respectively. Cycada supports multiple personas within
a single process by extending the domestic kernel’s application binary interface (ABI) to be aware of both
foreign and domestic threads.
Cycada provides OS compatibility by augmenting the domestic Android kernel with the ability to si-
multaneously present both a domestic kernel ABI as well as a foreign kernel ABI. Foreign user space code
interacts with a Cycada-enabled kernel in exactly the same way as it would with a foreign kernel, i.e., iOS
apps trap into the Cycada kernel exactly as if they were trapping into a kernel running on an iPhone or
iPad. Modifying the domestic kernel in this way allows Cycada both to avoid the traditional VM overhead
of running a complete instance of a foreign kernel, and reuse and run unmodified foreign user space library
code. Reuse of foreign code is essential in mobile ecosystems where libraries and frameworks are often
complex, closed-source, and proprietary.
To run unmodified foreign libraries and apps on a domestic OS, We had to overcome two key challenges:
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the difficulty of porting and reimplementing complex functionality of one OS in another, and the use of
proprietary and opaque kernel interfaces to access custom hardware. In particular, tightly integrated libraries
on mobile devices will often directly access proprietary hardware resources of a particular device through
opaque kernel interfaces such as the ioctl system call. Proprietary and opaque foreign kernel interfaces
cannot easily be implemented in the domestic kernel, and custom foreign hardware is often missing from
the domestic device. Additionally, driver source code for proprietary or custom hardware is rarely available.
Our solution takes advantage of two aspects of mobile ecosystems. First, although user space libraries
and frameworks are often proprietary and closed, even closed mobile ecosystems increasingly build on
open source kernel code through well-defined interfaces; iOS builds on the open source XNU kernel [13].
Second, although libraries on mobile devices will access custom hardware through opaque kernel interfaces,
the actual high-level functionality provided is often cross platform as companies mimic the best features of
their competitors’ devices such as the use of touchscreens for input and OpenGL for graphics on mobile
devices.
Based on these observations, Cycada supports running unmodified foreign apps on a domestic OS
through a novel combination of binary compatibility techniques, including two new OS compatibility mech-
anisms: compile-time code adaptation, and diplomatic functions. Leveraging existing open source im-
plementations and specifications, Cycada provides a foreign binary loader for the domestic kernel which
interprets the on-disk contents of foreign application binaries and libraries. The domestic kernel also con-
tains a foreign system call table (or tables), and an asynchronous signal delivery mechanism that translates
signals from domestic to foreign and vice-versa. These domestic kernel enhancements allow foreign user
space code to be loaded into memory, trap into the domestic kernel, and send and receive signals to and from
the domestic kernel. Foreign system call semantics and functionality are mapped, as much as possible, onto
pre-existing domestic kernel functionality. Foreign kernels, however, often contain subsystems or function-
ality that do not exist in the domestic kernel, e.g., the Android Linux kernel does not support Mach IPC, the
inter-process communication subsystem used heavily by iOS.
Cycada introduces duct tape, a novel compile-time code adaptation layer, that allows unmodified foreign
kernel code to be directly compiled into the domestic kernel. Foreign binaries can then use these kernel
services not otherwise present in the domestic kernel. Brute force implementation of these services and
functionality can be error-prone and tedious. Duct tape maximizes reuse of available foreign open source
OS code to substantially reduce implementation effort and coding errors.
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Cycada introduces diplomatic functions which allow foreign applications to use domestic libraries to
access proprietary software and hardware interfaces on the device. A diplomatic function is a function
which temporarily switches the persona of a calling thread to execute domestic code from within a foreign
app, or vice-versa. Using diplomatic functions, Cycada replaces calls into foreign hardware-managing
libraries, such as OpenGL ES, with calls into domestic libraries that manage domestic hardware, such as
a GPU. Diplomatic functions make it possible to deliver the same library functionality required by foreign
apps without the need to reverse engineer and reimplement the opaque foreign kernel interfaces used by
proprietary foreign libraries.
Using these OS compatibility mechanisms, we built a Cycada prototype that can run unmodified iOS
and Android applications simultaneously on Android devices. We leverage existing software infrastruc-
ture as much as possible, including unmodified user and kernel frameworks across both iOS and Android
ecosystems. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our prototype by running various iOS apps from the Apple
App Store together with Android apps from Google Play on a Nexus 7 tablet running Android 4.3, Jelly
Bean. Users can interact with iOS apps using multi-touch input, and iOS apps can leverage GPU hardware
to display smooth, accelerated graphics. Microbenchmark and app measurements of our prototype show
that Cycada imposes modest performance overhead, and can deliver faster performance for iOS apps than
corresponding Android counterparts on Android hardware. The faster performance is due to the greater
efficiencies of running native iOS code instead of interpreted bytecode as used by Android.
3.1 Overview of Android and iOS
To understand how Cycada runs iOS apps on Android, we first provide a brief overview of the operation of
Android and iOS. We limit our discussion to central components providing app startup, graphics, and input
on both systems.
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of these two systems. Android is built on the Linux kernel and runs on
ARM CPUs. The Android framework consists of a number of system services and libraries used to provide
app services, graphics, input, and more. For example, SystemServer starts Launcher, the home screen app on
Android, and SurfaceFlinger, the rendering engine which uses the GPU to compose all the graphics surfaces








































































Figure 3.1: Android and iOS Architecture Overview
Each Android app is compiled into Dalvik bytecode (dex) format, and runs in a separate Dalvik VM
instance. When a user interacts with an Android app, input events are delivered from the Linux kernel
device driver through the Android framework to the app. The app displays content by obtaining a piece of
memory, a graphics “surface”, or window memory, from SurfaceFlinger and draws directly into the window
memory. An app can attach an OpenGL context to the window memory and use the OpenGL ES framework
to render hardware-accelerated graphics into the window memory using the GPU.
iOS runs on ARM CPUs like Android, but has a very different software ecosystem. iOS is built on the
XNU kernel [13], a hybrid combination of a monolithic BSD kernel and a Mach microkernel running in a
single kernel address space. XNU leverages the BSD socket and VFS subsystems, but also benefits from
the virtual memory management [112] and IPC mechanisms [141] provided by Mach. iOS makes extensive
use of both BSD and Mach XNU services. The iOS user space framework consists of a number of user
space daemons. launchd is responsible for booting the system, and starting, stopping, and maintaining
services and apps. launchd starts Mach IPC services such as configd, the system configuration daemon,
notifyd, the asynchronous notification server, and mediaserverd, the audio/video server. launchd
also starts SpringBoard and backboardd. SpringBoard displays the iOS home screen. backboardd
handles and routes user input to apps, and uses the GPU to compose app display surfaces (window memory)
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onto the screen. These two services are analogous to an amalgamation of SurfaceFlinger, Launcher, and
SystemServer in Android.1
iOS apps are written in Objective-C, and compiled and run as native binaries in an extended Mach-
O [10] format. In contrast, the Java archives used by Android apps are interpreted by the Dalvik VM, not
loaded as native binaries. On iOS, apps are loaded directly by a kernel-level Mach-O loader which interprets
the binary, loads its text and data segments, and jumps to the app entry point. Dynamically linked libraries
are loaded by dyld, a user space binary, which is invoked from the Mach-O loader. Examples of frequently
used libraries in iOS apps include UIKit, the user interface framework; QuartzCore and OpenGL ES, the
core graphics frameworks; and WebKit, the web browser engine.
3.2 System Integration
Cycada provides a familiar user experience when running iOS apps on Android. Apps are launched from the
Android home screen, just like any other Android app, and users can switch seamlessly between domestic
Android apps and foreign iOS apps. Cycada accomplishes this without running the iOS XNU kernel or the
SpringBoard app. Cycada overlays a file system (FS) hierarchy on the existing Android FS, and provides
several background user-level services required by iOS apps. The overlaid FS hierarchy allows iOS apps to
access familiar iOS paths, such as /Documents, and the background services establish key microkernel-
style functionality in user space necessary to run iOS apps. Figure 3.2 shows an overview of the integration
of iOS functionality into our Android-based Cycada prototype.
iOS apps running on Cycada need access to a number of framework components including iOS libraries
and user-level Mach IPC services. Instead of reimplementing these components, a task which would require
substantial engineering and reverse-engineering efforts, we simply copy the existing binaries from iOS and
run them on the domestic system, leveraging Cycada’s OS compatibility architecture. Background user-
level services such as launchd, configd, and notifyd were copied from an iOS device, and core
framework libraries were copied from the Xcode SDK, Apple’s development environment.
To provide seamless system integration, and minimize Android user space changes, Cycada introduces
a proxy service, CycadaSong. The launch procedure and binary format of iOS and Android apps are com-




































Figure 3.2: System integration overview
pletely different, so iOS app startup and management cannot be directly performed by the Android frame-
work. CycadaSong is a standard Android app that integrates launch and execution of an iOS app with
Android’s Launcher and system services. It is directly started by Android’s Launcher, receives input such
as touch events and accelerometer data from the Android input subsystem, and its life cycle is managed
like any other Android app. CycadaSong launches the foreign binary, and proxies its own display memory,
incoming input events, and app state changes to the iOS app. An Android Launcher short cut pointing to
CycadaSong allows a user to click an icon on the Android home screen to start an iOS app, and the proxied
display surface allows screen shots of the iOS app to appear in Android’s recent activity list. Proxied app
state changes allow the iOS app to be started, stopped, and paused (put into the background) like a standard
Android app.
3.3 Architecture
The primary goal of Cycada is to run unmodified iOS binaries on Android, including iOS apps, frameworks,
and services. This is challenging because iOS binaries are built to run on iOS and XNU, not Android and
Linux. The XNU kernel provides a different system call (syscall) interface from Linux, and iOS apps make






























Figure 3.3: Overview of Cycada Architecture
compatibility is necessary: Cycada must make Android compatible with iOS. Cycada’s multi-persona OS
compatibility architecture solves this problem.
Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the Cycada OS compatibility architecture which can be divided into
three key components. First, Cycada provides XNU kernel compatibility by implementing a Mach-O loader
for the Linux kernel, supporting the XNU syscall interface, and facilitating proper signal delivery – together
referred to as the kernel application binary interface (ABI). Second, Cycada provides a duct tape layer to
import foreign kernel code that supports syscalls and subsystems not available in Linux. Third, Cycada
introduces diplomatic functions, implemented in the libdiplomat iOS library, to support apps that use
closed iOS libraries which issue device-specific calls such as opaque Mach IPC messages or ioctls. We
describe these components in further detail in the following sections.
3.3.1 Kernel ABI
At a high-level, providing an OS compatibility solution is straightforward. The interaction between apps and
an OS is defined by the kernel application binary interface (ABI). The ABI defines all possible interactions
between apps and the kernel. The ABI consists of a binary loader which interprets the physical contents
of the application binary and associated libraries, asynchronous signal delivery, and the syscall interface.
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To run iOS apps in Android, we need to implement these three components of the XNU ABI in the Linux
kernel.
Cycada provides a Mach-O binary loader built into the Linux kernel to handle the binary format used by
iOS apps. When a Mach-O binary is loaded, the kernel tags the current thread with an iOS persona that is
used in all subsequent interactions with user space. Personas are tracked on a per-thread basis, inherited on
fork or clone, and enable processes with multiple threads to simultaneously support multiple personas.
Multi-persona processes play a key role in supporting hardware-accelerated graphics, discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4.
Cycada provides a translation layer for asynchronous signal delivery that converts signals from the Linux
kernel (generated from events such as an illegal instruction, or a segmentation fault) into signals which would
have been generated by the XNU kernel. The XNU signals are then delivered to iOS applications, as appro-
priate, where they can be properly handled. Cycada also converts XNU signals generated programmatically
from iOS applications into corresponding Linux signals, so they can be delivered to non-iOS applications or
threads. Cycada uses the persona of a given thread to deliver the correct signal. Android apps (or threads)
can deliver signals to iOS apps (or threads) and vice-versa.
Since an app’s primary interface to the kernel is through syscalls, Cycada provides multiple syscall
interfaces to support different kernel ABIs. Cycada maintains one or more syscall dispatch tables for each
persona, and switches among them based on the persona of the calling thread and the syscall number.
It is aware of XNU’s low-level syscall interface, and translates things such as function parameters and
CPU flags into the Linux calling convention, making it possible to directly invoke existing Linux syscall
implementations. Different kernels have different syscall entry and exit code paths. For example, iOS apps
can trap into the kernel in four different ways depending on the system call being executed, and many XNU
syscalls return an error indication through CPU flags where Linux would return a negative integer. Cycada
manages these syscall entry and exit path differences through persona-tagged support functions.
Because the iOS kernel, XNU, is based on POSIX-compliant BSD, most syscalls overlap with function-
ality already provided by the Linux kernel. For these syscalls, Cycada provides a simple wrapper that maps
arguments from XNU structures to Linux structures and then calls the Linux implementation. To implement
XNU syscalls that have no corresponding Linux syscall, but for which similar Linux functionality exists, the
wrapper reuses one or more existing Linux functions. For example, Cycada implements the posix spawn
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syscall, which is a flexible method of starting a thread or new application, by leveraging the Linux clone
and exec syscall implementations.
3.3.2 Duct Tape
Simple wrappers and combinations of existing syscall implementations are not enough to implement the
entire XNU ABI. Many XNU syscalls require a core subsystem that does not exist in the Linux kernel.
Reimplementing these mechanisms would be a difficult and error-prone process. Mach IPC is a prime
example of a subsystem missing from the Linux kernel, but used extensively by iOS apps. It is a rich and
complicated API providing inter-process communication and memory sharing. Implementing such a subsys-
tem from scratch in the Linux kernel would be a daunting task. Given the availability of XNU source code,
one approach would be to try to port such code to the Linux kernel. This approach is common among driver
developers, but is time consuming and error-prone given that different kernels have completely different
APIs and data structures. For example, the Linux kernel offers a completely different set of synchronization
primitives from the XNU kernel.
To address this problem, Cycada introduces duct tape, a novel compile-time code adaptation layer that
supports cross-kernel compilation: direct compilation of unmodified foreign kernel source code into a do-
mestic kernel. Duct tape translates foreign kernel APIs such as synchronization, memory allocation, process
control, and list management, into domestic kernel APIs. The resulting module or subsystem is a first-class
member of the domestic kernel and can be accessed by both foreign and domestic apps.
To duct tape foreign code into a domestic kernel, there are three steps. First, three distinct coding zones
are created within the domestic kernel: the domestic, foreign, and duct tape zones. Code in the domestic
zone cannot access symbols in foreign zone, and code in the foreign zone cannot access symbols in the
domestic zone. Both foreign and domestic zones can access symbols in the duct tape zone, and the duct tape
zone can access symbols in both the foreign and domestic zones. Second, all external symbols and symbol
conflicts with domestic code are automatically identified in the foreign code. Third, conflicts are remapped
to unique symbols, and all external foreign symbols are mapped to appropriate domestic kernel symbols.
Simple symbol mapping occurs through preprocessor tokens or small static inline functions in the duct tape
zone. More complicated external foreign dependencies require some implementation effort within the duct
tape or domestic zone.
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Duct tape provides two important advantages. First, foreign code is easier to maintain and upgrade.
Because the original foreign code is not modified, bug fixes, security patches, and feature upgrades can be
applied directly from the original maintainer’s source repository. Second, the code adaptation layer created
for one subsystem is directly re-usable for other subsystems. For example, most kernel code will use locking
and synchronization primitives, and an adaptation layer translating these APIs and structures for one foreign
subsystem into the domestic kernel will work for all subsystems from the same foreign kernel. As more
foreign code is added, the duct tape process becomes simpler.
Cycada successfully uses duct tape to add three different subsystems from the XNU kernel into An-
droid’s Linux kernel: pthread support, Mach IPC, and Apple’s I/O Kit device driver framework, the latter
is discussed in Section 3.4.1. iOS pthread support differs substantially from Android in functional separa-
tion between the pthread library and the kernel. The iOS user space pthread library makes extensive use
of kernel-level support for mutexes, semaphores, and condition variables, none of which are present in the
Linux kernel. This support is found in the bsd/kern/pthread support.c file in the XNU source
provided by Apple. Cycada uses duct tape to directly compile this file without modification.
The Mach IPC subsystem is significantly more complicated than pthread support. It involves many
different header files and a large collection of C files. Cycada uses duct tape to directly compile the
majority of Mach IPC into the Linux kernel. However, code relying on the assumption of a deeper stack
depth in XNU required reimplementation. In particular, XNU’s Mach IPC code uses recursive queuing
structures, something disallowed in the Linux kernel. This queuing was rewritten to better fit within Linux.
Note that the BSD kqueue and kevent notification mechanisms were easier to support in Cycada as user
space libraries because of the availability of existing open source user-level implementations [62]. Because
they did not need to be incorporated into the kernel, they did not use duct tape. Rather, Cycada used API
interposition [68] to force iOS code to use the Cycada entry points instead of XNU system calls.
3.3.3 Diplomatic Functions
XNU kernel ABI support coupled with duct tape allows Cycada to successfully handle most kernel inter-
actions from iOS apps, however, the behavior of several key syscalls is not well-defined. For example, the
ioctl syscall passes a driver-specific request code and a pointer to memory, and its behavior is driver-
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specific. Without any understanding of how ioctls are used, simply implementing the syscall itself is of
little benefit to apps.
Additionally, Mobile apps often make use of closed and proprietary hardware and software stacks.
Compressed consumer production time lines and tight vertical integration of hardware and software lead
developers to discard cumbersome abstractions present on Desktop PCs in favor of custom, direct hardware
communication. For example, the OpenGL ES libraries on both Android and iOS directly communicate
with graphics hardware (GPU) through proprietary software and hardware interfaces using device-specific
ioctls (Android), or opaque IPC messages (iOS). Apps that link against the OpenGL ES interface can be
compiled to run on many devices and platforms, but the library implementations themselves are tied closely
to the hardware for which it was written. Cycada cannot simply implement kernel-level support for foreign,
closed libraries which directly manipulate hardware through proprietary interfaces. Not only are the seman-
tics of the closed library unknown, but they are likely closely tied to foreign hardware not present on the
domestic device.
Cycada solves the problem of direct access to proprietary hardware through the novel concept of diplo-
matic functions. A diplomatic function temporarily switches the persona of a calling thread to execute
domestic functions from within a foreign app. A thread’s persona, or execution mode, selects the kernel
ABI personality and thread local storage (TLS) information used during execution. The TLS area contains
per-thread state such as errno and a thread’s ID.
Cycada’s diplomatic function support comprises three key components: (1) The ability to load and
interpret domestic binaries and libraries within a foreign app. This involves the use of a domestic loader
compiled as a foreign library. For example, Cycada incorporates an Android ELF loader cross-compiled
as an iOS library. (2) Kernel-level persona management at a thread level including both kernel ABI and
TLS data management. The Cycada kernel maintains kernel ABI and TLS area pointers for every persona
in which a given thread executes. A new syscall (available from all personas) named set persona,
switches a thread’s persona. Different personas use different TLS organizations, e.g., the errno pointer is
at a different location in the iOS TLS than in the Android TLS. After a persona switch, any kernel traps or
accesses to the TLS area will use the new persona’s pointers. This allows the thread to invoke functions from
libraries compiled for a different persona. For example, in Section 3.4.3 (and in more detail in Chapter 4) we
describe how, using diplomatic functions, an iOS app can load and execute code in the Android OpenGL ES
library and thereby directly interact with the underlying GPU hardware (3) The ability to mediate foreign
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function calls into domestic libraries, appropriately loading, switching, and managing the domestic persona;
this is done through diplomats. A diplomat is a function stub that uses an arbitration process to switch the
current thread’s persona, invoke a function in the new persona, switch back to the calling function’s persona,
and return any results.
The Cycada arbitration process for calling a domestic function from foreign code through a diplomat is
as follows:
1. Upon first invocation, a diplomat loads the appropriate domestic library and locates the required entry
point, storing a pointer to the function in a locally-scoped static variable for efficient reuse.
2. The arguments to the domestic function call are stored on the stack.
3. The set persona syscall is invoked from the foreign persona to switch the calling thread’s kernel
ABI, and TLS area pointer to their domestic values.
4. The arguments to the domestic function call are restored from the stack.
5. The domestic function call is directly invoked through the symbol stored in step 1.
6. Upon return from the domestic function, the return value is saved on the stack.
7. The set persona syscall is invoked from the domestic persona to switch the kernel ABI and TLS
area pointer back to the foreign code’s values.
8. Any domestic TLS values, such as errno, are appropriately converted and updated in the foreign
TLS area.
9. The domestic function’s return value is restored from the stack, and control is returned to the calling
foreign function.
Because Cycada maintains kernel ABI and TLS information on a per-thread basis, a single app can
simultaneously execute both foreign and domestic code in multiple threads. For example, while one thread
executes complicated OpenGL ES rendering algorithms using the domestic persona, another thread in the
same app can simultaneously process input data using the foreign persona. Unlike previous binary com-
patibility work [55; 49; 50; 39], which only allowed an app to use a single persona, Cycada allows an app
to switch among personas and use multiple personas simultaneously. Cycada can replace an entire foreign
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library with diplomats, or it can define a single diplomat to use targeted functionality in a domestic library
such as popping up a system notification. Chapter 4 describes how Cycada replaces the iOS OpenGL ES
library with diplomats that use Android’s OpenGL ES libraries.
3.4 iOS Subsystems on Android
We highlight four examples of key iOS subsystems to show how Cycada’s OS compatibility architecture
supports each subsystem on an Android devices. Section 3.4.1 describes how Cycada supports the XNU
I/O Kit driver frameworks. Section 3.4.2 details Cycada’s multi-touch input support, Section 3.4.4 details
Cycada’s support for iOS networking facilities such as BSD sockets, multicast DNS, and CoreFoundation
networking APIs. Section 3.4.3 outlines our basic support for iOS graphics, however an in-depth discussion
of how Cycada supports accelerated 2D and 3D graphics through OpenGL can be found in Chapter 4.
3.4.1 Devices
Cycada uses duct tape to make Android hardware devices available to iOS apps via Apple’s I/O Kit. I/O
Kit is Apple’s open source driver framework based on NeXTSTEP’s DriverKit. It is written primarily in a
restricted subset of C++, and is accessed via Mach IPC. iOS Apps and libraries access Android devices via
I/O Kit drivers in Cycada exactly as they would access Apple devices on iOS.
To directly compile the I/O Kit framework, Cycada added a basic C++ runtime to the Linux kernel based
on Android’s Bionic. Linux kernel Makefile support was added such that compilation of C++ files from
within the kernel required nothing more than assigning an object name to the obj-y Makefile variable.
Cycada uses duct tape and its Linux kernel C++ runtime to directly compile the majority of the I/O Kit
code, found in the XNU iokit source directory, without modification.2 In fact, we initially compiled
Cycada with the I/O Kit framework found in XNU v1699.24.8, but later directly applied source code patches
upgrading to the I/O Kit framework found in XNU v2050.18.24.
Cycada makes devices available via both the Linux device driver framework and I/O Kit. Using a small
hook in the Linux device add function, Cycada creates a Linux device node I/O Kit registry entry (a
device class instance) for every registered Linux device. Cycada also provides an I/O Kit driver class for
2Portions of the I/O Kit codebase such as IODMAController.cpp and IOInterruptController.cpp were not nec-
essary as they are primarily used by I/O Kit drivers communicating directly with hardware.
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each device that interfaces with the corresponding Linux device driver. This allows iOS apps to access
devices as well as query the I/O Kit registry to locate devices or properties.
For example, iOS apps expect to interact with the device framebuffer through a C++ class named
AppleM2CLCD which derives from the IOMobileFramebuffer C++ class interface. Using the C++
runtime support added to the Linux kernel, the Cycada prototype added a single C++ file in the Nexus 7
display driver’s source tree that defines a class named AppleM2CLCD. This C++ class acts as a thin wrap-
per around the Linux device driver’s functionality. The class is instantiated and registered as a driver class
instance with I/O Kit through a small interface function called on Linux kernel boot. The duct taped I/O Kit
code matches the C++ driver class instance with the Linux device node (previously added from the Linux
device add function). After the driver class instance is matched to the device class instance, iOS user
space can query and use the device as a standard iOS device. We believe that a similar process can be done
for most devices found on a tablet or smartphone.
3.4.2 Input
No user-facing app would be complete without input from both the user and devices such as the accelerom-
eter. In iOS, every app monitors a Mach IPC port for incoming low-level event notifications and passes
these events up the user space stack through gesture recognizers and event handlers. The events sent to this
port include mouse, button, accelerometer, proximity and touch screen events. A system service, Spring-
Board, is responsible for communicating with the lower-level iOS input system, determining which app
should receive the input, and then sending corresponding input events to the app via its respective Mach IPC
port. Replicating the interactions between SpringBoard and the lower-level input system on Android would
potentially involve reverse engineering complex device driver interactions with input hardware that is not
present in Android devices.
Cycada takes a simpler approach to provide complete, interactive, multi-touch input support for iOS.
Cycada does not attempt to replicate the lower-level iOS input system. Instead, it simply reads events from
the Android input system, translates them as necessary into a format understood by iOS apps, and then
sends them directly to the Mach IPC port used by apps to receive events. In particular, Cycada creates a
new thread in each iOS app to act as a bridge between the Android input system and the Mach IPC port
expecting input events. This thread, the eventpump seen in Figure 3.2, listens for events from the Android
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CycadaSong app on a BSD socket. It then pumps those events into the iOS app via Mach IPC. In the
future, this intermediary thread could be avoided with a minimal Linux Mach IPC wrapper ABI. Using this
approach, Cycada is able to provide complete, interactive, multi-touch input support in a straightforward
manner. Panning, pinch-to-zoom, iOS on-screen keyboards and keypads, and other input gestures are also
all completely supported.
3.4.3 Graphics
Cycada leverages kernel-level personas through diplomatic functions to provide 2D and 3D graphics support
in iOS apps. User space libraries such as WebKit, UIKit, and CoreAnimation render content, such as
buttons, text, web pages, and images, using the OpenGL ES and IOSurface iOS libraries. These libraries
communicate directly to the iOS kernel via Mach IPC. They use I/O Kit drivers to allocate and share graphics
memory, control hardware facilities such as frame rates and subsystem power, and perform more complex
rendering tasks such as those required for 3D graphics.
Supporting the iOS graphics subsystem is a huge OS compatibility challenge; highly optimized user
space libraries are tightly integrated with mobile hardware. Libraries such as OpenGL ES, call into a set
of proprietary, closed source, helper libraries which, in turn, use opaque Mach IPC messages to closed
source kernel drivers that control black-box pieces of hardware. Opaque Mach IPC calls to kernel drivers
are essentially used as device-specific syscalls. Unlike the modern desktop OS, there are no well-defined
mobile interfaces to graphics acceleration hardware, such as the Direct Rendering Infrastructure used by the
X Window system. Neither implementing kernel-level emulation code nor duct taping a piece GPU driver
code, if it were even available, will solve this problem.
The following outlines our basic support for iOS graphics, but a more complete and detailed discussion
of the graphics subsystem can be found in Chapter 4.
Cycada enables 2D and 3D graphics in iOS apps through a novel combination of I/O Kit Linux driver
wrappers, and diplomatic IOSurface and OpenGL ES libraries. The IOSurface iOS library provides a zero-
copy abstraction for all graphics memory in iOS. An IOSurface object can be used to render 2D graphics via
CPU-bound drawing routines, efficiently passed to other processes or apps via Mach IPC, and even used as
the backing memory for OpenGL ES textures in 3D rendering. Cycada interposes diplomatic functions on
key IOSurface API entry points such as IOSurfaceCreate. These diplomats call into Android-specific
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graphics memory allocation libraries such as libgralloc. Well-known API interposition techniques are
used to force iOS apps to link against the Cycada version of a particular entry point.
To support more complicated 2D and 3D graphics, Cycada replaces the entire iOS OpenGL ES library
with diplomats. We leverage the fact that while the implementation of proprietary libraries, such as OpenGL
ES, and their interface to kernel drivers is closed, the app-facing API is well-known, and is typically similar
across platforms such as iOS and Android.3 The iOS OpenGL ES library consists of two parts: the standard-
ized OpenGL ES API [77; 74] and Apple-specific EAGL [17] extensions. Cycada provides a replacement
iOS OpenGL ES library with a diplomat for every exported symbol in both of these categories.
For standard OpenGL ES API entry points, Cycada provides a set of diplomats that use the arbitra-
tion process, described in Section 3.3.3, to load, initialize, and call into the Android OpenGL ES libraries.
Because each of these entry points has a well-defined, standardized function prototype, the process of cre-
ating diplomats was automated by a script. This script analyzed exported symbols in the iOS OpenGL ES
Mach-O library, searched through a directory of Android ELF shared objects for a matching export, and
automatically generated diplomats for each matching function.
Cycada provides diplomats for Apple’s EAGL extensions that call into a custom Android library to im-
plement the required functionality. Apple-specific EAGL extensions, used to control window memory and
graphics contexts, do not exist on Android. Fortunately, the EAGL extensions are Apple’s replacement for
the Native Platform Graphics Interface Layer (EGL) standard [76], and this is implemented in an Android
EGL library. To support Apple’s EAGL extensions, Cycada uses a custom domestic Android library, called
libEGLbridge, that utilizes Android’s libEGL library and SurfaceFlinger service to provide function-
ality corresponding to the missing EAGL functions. Diplomatic EAGL functions in the Cycada OpenGL
ES library call into the custom Android libEGLbridge library to fully support Apple’s EAGL APIs in
iOS apps. Allocating window memory via the standard Android SurfaceFlinger service also allows Cycada
to manage the iOS display in the same manner that all Android app windows are managed.





Networking in iOS involves several high-level APIs which are implemented on top of the Berkeley sockets
API (BSD sockets), a proprietary TCP connection library, several I/O Kit drivers, and a handful of key iOS
user space daemons. Kernel ABI support, diplomatic functions, and several I/O Kit Linux driver bridges
were necessary to fully support iOS networking.
While POSIX specifies API functions and token names, the binary implementation of the API is left
unspecified. Both Android and iOS use different binary representations for things such as bits in a flags
field, and padding in well-defined structures. Cycada uses its XNU kernel ABI support to flip appropriate
bits in flag fields, and translate iOS structures into their Linux equivalent. This ABI support allows iOS apps
to use BSD sockets. However, iOS layers a significant amount of complexity and functionality on top of
BSD sockets which require additional support from Cycada.
In iOS, many higher-level APIs, such as CFNetwork [16; 11], make use of both BSD sockets as well
as a proprietary TCP connection library, and several user space daemons accessed via Mach IPC. The iOS
TCP connection library creates and manages TCP connections. This library uses XNU routing sockets, and
can dynamically select the best interface over which a connection should route. XNU routing sockets are
currently unimplemented in the Cycada prototype (see Section 4.9.4), however, using diplomatic functions
which interpose on the TCP connection library APIs, Cycada can support this critical API. Cycada also
interposes on key functions in the popular SCNetworkReachability API [18] to avoid the need to
implement XNU routing sockets.
Functions in iOS such as gethostbyaddr, getaddrinfo, and many functions in the SCNetwork-
Reachability framework, communicate with user space daemons such as mDNS-Responder and
configd. These user space daemons are not only responsible for servicing requests for DNS lookups,
but they are also responsible for bringing up and configuring network interfaces. iOS keeps the status and
properties of its network configuration in both a dynamic and persistent store managed by the System-
Configuration framework [8]. This framework, along with the user space daemons themselves, use I/O
Kit driver interfaces such as PowerManagement, NetworkStack, and NetworkInterface which
provide various properties about the available network devices and their capabilities. Cycada provides a




User space networking daemons in iOS rely not only on proprietary libraries, and proprietary I/O Kit
drivers to provide system-critical information, they also rely on the BSD kqueue asynchronous event deliver
kernel subsystem. In iOS, this mechanism has been coupled to Mach IPC, and is a more full-featured
replacement for the basic listen/accept/read POSIX-compliant network daemon paradigm. While
Cycada uses a user space library to replace the kevent and kqueue APIs (see Section 3.3.2), Cycada also
needs to implement kernel-level support for event-driven socket notifications. More specifically, Cycada
extends the Linux inotify subsystem to also deliver events such as connection state and socket bytes
available to Linux socket inodes. This provides the kernel mechanism that our user space kqueue library
uses to map Linux socket events to iOS kevents.
3.5 Experimental Results
We have implemented a Cycada prototype for running both iOS and Android apps on an Android device,
and present some experimental results to measure its performance. We compared three different Android
system configurations to measure the performance of Cycada:
1. Linux binaries and Android apps running on unmodified (vanilla) Android.
2. Linux binaries and Android apps running on Cycada.
3. iOS binaries and apps running on Cycada.
For our experiments, we used a Nexus 7 tablet with a 1.3 GHz quad-core NVIDIA R© Tegra R© 3 CPU, 1 GB
RAM, 16 GB of flash storage, and a 7” 1280x800 216ppi display running Android 4.2 (Jelly Bean). We also
ran iOS binaries and apps on a jailbroken iPad mini with a 1 GHz dual-core A5 CPU, 512 MB RAM, 16 GB
of flash storage, and a 7.9” 1024x768 163ppi display running iOS 6.1.2. Since the iPad mini was released
around the same time as the Nexus 7 and has a similar form factor, it provides a useful point of comparison
even though it costs 50% more.
We used both microbenchmarks and real apps to evaluate the performance of Cycada. To measure the
latency of common low-level OS operations, we used microbenchmarks from lmbench 3.0 and compiled
two versions: an ELF Linux binary version, and a Mach-O iOS binary version, using the standard Linux
GCC 4.4.1 and Xcode 4.2.1 compilers, respectively. We used four categories of lmbench tests: basic
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(a) Cycada Home Screen (b) Calculator Pro for iPad Free
(c) Papers for iOS (d) PassMark 3D Benchmark
Figure 3.4: Cycada Displaying and Running iOS Apps
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operations, syscalls and signals, process creation, and local communication and file operations. To measure
real app performance, we used comparable iOS and Android PassMark apps available from the Apple App
Store [105] and Google Play [106], respectively. PassMark conducts a wide range of resource intensive
tests to evaluate CPU, memory, I/O, and graphics performance. We used PassMark because it is a widely
used, commercially-supported app available on both iOS and Android, and provides a conservative measure
of various aspects of app performance. We normalize all results using vanilla Android performance as the
baseline to compare across systems. This is useful to measure Cycada performance overhead, and also
provides some key observations regarding the characteristics of Android and iOS apps.
3.5.1 Obtaining iOS Apps
The iOS apps used in our evaluation were downloaded from the Apple App Store. In the future, we envision
that developers and app distributors may be incentivized to provide alternative distribution methods. For
example, Google Play might be incentivized to take advantage of Cycada to make a greater number and
higher quality of apps available for Android devices. However, using the App Store required a few more
steps to install the applications on an Android device because of various security measures used by Apple.
App Store apps, unlike iOS system apps such as Stocks, are encrypted and must be decrypted using keys
stored in encrypted, non-volatile memory found in an Apple device. We modified a widely used script [125]
to decrypt apps on any jailbroken iOS device using gdb [54]. To illustrate this point, we used both the
iPad mini and an old iPhone 3GS running iOS 5.0.1 to decrypt applications. The script decrypts the app,
and then re-packages the decrypted binary, along with any associated data files, into a single .ipa file
(iOS App Store Package). Each .ipa file was copied to the Cycada prototype, and a small background
process automatically unpacked each .ipa and created Android shortcuts on the Launcher home screen,
pointing each one to the CycadaSong Android app. The iOS app icon was used for the Android shortcut.
Decrypted iOS apps work on Cycada exactly as they would on an iPhone or iPad, including displaying ads
using Apple’s iAd framework.
Figure 3.4 shows screenshots of the Nexus 7 tablet with various iOS apps that we installed and ran
on the device (from left to right): the Nexus 7 home screen with iOS and Android apps side-by-side, the



































































































































Figure 3.5: Microbenchmark latency measurements normalized to vanilla Android; lower is better
performance.
displaying a banner ad via the iAd framework, the highly-rated Papers [37] app highlighting text in a PDF,
and the PassMark [105] app running the 3D performance test.
3.5.2 Microbenchmark Measurements
Figure 3.5 shows the results of running lmbench microbenchmarks on the four system configurations.
Vanilla Android performance is normalized to one in all cases, and the results are not explicitly shown.
Measurements are latencies, so smaller numbers are better. Measurements are shown at two scales to provide
a clear comparison despite the wide range of results. Results are analyzed in four groups.
First, Figure 3.5 shows basic CPU operation measurements for integer multiply, integer divide, double
precision floating point add, double precision floating point multiply, and double precision bogomflop tests.
They provide a comparison that reflects differences in the Android and iOS hardware and compilers used.
The basic CPU operation measurements were essentially the same for all three system configurations using
the Android device, except for the integer divide test, which showed that the Linux compiler generated more
optimized code than the iOS compiler. In all cases, the measurements for the iOS device were worse than
the Android device, confirming that the iPad mini’s CPU is not as fast as the Nexus 7’s CPU for basic math
operations.
Second, Figure 3.5 shows syscall and signal handler measurements including null syscall, read, write,
open/close, and signal handler tests. The null syscall measurement shows the overhead incurred by Cy-
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cada on a syscall that does no work, providing a conservative measure of the cost of Cycada. The overhead
is 8.5% over vanilla Android running the same Linux binary. This is due to extra persona checking and
handling code run on every syscall entry. The overhead is 40% when running the iOS binary over vanilla
Android running the Linux binary. This demonstrates the additional cost of using the iOS persona, and
translating the syscall into the corresponding Linux syscall. These overheads fall into the noise for syscalls
that perform some useful function, as shown by the other syscall measurements. Running the iOS binary
on the Nexus 7 using Cycada is much faster in these syscall measurements than running the same binary
on the iPad mini, illustrating a benefit of using Cycada to leverage the faster performance characteristics of
Android hardware.
The signal handler measurement shows Cycada’s signal delivery overhead when the signal is generated
and delivered within the same process. This is a conservative measurement because no work is done by
the process as a result of signal delivery. The overhead is small: 3% over vanilla Android running the
same Linux binary. This is due to the added cost of determining the persona of the target thread. The
overhead is 25% when running the iOS binary over vanilla Android running the Linux binary. This shows
the overhead of the iOS persona which includes translation of the signal information and delivery of a larger
signal delivery structure expected by iOS binaries. Running the iOS binary on the iPad mini takes 175%
longer than running the same binary on the Nexus 7 using Cycada for the signal handler test.
Third, Figure 3.5 shows five sets of process creation measurements, fork+exit, fork+exec, and
fork+sh tests. The fork+exit measurement shows that Cycada incurs negligible overhead versus
vanilla Android running a Linux binary despite the fact that it must do some extra work in Mach IPC initial-
ization. However, Cycada takes almost 14 times longer to run the iOS binary version of the test compared
to the Linux binary. The absolute difference in time is roughly 3.5 ms, the Linux binary takes 245 µs while
the iOS binary takes 3.75 ms. There are two reasons for this difference. First, the process running the iOS
binary consumes significantly more memory than the Linux binary because the iOS dynamic linker, dyld,
maps 90 MB of extra memory from 115 different libraries, irrespective of whether or not those libraries
are used by the binary. The fork syscall must then duplicate the page table entries corresponding to all
the extra memory, incurring almost 1 ms of extra overhead. Second, an iOS process does a lot more work
in user space when it forks because iOS libraries use a large number of pthread atfork callbacks that
are called before and after fork. Similarly, for each library, dyld registers a callback that is called on
exit, resulting in the execution of 115 handlers on exit. These user space callbacks account for 2.5 ms of
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extra overhead. Note that the fork+exit measurement on the iPad mini is significantly faster than using
Cycada on the Android device due to a shared library cache optimization that is not yet supported in the
Cycada prototype. To save time on library loading, iOS’s dyld stores common libraries prelinked on disk
in a shared cache in lieu of storing the libraries separately. iOS treats the shared cache in a special way and
optimizes how it is handled.
The fork+exec measurement is done in several unique variations on Cycada. This test spawns a child
process which executes a simple hello world program. We compile two versions of the program: a Linux
binary and an iOS binary. The test itself is also compiled as both a Linux binary and an iOS binary. A
vanilla Android system can only run a Linux binary that spawns a child to run a Linux binary. Similarly, the
iPad mini can only run an iOS binary that spawns a child to run an iOS binary. Using Cycada, the test can
be run four different ways: a Linux binary can spawn a child to run either a Linux or an iOS binary, and an
iOS binary can spawn a child to run either a Linux or an iOS binary. To compare the different fork+exec
measurements, we normalize performance against the vanilla Android system running a Linux binary that
spawns a child running a Linux binary. Figure 3.5 shows all four fork+exec measurements using Cycada.
The fork+exec(android) test forks a child that execs a Linux binary. The Cycada Android bar
shows results of a Linux test program while the Cycada iOS bar shows results of an iOS test program.
Cycada incurs negligible overhead in the Cycada Android case. The actual test run time is roughly 590
µs, a little more than twice the time it takes to run the fork+exit measurement, reflecting the fact that
executing the hello world program is more expensive than simply exiting. Cycada takes 4.8 times longer to
run the test in the Cycada iOS case. The extra overhead is due to the cost of an iOS binary calling fork,
as discussed previously in the fork+exit measurement. Interestingly, the fork+exec(android)
Cycada iOS measurement is 3.42 ms, less than the fork+exit measurement because the child process
replaces its iOS binary with the hello world Linux binary. This is less expensive than having the original
iOS binary exit because of all the exit handlers that must execute.
The fork+exec(ios) test forks a child that execs an iOS binary. The Cycada Android bar shows
results of a Linux test program. The Cycada iOS and iOS bars show results of an iOS test program. This test
is not possible on vanilla Android, thus the comparison is intentionally unfair and skews the results against
this test which executes a more heavyweight iOS binary. Nevertheless, using this comparison, Figure 3.5
shows that spawning a child to run an iOS binary is much more expensive. This is because dyld loads
90 MB of extra libraries when it starts the iOS binary. Unlike fork where copy-on-write can be used to
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limit this cost of page table duplication, the cost of exec involves not just creating the page tables, but also
mapping the libraries themselves into memory. This is very expensive because the Cycada prototype uses
non-prelinked libraries, and dyld must walk the filesystem to load each library on every exec. The extra
overhead of starting with an iOS binary versus a Linux binary is due to the cost of the iOS binary calling
fork, as discussed previously in the fork+exit measurement. Running the fork+exec test on the
iPad mini is faster than using Cycada on the Android device because of its shared cache optimization which
avoids the need to walk the filesystem and load/map each library.
Similar to the fork+exec measurement, the fork+sh measurement is done in four variations on
Cycada. The fork+sh(android) test launches a shell that runs a Linux binary. Cycada incurs negligible
overhead versus vanilla Android when the test program is a Linux binary, but takes 110% longer when the
test program is an iOS binary. The extra overhead is due to the cost of an iOS binary calling fork, as
discussed previously in the fork+exec measurement. Because the fork+sh(android) measurement
takes longer, 6.8 ms using the iOS binary, the relative overhead is less than the fork+exec(android)
measurement.
The fork+sh(ios) test launches a shell that runs an iOS binary. This is not possible on vanilla
Android, so we normalize to the fork+sh(android) test, skewing the results against this test. Using
this comparison, Figure 3.5 shows that spawning a child to run an iOS binary is much more expensive for
the same reasons as the fork+exec measurements. Because the fork+sh(ios) test takes longer, the
relative overhead is less than the fork+exec(ios) measurement.
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows local communication and filesystem measurements including pipe, AF -
UNIX sockets, select on 10 to 250 file descriptors, and creating and deleting 0 KB and 10 KB files.
Measurements were quite similar for all three system configurations using the Android device. However,
measurements on the iPad mini were significantly worse than the Android device in a number of cases.
Perhaps the worst offender was the select test whose overhead increased linearly with the number of file
descriptors to more than 10 times the cost of running the test on vanilla Android. The test simply failed
to complete for 250 file descriptors. In contrast, the same iOS binary runs using Cycada on Android with
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Figure 3.6: App Throughput Measurements Normalized to Vanilla Android; Higher is Better
Performance.
3.5.3 Application Measurements
Figure 3.6 shows the results of the iOS and Android PassMark benchmark apps [106; 105] on the four
different system configurations. Vanilla Android performance is normalized to one in all cases, and not
explicitly shown. Measurements are in operations per second, so larger numbers are better. In all tests,
Cycada adds negligible overhead to the Android PassMark app. Test results are analyzed in five groups.
First, Figure 3.6 shows CPU operation measurements for integer, floating point, find primes, random
string sort, data encryption, and data compression tests. Unlike the basic lmbench CPU measurements,
the PassMark measurements show that Cycada delivers significantly faster performance when running the
iOS PassMark app on Android. This is because the Android version is written in Java and interpreted
through the Dalvik VM while the iOS version is written in Objective-C and compiled and run as a native
binary. Because the Android device contains a faster CPU than the iPad mini, Cycada outperforms iOS
when running the CPU tests from the same iOS PassMark application binary.
Second, Figure 3.6 shows storage operation measurements for write and read tests. Cycada has similar
storage read performance to the iPad mini when running the iOS app. However, the iPad mini has much
better storage write performance than either the iOS or Android app running on Cycada. Because storage
performance can depend heavily on the OS, these results may reflect differences in both the underlying
hardware and the OS.
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Third, Figure 3.6 shows memory operation measurements for write and read tests. Cycada delivers
significantly faster performance when running the iOS PassMark app on Android. This is, again, because
Cycada runs the iOS app natively while Android interprets the app through the Dalvik VM. Cycada outper-
forms the iPad mini running the memory tests from the same iOS PassMark app binary, again reflecting the
benefit of using faster Android hardware.
Fourth, Figure 3.6 shows graphics measurements for a variety of 2D graphics operations including solid
vectors, transparent vectors, complex vectors, image rendering, and image filters. With the exception of
complex vectors, the Android app performs much better than the iOS binary on both Cycada and the iPad
mini. This is most likely due to more efficient/optimized 2D drawing libraries in Android. Additionally,
since these tests are CPU bound, Cycada generally outperforms iOS due to the Nexus 7’s faster CPU.
However, bugs in the Cycada OpenGL ES library related to “fence” synchronization primitives caused
under-performance in the image rendering tests.
Finally, Figure 3.6 shows graphics measurements for simple and complex 3D tests, the latter shown in
Figure 3.4d. Because the iPad mini has a faster GPU than the Nexus 7, it has better 3D graphics performance.
The iOS binary running on Cycada performs 20-37% worse than the Android PassMark app due to the
extra cost of diplomatic function calls. Each function call into the OpenGL ES library is mediated into
the Android OpenGL ES library through diplomats. As the complexity of a given frame increases, the
number of OpenGL ES calls increases, which correspondingly increases the overhead. This can potentially
be optimized by aggregating OpenGL ES calls into a single diplomat, or by reducing the overhead of a
diplomatic function call. Both optimizations are left to future work.
3.6 Limitations
We have not encountered any fundamental limitations regarding the feasibility of the Cycada approach, such
as any unbridgeable compatibility issues between iOS and Android. However, while we have implemented
an initial Cycada prototype that successfully runs many iOS apps on Android devices, the implementation
is incomplete. In particular, smartphones and tablets incorporate a plethora of devices that apps expect to be
able to use, such as cameras, cell phone radio, Bluetooth, and others. Although our prototype supports GPS
and location services, full support for the full range of devices available on smartphones and tablets is left
to future work. Cycada will not currently run iOS apps that depend on such devices. For example, an app
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such as Facetime that requires use of the camera does not currently work with Cycada, however, if the iOS
app has a fall-back code path it can still partially function.
Implementation of Cycada device support varies with device and interface complexity. Devices with a
relatively simple interface can be supported with I/O Kit drivers, discussed in Section 3.4.1, and diplomatic
functions. Devices that use more standardized interfaces can be supported either through duct tape given an
open source implementation, or diplomatic functions given a well-defined API. More complicated devices
such as the camera and cell radio were not investigated as part of this research, but we believe that techniques
similar to those used in the Cycada graphics solution, detailed in Section 3.4.3 and Chapter 4, could be used
to support these devices. For example, iOS exposes a camera API to apps. By replacing these API entry
points with diplomatic functions that interact with native Android hardware, it may be possible to provide
camera support for iOS apps.
Our initial prototype contained limited support for advanced graphics. These limitations degraded our
graphics performance, however they are addressed in detail in Chapter 4.
Finally, Cycada does not map iOS security to Android security, and our system requires a jailbroken
iPad or iPhone. Android’s permission-based security model differs significantly from the more dynamic
iOS security, which is enforced at runtime. A complete mapping of the two models is left to future work.
Decrypting iOS App Store apps currently requires a jailbroken iPhone or iPad. Extracting decryption keys
from an Apple device may mitigate this requirement, but this also is left to future work.
3.7 Related Work
Many approaches have tried to run apps from multiple OSes on the same hardware, though primarily in
the context of desktop computers, not mobile devices. Several BSD variants maintain binary compatibility
layers for other OSes [55; 48; 49] at the kernel level. BSD reimplements foreign syscalls in the OS, using
a different syscall dispatch table for each OS to glue the calls into the BSD kernel. It works for foreign
OSes that are close enough to BSD such as Linux, but attempts to extend this approach to Mac OS X apps
only provide limited support for command-line tools, not GUI apps [50]. Similarly, Solaris 10 Zones [92;
100] provided an lx brand mechanism that emulates outdated Linux 2.4 kernel system call interfaces to run
some Linux binaries on Solaris, though this feature is no longer available as of Solaris 11 [102]. Cycada
goes beyond these approaches by introducing duct tape to make it easier to add foreign kernel code to an
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OS and diplomatic functions to support the use of opaque foreign kernel interfaces, providing a richer OS
compatibility layer that supports GUI apps with accelerated graphical interfaces.
Operating at user instead of kernel level, Wine [2] runs Windows apps on x86 computers running Linux.
It achieves this by attempting to reimplement the entire foreign user space library API, such as Win32, using
native APIs. This is tedious and overwhelmingly complex. Wine has been under development for over 20
years, but continues to chase Windows as every new release contains new APIs that need to be implemented.
Darling [46] takes a similar approach to try to run Mac OS X apps on Linux, though it remains a work in
progress unable to run anything other than simple command-line apps. In contrast, Cycada provides kernel-
level persona management that leverages existing unmodified libraries and frameworks to avoid rewriting
huge amounts of user space code. Cycada’s duct tape layer and diplomatic function calls facilitate this by
incorporating existing foreign kernel code without tedious reimplementation, and allowing foreign apps to
directly leverage existing domestic libraries.
Wabi [67] from Sun Microsystems ran Windows apps on Solaris. It supported apps developed for Win-
dows 3.1, but did not support later versions of Windows and was discontinued. Unlike Wine, it required
Windows 3.1 and leveraged existing Windows libraries except for the lowest layers of the Windows envi-
ronment, for which it replaced low-level Windows API libraries with versions that translated from Windows
to Solaris calls. It also provided CPU emulation to allow x86 Windows apps to run on Sparc, similar to
binary translation systems such as DEC’s FX!32 [39]. Wabi ran on top of Solaris and provided all of its
functionality outside of the OS, limiting its ability to support apps that require kernel-level services not
available in Solaris. In contrast, Cycada provides binary personality support in the OS to support foreign
kernel services, uses diplomatic functions to make custom domestic hardware accessible to foreign apps,
and does not need to perform any binary translation since both iOS and Android run on ARM CPUs.
While most previous approaches have not considered mobile software ecosystems, AppPlayer from
BlueStacks [35] allows users to run Android apps on a Windows PC or Apple OS X computer by utilizing
a cross-compiled Dalvik VM and ported Android services such as SurfaceFlinger. This is possible
because Android is open source, and the whole system can be easily cross-compiled. Since many Android
apps are entirely Java-based and consist of bytecodes run in a VM, it is relatively easy to run them anywhere.
However, many popular Android apps increasingly incorporate native libraries for performance reasons –
these apps will not work. Similarly, this approach will not work for iOS apps which are native binaries
running on a proprietary system for which source code is not available. In contrast, Cycada utilizes kernel-
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level persona management and diplomatic function calls to support unmodified iOS binaries which link
against unmodified iOS libraries and communicate with unmodified iOS support services such as notifyd
and syslogd.
Some developer frameworks [40; 108; 140] allow mobile app developers to target multiple OSes from
a single code base. This requires apps to be written using these frameworks. Because such frameworks
are often more limited than those provided by the respective mobile software ecosystems, the vast majority
of apps are not written in this manner, and are thus tied to a particular platform. Cycada does not require
developers to rewrite or recompile their apps to use specific non-standard frameworks, but instead runs
unmodified iOS binaries on an Android device.
Other partial solutions to OS compatibility have been explored for desktop systems. Shinichiro Hamaji’s
Mach-O loader for Linux [61] can load and run some desktop OS X command-line binaries in Linux. This
project supports binaries using the “misc” binary format, and dynamically overwrites C entry points to
syscalls. NDISWrapper [78] allows the Linux kernel to load and use Windows NDIS driver DLLs. The
project’s kernel driver implements the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) [111], and dynami-
cally links the Windows DLL to this implementation. It is narrowly focused on a single driver specification,
does not support incorporation of general foreign kernel subsystems, and does not support app code. In
contrast, Cycada makes it possible to incorporate general kernel subsystems, such as Mach IPC, with-
out substantial implementation effort and provides a complete environment for foreign binaries including
graphics libraries and device access.
VMs are commonly used to run apps requiring different OS instances on desktop computers. Various
approaches [28; 43; 69] have attempted to bring VMs to mobile devices, but they cannot run unmodified
OSes, incur higher overhead than their desktop counterparts, and provide at best poor, if any, graphics per-
formance within VMs. Some of these limitations are being addressed by ongoing work on KVM/ARM using
ARM hardware virtualization support [44]. Lightweight OS virtualization [4; 38] claims lower performance
overhead, but does not support different OS instances and therefore cannot run foreign apps at all. Unlike
Cycada, none of these previous approaches can run iOS and Android apps on the same device.
Drawbridge [110] and Bascule [29] provide user mode OS personalities for desktop apps by refactor-
ing traditional OSes into library OSes that call down into a host OS. Refactoring is a complex and tedious
process, and there is no evidence that these systems would work for mobile devices. For example, Bascule
has no support for general inter-process sharing, and relies on an external X11 server using network-based
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graphics, running on the host OS, to support GUI apps. It is unclear how these systems might support ver-
tically integrated libraries that require direct communication to hardware, or multi-process services based
on inter-process communication. In contrast, Cycada provides duct tape to easily incorporate kernel sub-
systems that facilitate the multi-process communication required by iOS apps, and leverages diplomatic
function calls to support direct communication with closed or proprietary hardware – a feature crucial for
vertically integrated mobile devices.
3.8 Conclusions
Cycada is the first system that can run unmodified iOS apps on non-Apple devices. It accomplishes this
through a novel combination of binary compatibility techniques including two new operating system com-
patibility mechanisms: duct tape and diplomatic functions. Duct tape allows source code from a foreign
kernel to be compiled, without modification, into the domestic kernel. This avoids the difficult, tedious, and
error prone process of porting or implementing new foreign subsystems. Diplomatic functions leverage per-
thread personas and mediate foreign function calls into domestic libraries. This enables Cycada to support
foreign libraries that are closely tied to foreign hardware by replacing library function calls with diplomats
that utilize domestic libraries and hardware. This functionality is essential on mobile devices to support
graphics. We built a Cycada prototype that reuses existing unmodified user and kernel frameworks across
both iOS and Android ecosystems. Our results demonstrate that Cycada has modest performance overhead
and runs popular iOS and Android apps together seamlessly on the same Android device.
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In the previous chapter, we presented Cycada, an OS compatibility architecture that runs applications built
for different mobile ecosystems, iOS or Android, together on the same device. Cycada was built on the
premise that the wide availability of open source software and the use of standardized APIs for mobile app
development can be used to build binary compatibility into an existing mobile OS. Cycada mimics the ABI
of a foreign OS, iOS, enabling the domestic OS, Android, to run unmodified foreign binaries.
Cycada introduces two new binary compatibility mechanisms, compile-time code adaptation, and diplo-
matic functions. Compile-time code adaptation, or duct tape, allows existing unmodified foreign (iOS)
source code to be reused within the domestic (Android) kernel, reducing implementation effort required to
support multiple binary interfaces for executing domestic and foreign apps. Duct tape translates foreign ker-
nel APIs such as synchronization, memory allocation, process control, and list management, into domestic
kernel APIs. The resulting module or subsystem is a first-class member of the domestic kernel and can be
accessed by both foreign and domestic apps.
A diplomat, or diplomatic function, temporarily switches the persona of a calling thread to execute
domestic code from within a foreign app. A thread’s persona, or execution mode, selects the kernel ABI
personality and thread local storage (TLS) information used during execution. Diplomatic functions allow
foreign, iOS, apps to leverage domestic, Android, libraries to access proprietary hardware and software
interfaces. Diplomats are more than simple API “thunks,” “glue code,” or “trampolines.” Beyond simply
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adapting two different API surfaces, a diplomat manages transitions between APIs across different thread-
level personas. Each side of the diplomat is assumed to use its own TLS data and calling conventions, and
the diplomat translates between the two.
Although Chapter 3 demonstrated the feasibility of the Cycada approach, a more detailed examination
of iOS and Android compatibility has shown Cycada to be incomplete. In particular, the type of graphics
acceleration used in libraries such as WebKit [23], the HTML and JavaScript rendering engine, was only
partially supported. WebKit consists of over 5 million lines of code [33] and heavily uses the GPU to
accelerate web page layout and rendering. GPU device support is of paramount importance given how
extensively mobile devices rely on GPUs not only to support 3D graphics, but also to accelerate basic UI
functionality, and libraries such as WebKit.
Binary compatible graphics support is a key challenge on mobile platforms because of their vertically
integrated stack of proprietary closed-source vendor libraries that communicate directly to the kernel or
device drivers through opaque, undocumented calls to control black-box GPU hardware.
In this chapter, we present a graphics-focused study of Cycada, and extend its binary compatibility sup-
port through three new OS compatibility techniques necessary to build a complete real-world system able
to run apps built for different mobile ecosystems, iOS and Android, that require complex GPU-accelerated
frameworks such as WebKit, together on the same smartphone or tablet. First, we extend Cycada’s basic
diplomat construction to perform library-wide prelude and postlude operations in the context of the for-
eign OS before and after domestic library usage. Using these prelude and postlude functions, we formalize
four diplomat usage patterns, direct, indirect, data-dependent, and multi, which together provide the com-
plex and rigorous management of resources necessary for bridging between proprietary iOS and Android
implementations of complex real-world graphics APIs, such as OpenGL.
Second, we introduce thread impersonation which allows thread-specific context to be shared amongst
multiple threads running under multiple personas. A thread impersonating another thread temporarily takes
on the identity of another thread (in all running personas), to perform some action that may be thread-
dependent.
Third, we load multiple, independent instances of a single library within the same process through a
technique called dynamic library replication. Dynamic Library Replication enables a dynamic linker to
create separate loaded instances of a dynamic library in a single process including unique virtual addresses
for each instance of every symbol in the library including library-global and initialization data.
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We extend Cycada with these three new OS compatibility techniques to provide binary compatible
support for the OpenGL ES (GLES) standard available on both iOS and Android, and heavily used by
frameworks such as WebKit. While GLES is standardized, it relies on other graphics infrastructure such
as graphics resource management to manage the state information, commands, and resources needed to
draw using GLES, and this may not be standardized. Furthermore, the GLES standard is intended to be
extensible, and vendor libraries and GPU hardware are free to implement any subset of available extensions
or even implement new extensions. We use the diplomat usage patterns, thread impersonation, and dynamic
library replication OS compatibility techniques to allow Cycada’s graphics compatibility mechanisms to
bridge differences in GLES implementations across iOS and Android.
We extend the Cycada prototype, and demonstrate its effectiveness in enabling widely-used iOS apps
such as Safari that make extensive use of WebKit to run on Android with reasonable graphics performance.
We also demonstrate through detailed micro-benchmarks that Cycada provides robust binary compatible
graphics device support across a broad range of graphics functions. Our detailed study, new OS compatibility
techniques, experimental results, and our overall experiences building binary compatible graphics devices
support are also useful for other approaches such as virtualization in the context of mobile platforms.
Our experiences with Cycada show that our new OS compatibility mechanisms, diplomat usage patterns,
thread impersonation, and dynamic library replication, are key to supporting graphics binary compatibility.
Our study shows:
1. Real-world graphics implementations vary greatly between platforms. Although the GLES API stan-
dardized, both iOS and Android take advantage of a number of GLES extensions such that more than
half of the extensions used in one platform are not available in the other. Each extensions adds API
entry points or modifies the behavior of an existing API. GPU binary compatibility or virtualization
approaches that perform simple API forwarding or basic API thunks will not work for these mo-
bile platforms due to the large differences between the resulting extended APIs. Despite their GLES
differences, it is possible to map iOS GLES to Android GLES. Most iOS GLES functions, includ-
ing extension functions, can be supported by leveraging one or more Android GLES functions via
diplomat usage patterns.
2. iOS and Android have substantially different graphics resource management APIs. Graphics rendering
APIs such as GLES require display and memory management APIs to provide window and memory
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management. iOS uses an Apple-proprietary API, EAGL, while Android uses the standardized EGL
API. These APIs are different enough that running iOS apps on Android requires reimplementing
Apple’s EAGL APIs, which also requires reverse engineering the EAGL library in the absence of
access to non-public Apple specifications and source code. Fortunately, the EAGL API is small, and
many functions can leverage aspects of Android’s EGL through a combination of diplomat usage pat-
terns and dynamic library replication. However, Android provides an incomplete key EGL extensions
which complicates its use.
3. iOS graphics libraries are designed for multi-threaded use that is not supported in Android’s graphics
libraries. Cycada uses thread impersonation and dynamic library replication to allow Android threads
to impersonate iOS graphics threads. Each thread uses diplomats to access access multiple, isolated
instances of the Android graphics libraries. The isolated graphics libraries and thread impersonation
allow each Android thread to perform thread-specific actions and ultimately support multi-threaded
iOS graphics functionality.
4. iOS provides richer support than Android for multiple GLES API versions. Both iOS and Android
support multiple GLES API versions which are useful for different purposes but incompatible. How-
ever, iOS allows multiple GLES versions to be used simultaneously by different threads in the same
process while Android does not. This is widely used by multi-threaded iOS apps. For example, an
iOS game may use GLES v1 APIs to render game graphics, but use a WebKit view to render a basic
HTML “about” page which uses GLES v2 APIs. Cycada uses dynamic library replication to support
iOS apps using multiple GLES API versions on Android.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of iOS and Android graphics.
Section 4.3 describes the Cycada graphics architecture. Sections 4.4 to 4.8 discuss our new OS compatibility
techniques in the context of binary compatibility support for various aspects of the iOS graphics system.
Section 4.9 presents experimental results. Section 4.10 presents related work. Finally, we present some
concluding remarks.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of iOS Graphics
4.2 iOS and Android Graphics Overview
Modern graphics subsystems can be broken into three major components: rendering or drawing, display and
window management, and memory management. On mobile platforms such as iOS and Android, the most
widely-used subsystem for GPU-accelerated graphics is often loosely referred to as OpenGL ES (GLES).
However, the GLES API [74] is more properly thought of as a rendering, or drawing, API. GLES takes
no responsibility for display and window management. To bridge between the rendered output of GLES
and what is actually shown on the screen, GLES relies on the EGL, originally Embedded-System Graphics
Library, display API. A native window API such as EGL can be thought of as the canvas on which GLES
draws. GLES and EGL objects all require memory to store graphics state. The memory management is
done by the OS and generally involves a separate OS-specific API, allowing the resulting memory objects
to be efficiently shared between apps or between different drawing APIs, such as between OpenGL and
non-OpenGL APIs.
To understand how GLES is supported in iOS and Android, we first review some basics. A GLES
object is an opaque structure that refers to memory objects which store actual graphics data. Renderbuffers,
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framebuffers, and textures are some examples of GLES objects. A GLES context is a state container for all
GLES objects associated with a given instance of GLES. When a thread calls a GLES function, the function
is called in a GLES context to manipulate a GLES object. A thread can create many GLES contexts. Because
there are multiple versions of GLES which have different characteristics and are not compatible with each
other, an EGL context, created with the EGL native window management API, defines the rendering API
version used, and therefore the set of GLES functions that can be used within that EGL context.
With this brief background, Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the major graphics components in iOS.
iOS apps use user space libraries such as UIKit and CoreAnimation to render user content, such as buttons,
text, and images, using CoreGraphics and GLES system libraries. These system libraries communicate di-
rectly to the iOS kernel via opaque Mach IPC calls, and use I/O Kit drivers to allocate and share graphics
memory, control hardware facilities such as frame rates and subsystem power, and perform more complex
rendering tasks such as those required for 3D graphics. For 3D rendering and drawing, iOS uses the standard
GLES API [77; 74]. For display and window management, Apple has devised a non-standard native win-
dow API, EAGL (Embedded Apple GL). The iOS GLES library renders content into a window or display
managed by the EAGL library. For memory management, all graphics memory is allocated and manipulated
through the IOSurface API which communicates via opaque Mach IPC messages to the IOCoreSurface I/O
Kit driver. An IOSurface object is a memory abstraction that facilitates zero-copy transfers of large graph-
ics buffers between apps and rendering APIs. Most GLES objects, such as textures, reference IOSurface
memory objects for storing graphics data. For 2D graphics, the CoreGraphics or QuartzCore APIs are used
to draw directly into IOSurfaces. IOSurfaces from both CoreGraphics and GLES are composited together
using the IOMobileFramebuffer kernel driver, again accessed as an I/O Kit driver via opaque Mach IPC
calls. Opaque Mach IPC calls are inter-process communication messages where both client and server ends
of the communication either hide or obfuscate the details of messages being passed.
Figure 4.2 provides an overview of the major graphics components in Android. Android Java apps use
the android.graphics.canvas and android.opengl APIs to render both 2D and 3D graphics. These Java APIs
make extensive use of Java native calls to system libraries which communicate to the Android Linux kernel
via opaque ioctls and Binder IPC. Opaque ioctls are ioctl system calls on a proprietary driver where
both the command and the arguments are intentionally obfuscated or hidden creating an opaque interface
into the kernel. For rendering and drawing, Android uses the standard GLES API. All 3D drawing is
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Figure 4.2: Overview of Android Graphics
done via GLES, and as of Android 4.0, all 2D drawing is also accelerated by GLES [120]. For display
and window management, Android uses the Khronos standardized EGL [76] API, unlike the proprietary
EAGL used by iOS. The Android GLES library renders content into a window or display managed by the
EGL library. For memory management, all graphics memory is managed by the GraphicBuffer API, and
allocated through the HW Composer or gralloc APIs which use non-standard, often opaque, Linux kernel
driver interfaces. Similar to iOS, Android GraphicBuffer objects facilitate cross-process and cross-API
zero-copy memory transfers. Unlike their IOSurface counterparts in iOS, GraphicBuffer objects are a much
lower-level abstraction managed by the Surface Texture API. Surface Textures are use by both 2D and 3D
drawing APIs, and are composited together by the Surface Flinger which uses the HW composer API and
Linux kernel framebuffer driver.
4.3 Cycada Graphics Architecture
Graphics binary compatibility support in Android for iOS is a key challenge because the graphics sub-
systems in both OSes are driven by closed-source libraries that discard all abstractions and communicate
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directly with kernel drivers through opaque, undocumented Mach IPC calls and ioctls, which in turn
control complex, black-box pieces of hardware. Given the tight coupling of user space libraries to opaque,
undocumented kernel APIs, rewriting any complex libraries or drivers, or emulating hardware would be
at best an enormous and difficult reverse engineering effort attempting to keep up with product develop-
ment cycles of large companies. Alternatively, any attempt to interpose on the kernel ABI would be useless
without an understanding of the driver-specific ioctl commands or opaque Mach IPC messages.
At a high level, Cycada addresses this problem by leveraging the fact that the GLES standard is used
across mobile platforms. Loosely speaking, instead of having iOS apps use their own iOS GLES libraries,
Cycada has them use Android GLES libraries. This is done by introducing diplomats [6] which allow
foreign apps to use domestic libraries to access proprietary software and hardware interfaces on the device.
In Cycada, a thread has two personas, or execution modes, a foreign one for executing foreign code with
a foreign kernel ABI (iOS) and a domestic one for executing domestic code with a domestic kernel ABI
(Android). A diplomat is a function which temporarily switches the persona of a calling thread to execute
domestic code from within a foreign app, or vice-versa. Using diplomats, Cycada replaces calls into foreign
hardware-managing libraries, such as GLES, with calls into domestic libraries that manage domestic GPU
hardware. Each diplomat maps iOS functionality onto equivalent Android functionality.
We extend the basic Cycada diplomat construction to include a prelude and postlude operation in the
context of the foreign persona. Before our extended diplomats switch the persona of the calling thread,
they invoke a prelude function that executes in the foreign persona. After invoking the domestic function
and switching the persona of the calling thread back to the foreign persona, our new diplomats invoke a
postlude function in the context of the foreign persona. These prelude and postlude functions allow Cycada
to support the necessary multiplexing of multiple loaded instances of a single Android graphics library. This
is discussed in more detail in Section 4.8.
The complete process of calling a domestic function from foreign code through a diplomat is:
1. Upon first invocation, a diplomat loads the appropriate domestic library and locates the required entry
point (function), storing a pointer to the function in a locally-scoped static variable for efficient reuse.
2. A prelude function executes foreign code using the foreign persona. This function is common to all
diplomats and is specified at compile time.
3. Arguments to the domestic function call are stored on the stack.
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4. A new set persona system call is invoked from the foreign persona to switch the calling thread’s
kernel ABI and TLS area pointer to their domestic persona values.
5. Arguments to the domestic function call are restored from the stack.
6. The domestic function call is directly invoked through the symbol stored in step 1.
7. Upon return from the domestic function, the return value is saved on the stack.
8. The set persona syscall is invoked from the domestic persona to switch the kernel ABI and TLS
area pointer back to their foreign persona values.
9. Any domestic TLS values, such as errno, are appropriately converted and updated in the foreign
TLS area.
10. A postlude function executes foreign code using the foreign persona. based on the foreign library
being replaced. Similar to the prelude, the postlude function is common to all diplomats and is
specified at compile time.
11. The domestic function’s return value is restored from the stack, and control is returned to the calling
foreign function.
Using diplomat usage patterns, thread impersonation, and dynamic library replication, we complete the
Cycada graphics compatibility architecture to run unmodified iOS binaries on Android, including iOS apps
and graphics frameworks. Figure 4.3 depicts the components of this architecture. Components shown in
grey represent new Cycada code, components in blue represent iOS code, and components in green repre-
sent Android code. Components containing both blue and green represent libraries containing diplomats.
Components can be loosely grouped based on graphics compatibility functionality they provide, and we
discuss our new OS compatibility techniques in this logical order. Section 4.4 discusses iOS GLES support
implemented by the diplomatic OpenGL ES library which includes OpenGL ES Bridge Logic to support
indirect and data-dependent diplomats. Section 4.5 discusses iOS display and window management API
support through a re-implemented Apple EAGL API that leverages multi diplomats composed in the diplo-
matic libEGLbridge library. Section 4.6 discusses iOS graphics memory management support which is
implemented using a diplomatic IOSurface library and LinuxCoreSurface, a reimplementation of the iOS
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Figure 4.3: Cycada iOS Graphics Compatibility
kernel framework, IOCoreSurface. Section 4.7 discusses Cycada’s multi-threaded iOS OpenGL ES support
using thread impersonation. Section 4.8 discusses iOS EAGL Multi-Context Support using dynamic library
replication. This support incorporates the diplomatic libEGLbridge library and a new Android implementa-
tion library, libui wrapper.
4.4 GLES
GLES is the rendering, or drawing, API used by both iOS and Android, and its specification has been stan-
dardized by the Khronos Group, so at first glance, it seems straightforward to simply replace iOS GLES
standard C-function symbols with diplomats that call into the Android GLES library to run iOS apps. How-
ever, the GLES standard is intended to be extensible [75], and vendor library implementations are free to
implement any subset of available extensions or even implement new extensions. The set of available ex-
tensions depends on both the GPU hardware and the vendor library used. Because Apple provides both
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OpenGL ES iOS Android Khronos
1.0 Standard Functions 145 145 145
2.0 Standard Functions 142 142 142
Extension Functions 94 42 285
Common Extension Functions 27 27 -
Extensions 50 60 174
Extensions not in Android 33 0 -
Extensions not in iOS 0 43 -
Table 4.1: OpenGL ES Implementation Breakdown
the vendor library and GPU hardware for iOS platforms, iOS GLES implements a similar set of extensions
across all iOS platforms of a given generation. However, Android runs on a multitude of platforms provided
by many different manufacturers, so the GLES extensions implemented can vary and depend on the partic-
ular vendor library and GPU hardware. Apps on both platforms are expected to query GLES to determine
what extensions are available and adjust their behavior accordingly.
Table 4.1 gives a summary of standard and extension GLES functions implemented in iOS and Android,
as well as the total number of GLES functions reported by Khronos. The Android function list comes from
a Nexus 7 tablet with an NVIDIA Tegra 3 GPU. We focus on GLES v1 and v2 standard functions, as GLES
v3 is only supported by a minority of both iOS [20] and Android [121] devices. Additionally, the table only
considers GLES functions added by extensions, not functionality added to existing functions. Table 4.1
shows that iOS and Android implement the complete set of GLES standard functions, but vastly differ in
extensions and extension functions they implement. As a result, there is no possible one-to-one mapping
from iOS to Android GLES functions.
4.4.1 Diplomat Usage Patterns
To support the complete set of iOS GLES functions, including extensions, on Android, we taxonomize
diplomat usage based on common patterns uncovered through our study of iOS and Android graphics.
Similar to the Gang of Four’s design patterns [56], our diplomat usage patterns allow Cycada to quickly
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identify recurring solutions to binary compatibility problems. We formalize four diplomat usage patterns,
direct, indirect, data-dependent, and multi, that together provide the rigorous and complex management of
resources necessary to bridge the intricacies of two mis-matched APIs.
First, standard GLES functions which are not augmented in any way by extensions can be implemented
using our extended Cycada diplomats. We refer to these as direct diplomats. A direct diplomat uses the
procedure listed in Section 4.3 to directly invoke a corresponding Android function. For iOS functions
where direct invocation of an Android function is not possible, we introduce indirect, data-dependent, and
multi diplomats.
An indirect diplomat uses a small amount of custom logic or wrapper code around a standard diplomat.
The custom logic runs in the foreign, iOS, context and can re-direct APIs to similar Android APIs with
different names, or can manipulate input data to match an existing Android implementation. For example,
APPLE fence [57] is an extension implemented in iOS but not in Android. Cycada supports this extension
using an indirect diplomat that maps APPLE fence APIs to a similar extension, NV fence [73], present on
the NVIDIA Nexus 7 tablet. A small amount of iOS code performs minor input re-arranging within each
APPLE fence API before calling into a corresponding Android GLES NV fence API.
Data-dependent diplomats augment standard diplomats by performing input-dependent logic or imple-
mentation before optionally calling the Android function. For instance, if an iOS extension adds the ability
to render a new pixel format which is unsupported in Android, GLES functions that allocate or manipulate
textures would need data-dependent diplomats that can understand the iOS texture format and manipulate
it into a form understood by Android functions. For example, the standard GLES glGetString func-
tion in iOS has been modified by Apple to accept a non-standard parameter name which is unknown in
Android. That parameter name is intended to return Apple–proprietary extensions available on the plat-
form. Cycada uses a data-dependent glGetString diplomat that interprets the input parameter and either
calls the Android function, or returns a custom string indicating that no Apple-proprietary extensions are
available. Some data-dependent diplomats may not invoke an Android function at all due to a lack of cor-
responding Android functionality. For example, the APPLE row bytes [72] extension handes two extra
parameters to the glPixelStorei function, PACK ROW BYTES APPLE and UNPACK ROW BYTES -
APPLE, and maintains state associated with the current GLES context which controls how three GLES
functions, glTexImage2D, glTexSubImage2D, and glReadPixels, read in or write out pixel data.
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Unimplemented (never called) 10
Total 344
Table 4.2: Cycada iOS OpenGL ES Support Breakdown
These three GLES functions are implemented using data-dependent diplomats such that when the APPLE -
row bytes [72] extension is being used, Cycada reads in and writes out the packed data manually.
Finally, multi diplomats are necessary when iOS functions or extension logic do not map cleanly to
a single Android function, and the behavior is too complex for wrapper or glue logic. These diplomats
leverage several different Android library functions through two or more coalesced diplomats. Cycada uses
multi diplomats to implement a variety of window management and memory management functionality
discussed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6.
Table 4.2 indicates how effective our diplomat usage patterns are in supporting iOS GLES on Android.
The majority of GLES functions are supported via direct diplomats. Twenty GLES functions are supported
via indirect or data-dependent diplomats, and 2 GLES functions require multi diplomats. While indirect
diplomats are simple, data-dependent diplomats can, in some cases, require a hundred lines of additional
code, and multi diplomats involve the most implementation complexity. No GLES functions need to be
completely reimplemented. For completeness, we also list the number of iOS GLES functions that are
not implemented in our prototype because they are never called. Note that the total number of functions
in Table 4.2 does not match Table 4.1 because the numbers in Table 4.1 are not mutually exclusive; for
example, some GLES v1 and v2 standard functions are the same. This table shows that our diplomat usage
patterns successfully bridge the gap between iOS and Android GLES APIs.
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4.5 EAGL
Graphics resource management, including display and window management, is done in iOS using Apple’s
own EAGL Objective-C API, but in Android using the Khronos standardized EGL API. There is not a direct
mapping from EAGL to EGL which requires Cycada to implement substantial logic to support EAGL. How-
ever, the Android EGL library performs conceptually similar functions the Apple’s EAGL, and the EAGL
API itself is small. Using this insight, it is possible to construct an EAGL implementation from a combina-
tion of Android EGL and GLES libraries using multi diplomats with a modest amount of support and glue
logic. For efficiency, we coalesced our multi diplomats into a single Android library called libEGLbridge
(see Figure 4.3). This allows us to pay the overhead of a single diplomat which calls into a custom Android
API that uses several standard Android functions and libraries to perform the required function.
Table 4.3 shows the EAGL API, which consists of only 17 Objective-C methods. Six methods were
supported using multi diplomats, 10 required implementation from scratch, and 1 was not implemented in
the current Cycada prototype as it was never called. The 10 EAGL functions implemented from scratch
required less than 30 lines of code in total as most of them called other EAGL functions, or returned class
properties. In contrast, the methods supported by multi diplomats were much more complicated and required
approximately 5000 lines of code to implement these 6 methods. To provide clearer insight into how multi
diplomats were used to implement EAGL methods, we now describe two examples: render-target object
attachment, and double buffering.
4.5.1 Render-Target Object Attachment
Recall from Section 4.2 that the window management API provides a canvas on which the rendering APIs
draw. Apple’s EAGL provides this functionality, in part, through APIs that attach GLES objects, such as
textures and renderbuffers, to memory buffers wrapped in objects called IOSurfaces. In iOS, an IOSurface
object provides a fast, zero-copy API to manipulate and share large memory allocations (see Section 4.6 for
more detail). When connected to an IOSurface, a GLES object use the associated memory buffer to store
the results of rendering operations. EAGL can then take the rendered results from the memory buffer and
display them on the screen.
GLES functions are standardized and only manipulate GLES objects, not platform-specific objects like
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Multi-diplomats
































Table 4.3: EAGLContext Objective-C API
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IOSurfaces. Apple’s EAGL library provides the bridge between platform and window management specific
data, and standard GLES objects. Implementing this bridge without low-level OS assistance would result in
painfully slow data transfer between processes and APIs making advanced graphics nearly unusable. For-
tunately, Android’s EGL implementation provides the EGLImage extension [71] that introduces EGLImage
objects that are used in approximately the same way IOSurfaces are used in iOS. For example, Android’s
Surface Texture API uses EGLImage objects to associate GLES textures with memory objects.
Cycada implements EAGL functions for associating GLES objects with IOSurfaces using multi diplo-
mats. The functions create EGLImage objects using the Android EGL APIs, and connect them to GLES
objects using GLES extension APIs. However, Android’s EGLImage implementation is incomplete and
only allows textures to be tied to memory objects, not renderbuffers. Because iOS allows either textures
or renderbuffers to be associated with IOSurfaces for GLES drawing, Cycada forces the use of textures to
leverage Android’s EGLImage extension. This is done by interposing on iOS’s EAGL and GLES func-
tions that manipulate renderbuffers and transparently translating their functionality, using multi diplomats,
to manipulate the underlying Android GLES textures used in place of renderbuffers.
4.5.2 Double Buffering
Care must be taken when rendering using GLES APIs. The memory backing the render target is necessarily
accessible to the window management API and could potentially be displayed on the screen at any time. To
prevent corrupt, or half-rendered output, window management APIs usually provide some method of double
(or triple, or quadruple) buffering the output. Double buffering allows the rendering APIs to draw into a
memory buffer while the window management APIs send a different memory buffer out to the screen.
GLES uses an object called a framebuffer to represent the abstracted memory and render target provided
by the window management API. Programmers can create many framebuffers, but the first, or default, frame-
buffer always represents the display screen or window area. The standardized EGL window management
API uses a function named, eglSwapBuffers to swap the rendering target of the default framebuffer
between a “front” buffer (the GLES render target) and a “back” buffer (the memory sent out to the screen or
window). In contrast, Apple’s EAGL API only allows rendering to an off-screen (non-default) framebuffer.
When frame rendering is complete, the programmer must call the presentRenderbuffer function that
copies the off-screen framebuffer into the display screen or window area.
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Because EAGL does not use the default framebuffer, the standard Android eglSwapBuffers will
not work to transfer rendered frame data to the screen or window memory - the rendered data was never put
into memory associated with the default framebuffer! To display the contents of an off-screen framebuffer
into which an iOS app has rendered content, Cycada implements the EAGL presentRenderbuffer
function using a multi diplomat. This diplomat uses simple GLES vertex and fragment shader programs,
via several Android GLES APIs, to render the off-screen framebuffer contents into the default framebuffer.
From the default framebuffer, Cycada can use eglSwapBuffers to display the content. This implementa-
tion is obviously inefficient, and could be improved through a more complicated management of underlying
graphics memory or deeper ties into the Android EGL/GLES libraries. However, due to time constraints,
Cycada prototype performance, detailed in Section 4.9.2, suffers from this inefficiency.
4.6 Memory Management
The massive size, low latency requirements, and cross–process composition of graphics objects requires
an efficient, zero–copy mechanism that allows graphics memory to be shared between libraries and appli-
cations. iOS uses IOSurface objects for efficient graphics memory management. Kernel-level IOSurface
support (see IOCoreSurface in Figure 4.1), provides the zero-copy support which allows IOSurface objects
to be efficiently passed between libraries and applications. In the absence of internal Apple information, we
needed to reverse engineer IOCoreSurface kernel APIs and functionality. The resulting module is shown as
LinuxCoreSurface within the Android Linux kernel in Figure 4.3.
Android manages efficient graphics memory transfers using GraphicBuffer objects. While these ob-
jects perform the same high-level functions as iOS IOSurface objects, the IOSurface API is significantly
more complicated and offers a richer interface for manipulating, sharing, and remapping graphics memory.
Cycada must therefore provide a mapping between IOSurfaces and GraphicBuffers for GLES to function
correctly. We discuss two key aspects of IOSurfaces and how they are supported in Cycada: object life cycle
management, and cross-API object sharing.
4.6.1 IOSurface Life Cycle Management
IOSurfaces are created using IOSurfaceCreate. This function must allocate the necessary memory
buffer, and connect the allocated region to the supporting kernel infrastructure. To provide the necessary
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kernel support for advanced IOSurface memory operations, Cycada interposes on IOSurfaceCreate
using an indirect diplomat to create an Android GraphicBuffer object as the underlying backing graphics
memory for an IOSurface. Similarly, as the created IOSurface is associated with GLES textures, or other
library objects, Cycada uses indirect diplomats to interpose Android GraphicBuffer management. For ex-
ample, Cycada interposes on the glDeleteTextures API and removes any corresponding connection
to the underlying Android GraphicBuffer.
4.6.2 Cross-API Object Sharing
An IOSurface, much like its GraphicBuffer counterpart, can be used by 3D as well as other 2D rendering
APIs. These 2D APIs, such as CoreGraphics, use the CPU to draw directly into IOSurfaces as opposed
to sending commands to the GPU to render content into the memory. To allow 2D and 3D APIs to share
IOSurfaces, iOS provides the IOSurfaceLock and IOSurfaceUnlock functions to lock and unlock
an IOSurface for CPU-only access, during which time the GPU may not access it. Although the Android
GraphicBuffer object can be locked for CPU-only access, it cannot be CPU locked after it has been associ-
ated with a GLES texture (via an EGLImage). As discussed in Section 4.5, iOS associates IOSurfaces, and
thus GraphicBuffers, with GLES textures for 3D drawing. Thus the exact scenario in which we need to lock
a GraphicBuffer to support IOSurfaces is unsupported by the Android API!
To circumvent this limitation, Cycada interposes on the IOSurfaceLock and IOSurfaceUnlock
functions with multi diplomats. When an IOSurface is locked, Cycada disassociates the Android Graph-
icBuffer from the connected GLES texture allowing it to be locked for CPU-only access. However, this
process is non-trivial, and unsupported by current Android GLES and EGL APIs. A GLES texture is re-
quired to be associated with some memory object, so while the IOSurface is locked for CPU access the
Cycada multi diplomat rebinds the GLES texture to a single-pixel buffer allocated by glTexImage2D.
The multi diplomat can then destroy the EGLImage object associated with the texture which implicitly dis-
associates the Android GraphicBuffer. 1 At this point, the GraphicBuffer can be locked for CPU access. By
assuming correct IOSurface locking behavior of the iOS application, we know that no Open GL function
calls will occur that will try to render using the texture.
1The GraphicBuffer object is tied to an EGLImage, and the EGLImage is used as the backing object for the GLES texture.
Destroying the EGLImage object explicitly disassociates the GraphicBuffer fromt the EGLImage, and ultimately from the GLES
texture.
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Cycada also interposes on the IOSurfaceUnlock function with another multi diplomat. Here, we
create a new EGLImage object and rebind it, and the GraphicBuffer, back to the GLES texture. Since
GLES did not have access to the IOSurface (or GraphicBuffer) while it was locked, the disassociation and
re-association process is transparent to iOS’s GLES.
4.7 Multi-Threaded GLES
GLES and EGL are commonly used in heavily multi-threaded environments, however there are some re-
strictions based on the specifications. First, GLES functions are not thread safe, so apps are expected to syn-
chronize access to GLES state outside of the GLES API. Second, an EGLContext object (see Section 4.2)
defines the set of GLES functions available, and it is possible for a standards-compliant EGL implemen-
tation to allow only a single context to be created per thread group [76]. Thus, the accepted standard for
multi-threaded apps using GLES/EGL is to use a single thread dedicated for rendering.
iOS and Android are both heavily multi-threaded environments, but differ in the level of GLES threading
support. iOS allows any thread to use a GLES context; one thread can create a GLES context and another can
use it. Apple’s Grand Central Dispatch (GCD) is used heavily and relies on this feature to asynchronously
dispatch GLES jobs such as texture loading or off-screen rendering. Each thread in the system has its own
context, and implicitly takes on the GLES and EAGL context of the thread that submitted the asynchronous
job. Similarly, the iOS WebKit library spawns a rendering thread that allocates and initializes its own GLES
context which is used by other threads related to WebKit. This level of multi-threaded support does not exist
in Android GLES or EGL libraries, which only allow a GLES context to be used by a thread if it or its thread
group leader created the context. In other words, a GLES context created by Android thread 1 could not be
used by Android thread 2 unless thread 1 also happened to be the “main” thread.
4.7.1 Thread Impersonation
To support multi-threaded iOS GLES apps on Android, Cycada introduces thread impersonation. Thread
impersonation allows thread-specific context to be shared amongst multiple threads enabling one thread to
temporarily assume the persona of another thread. While more limited forms of this impersonation have been
used in security contexts, Cycada thread impersonation presents a generalized mechanism to impersonate a
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thread across all personas in which the thread may execute. In each of these personas, a subset of thread-
specific data may be used or shared by the impersonating thread.
In Cycada, iOS threads attempting to perform GLES operations will impersonate the Android thread
that created an Android GLES context. We refer to the Android thread which created the GLES context as
the target thread, and the iOS thread that invoked a GLES function (through a diplomat) the running thread.
At a high level, diplomats invoked by the running thread will leverage the prelude and postlude functions,
discussed in Section 4.3, to migrate thread local data between the target and running threads. Both Android
and iOS TLS state must be migrated. Although somewhat unintuitive, this is necessary because the target
thread created the GLES context through a diplomat. Thus the target thread has both iOS and Android
graphics state in their respective thread local storage.
However, not all data in thread local storage (TLS) needs to be, or should be, migrated. TLS is an array
of void pointers unique to each persona of thread. Each array entry is a slot. Some TLS slots are reserved
for system use for things such as a thread-local errno value, but apps can reserve other slots using the
pthread key create function, which returns a globally-unique TLS slot ID. A given thread passes the
returned slot ID into the pthread getspecific or pthread setspecific functions to get or set
a thread-local, or thread-private, value. Cycada thread impersonation allows selective migration of TLS
data by modifying Android’s libc to send out a notification whenever a new TLS key is reserved through
pthread key create and destroyed through pthread key delete; this is a trivial 12 line patch.
By registering for hook that is invoked on every pthread key create and pthread key delete
call, we can selectively monitor TLS slot allocation.
Because Cycada migrates graphics contexts, we monitor graphics-specific TLS slot allocations by gating
the Android pthread key create and pthread key delete hooks in the prelude and postlude of
each graphics diplomat. In this way we selectively migrate only the graphics-relevent TLS data between the
target and running thread’s Android personas. We also migrate well-known iOS TLS slots used by Apple
graphics libraries. 2 Since vendor graphics libraries are opaque (even on Android), we can assume that the
TLS slots they reserve are not used by any other subsystems because their use of TLS slots are also opaque
to other subsystems.
2Well-known iOS TLS slots are used by other Apple graphics libraries, such as CoreGraphics, when invoking GLES or EAGL
APIs.
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More formally, Cycada thread impersonation for graphics is done as follows:
1. Cycada identifies graphics-related TLS state using pthread key create and pthread key -
delete Android libc hooks as described above.
2. Whenever an GLES context is created or modified, Cycada ties the graphics-related TLS of the thread
that created the GLES context to the GLES context itself.
3. Whenever a thread calls a GLES function using a GLES context it did not create, Cycada saves the
running thread’s graphics-related TLS state, in both its iOS and Android personas, and replaces it with
TLS data associated with the GLES context.
4. Updates are made to the TLS values as needed as the thread executes graphics functions, and these
updates are reflected back into the TLS associated with the GLES context.
5. Upon GLES function return, Cycada restores the running thread’s original graphics-related TLS state.
In Cycada, a thread has both an iOS and an Android persona, and each persona has its own TLS. Cycada
must ensure that graphics-related use of TLS in the iOS persona matches what is expected by iOS apps. In
general, this is done by relying on iOS libraries to manipulate the TLS in the iOS persona as needed without
any additional work by Cycada. However, when a thread submits an asynchronous job to GCD, Cycada
must associate the iOS TLS data of the submitting thread with the EAGL context such that when the GCD
job is run on a different thread, that thread’s iOS TLS can be properly updated.
Cycada must also ensure that when diplomats are used, thread migration in Android is done to match the
necessary iOS GLES and EAGL contexts, i.e., thread migration must occur for each persona. For example,
if thread A passes its context to thread B before calling a diplomat, thread B must impersonate thread A in
both iOS and Android. However, iOS and Android use separate TLS areas for execution, and the only place
with knowledge of both TLS areas is the kernel. Thus to effect thread migration, Cycada introduces two
new system calls: locate tls and propagate tls. The locate tls syscall can extract TLS values
from any given persona in which a thread has executed. Similarly, the propagate tls syscall pushes
TLS values into any given persona. Using these two syscalls, Cycada ensures proper GLES functionality
across multi-persona thread migration.
Although Android’s EGL implementation is not designed for the type of multi-threaded support avail-
able in iOS, Cycada can still guarantee correct behavior of the calling GLES functions. The GLES spec-
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ification explicitly requires external thread synchronization. By assuming that an iOS app or framework
has correctly synchronized calls to GLES functions, Cycada can guarantee that calls to the Android GLES
library, through diplomats will be properly synchronized.
4.8 EAGL Multi-Context Support
The iOS EAGL library can instantiate multiple EAGLContext objects, each with their own GLES connection.
Each GLES connection can use a different API version. For example, consider a simple iOS game with an
initial menu interface, and a UIWebView to render an HTML “about” page. The UIWebView class uses the
WebKit library to render HTML which implicitly creates its own EAGLContext object connected to GLES
API v2. If the game uses GLES, it will create its own EAGLContext object with its own connection to the
GLES API. The iOS app is free to use either GLES v2 or GLES v1. If the game uses GLES v1, the process
has now instantiated two unique EAGLContext objects each using a different version of the GLES API.
There is no EGL or Android mechanism to support this paradigm. Only a single EGL connection to a single
GLES API version can be made per-process.
4.8.1 Dynamic Library Replication
To support multiple EAGLContexts in a single process, we introduce dynamic library replication. At a
high level, our solution reloads and re-initializes, or re-instances, all the Android graphics libraries. Each
new library instance, or replica, is loaded and linked as if no other libraries have been loaded. 3 This
causes each replica to occupy its own virtual memory space, and invoke its own pseudo-private copies of
all library functions and their constituent dependencies. A replica, then, is essentially a library namespace
which include all dependent libraries. For example, the NVIDIA graphics support library, libGLESv2 -
tegra.so requires the libnvrm.so library which, in turn, requires the libnvos.so library. Each replica of the
libGLESv2 tegra.so library would not only occupy its own virtual address space, it would also link against
privately loaded copies of all required libraries such as libnvrm.so and libnvos.so.
To better understand the need for dynamic library replication, we first discuss Android’s EGL imple-
mentation. Android’s EGL implementation can be broken into two pieces: an open source library that
3We do not reload libc; all library instances use a single, shared instance of libc.
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exports all the standardized EGL functions, and a vendor-provided, device-specific EGL implementation.
Android applications link against the open source library, and when an app initializes the EGL interface
using the eglInitialize function, the open source library loads the vendor-specific EGL and OpenGL
ES libraries. The restriction of a single EGL-to-GLES connection per process is seemingly arbitrary, but
enforced by both the open source library and the vendor-specific libraries.
Modifying the open source EGL implementation to maintain per-thread EGL connection information
only partially solves the problem. While individual threads in a process can separately initialize and main-
tain EGL-to-GLES connections through the open source library, the vendor provided EGL and GLES li-
braries are proprietary and closed source and operate under the assumption of a single, process-wide EGL
connection.
To bypass arbitrary vendor restrictions on singleton EGL connections, Cycada introduces the concept of
dynamic library replication (DLR) - a dynamic linker mechanism that loads multiple, independent instances
of a dynamic library. We refer to a duplicate loaded instance as a replica. Normally, on a call to dlopen
the linker will not re-initialize or reload a library if it’s already been loaded. The linker will simply return
a handle to the previously loaded instance. The Cycada DLR-enabled linker introduces a new function,
dlforce, which opens a library (the replica), and all its dependencies, just as if they were never previously
loaded. The replica and all of its dependencies will have unique virtual addresses, and all of their library
constructors will be called. The linker keeps track of each replica, and the same dlforce function can
be used to modify the behavior of other linker functions such as dlsym and dlopen to search only those
libraries loaded from the given dlforce handle. This allows library code within a replica, or any of its
dependencies, to use the dynamic loader normally, and essentially creates isolated trees of libraries.
4.8.1.1 EGL Extension: multi context
Cycada uses dynamic library replication in the Android EGL open source library through a custom EGL ex-
tension named EGL CU multi context and a supporting library, libui wrapper (see Figure 4.3). This exten-
sion API, shown in Figure 4.4, adds four new EGL functions for creating and manipulating EGLContext ob-
jects that maintain isolated, unique GLES connections within the same process: eglReInitializeMC,
eglSwitchMC, eglGetTLSMC, and eglSetTLSMC. The libui wrapper library links against the ven-
dor GLES and EGL libraries and encapsulates other Android system libraries which implicitly link against
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EGLBoolean eglReInitializeMC(EGLNativeDisplayType display,
EGLDisplay *dpy,
EGLint *major, EGLint *minor);
EGLBoolean eglSwitchMC(EGLContext new_ctx, EGLContext old_ctx);
EGLBoolean eglGetTLSMC(void **tls_vals, int nvals);
EGLBoolean eglSetTLSMC(void **tls_vals, int nvals);
Figure 4.4: Columbia EGL Extension: EGL CU multi context
GLES or EGL. The eglReInitializeMC function creates a replica of the vendor EGL and GLES li-
braries. The eglSwitchMC functions allows a thread to select which replica, and thus which GLES con-
nection, it will use by setting the thread’s EGLContext object to the one contained within the replica.
Creating EGL and GLES replicas, through a modified Android open source EGL library, results in
unique GLES connection management challenges related to TLS. The unmodified Android EGL library
allows one EGL-to-GLES connection (EGLConnection object) per-process, and it stores this information
in a library-static global variable. Creating replicas of the vendor EGL and GLES libraries allows multi-
ple threads to use different EGLConnections concurrently. A single, global EGLConnection variable no
longer suffices, so the EGL CU multi context extension stores this per-thread EGLConnection object in the
TLS. A common paradigm in GLES programming is to create a context on one thread (generally the main
thread), and pass the context information to another thread which will perform rendering or texture loading
functions. Because the EGL CU multi context extension has moved the previously global GLES connec-
tion information into a thread-local variable, we require the ability to copy, or migrate, TLS values between
threads. This is accomplished using the thread impersonation mechanism discussed in Section 4.7 through
the eglGetTLSMC and eglSetTLSMC extension functions.
4.8.2 Unintended Consequences
Moving data from a presumed global location into thread-specific variables, and creating multiple copies
of the same library can have unintended consequences that are not easily predicted. Cycada’s EAGL im-
plementation relies on a custom library, libEGLbridge, described in Section 4.5, that provides targeted
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Android functionality through a set of diplomats. In particular, this library uses Android GraphicBuffer
objects which use the “gralloc” or “HW Composer” APIs to allocate memory. These APIs are provided
in vendor-proprietary libraries that link against the same libraries used by the vendor-proprietary EGL and
GLES libraries. In other words, libEGLbridge implicitly links against the vendor EGL and GLES libraries.
The mechanism by which GraphicBuffer memory is shared between APIs such as GLES and EGL requires
that the gralloc and HW composer APIs use the same GLES connection, established by EGL, that the GLES
rendering functions use. In other words, a GraphicBuffer allocated by libEGLbridge using the first instanti-
ation of the EGL and GLES libraries cannot be used by GLES functions in replicas created by multiple iOS
EAGLContexts.
To avoid this morass of library dependencies, Cycada separates the libEGLbridge functionality into two
pieces. The first piece, labeled in Figure 4.3 as “libEGLbridge,” contains all the diplomats used by the iOS
code, and carefully avoids linking against any libraries. The second piece, labeled “libui wrapper,” contains
all of the actual logic that links against Android graphics libraries. Whenever a new EAGLContext object
is created, a diplomat in libEGLbridge simultaneously creates a replica of the libui wrapper library and the
EGL and GLES libraries by using the prelude functionality of diplomats discussed in Section 4.3. In this
way, the libui wrapper functionality uses the same replica of GLES as the gralloc functions which allocate
a GraphicBuffer.
4.9 Evaluation
We have extended the Cycada prototype, described in Section 2.7, to more completely bridge the differences
between iOS and Android graphics subsystems. Our extended prototype runs widely used iOS apps on
Android, including those that make extensive use of WebKit, such as the Apple-only apps Safari and iBooks,
and third-party apps Yelp, Holy Bible, and Wikipedia. Support for other devices such as GPS and networking
is also completely functional, so apps such as Yelp can be used to find local restaurants and other businesses.
We present some experimental results that both demonstrate the feasibility of our approach and measure its
performance using both application-level benchmarks and targeted micro-benchmarks. For our experiments,
we used Cycada on a Nexus 7 tablet with Android 4.2.2, and compared its performance with an iPad mini
running iOS 6.1.2.
To round-out our evaluation, in Section 4.9.3 we present a complete list of all applications that we
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downloaded, decrypted, and tested on an Android device along with a short description of the current state
of the app on Cycada. Finally, Section 4.9.4 describes the current state of the Cycada prototype including
known bugs and unimplemented features.
4.9.1 iOS WebKit Functionality
We first ran the iOS Safari Web browser on Cycada to demonstrate its functionality. Safari is an excellent
test app because it uses a wide range of complex graphics functionality via WebKit. While advanced graph-
ics APIs, such as GLES, are often thought of exclusively in the context of games or third-party applications,
GPUs and their associated APIs are also used to accelerate many different aspects of computation. For exam-
ple, WebKit uses CoreImage, QuartzCore, CoreGraphics, and IOSurface libraries in iOS which together use
GLES to accelerate image and graphics processing. Additionally, the deep vertical integration of iOS allows
library designers, as opposed to third-party developers, to bypass standard GLES extension query mecha-
nisms, and make simplifying assumptions about available GLES extensions. Our prototype supports these
implicit assumptions by mapping missing extension functionality onto existing Android GLES functions.
Thus, running an app such as Safari in Cycada requires a near-complete GLES bridge implementation.
We performed two sets of experiments. First, we used Safari to browse the main page of the top 30
websites in the US [1] and compared the visual results between Safari running on Cycada on a Nexus 7
tablet, and Safari running on an iPad mini. All of the top 30 websites rendered their content correctly and
appeared visually similar to the respective content on the iPad mini. Second, we used Safari to run the most
recent Acid3 test [129], a web test page from the Web Standards Project that checks browser compliance
with web standards, including the Document Object Model (DOM) and JavaScript. Safari on Cycada passes
the test, showing smooth animation, a score of 100/100, and having the final page look exactly, pixel for
pixel, like the reference rendering.
4.9.2 Performance
We compared four different Android and iOS system configurations to measure the performance of Cycada:
an iOS app running on Cycada (Cycada iOS), an Android app running on Cycada (Cycada Android), an
iOS app running on iOS (iOS), and an Android app running on Android. We normalize our results to the
Android app running on Android. A Nexus 7 tablet with Android 4.2.2 was used in all cases except for iOS
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Null Syscall Diplomatic Calls
System Time (ns) Function Call Time (ns)
Stock Android 225.2 Standard Function 9
Cycada Android 244.1 Diplomat 815.8
Cycada iOS 304.6 Diplomat +Pre/Post 827.7
iPad mini iOS 575.1 Diplomat + GL Pre/Post 932.8
Table 4.4: Kernel-level / ABI Micro-Benchmarks
app on iOS which was run on an iPad mini. Both tablets were released around the same time frame and have
a similar form factor, providing a useful point of comparison.
We first ran a simple set of micro benchmarks using the lmbench test suite to measure the raw overhead
of using diplomats. A diplomat involves two system calls: one to switch the thread from the iOS persona
to Android persona, and one to switch back. We first ran the null system call lmbench micro-benchmark
which invokes system calls that perform no work within the kernel. Using Cycada, we then ran a custom
micro-benchmark using the lmbench infrastructure that measures the time to invoke a standard iOS func-
tion, a diplomat with no prelude or postlude, a diplomat with an empty prelude and postlude, and a diplomat
using the Cycada GLES prelude and postlude functions.
Table 4.4 shows the results of our kernel and ABI micro-benchmarks. For all tests run on the Nexus 7,
the CPU was pinned to 1.3HGz. Unfortunately, there is no interface to pin the CPU frequency in iOS, so
we used the lmbench framework in a best effort to “warm up” the caches, and ramp the CPU frequency to
its maximum of 1GHz. The null syscall results on the four different Android and iOS system configurations
show that Cycada adds approximately 8% overhead to an Android kernel trap and 35% to an iOS trap due
to an unoptimized kernel entry path. It is interesting to note that the iPad mini had a significantly higher
cost to trap into the kernel due primarily to the addition of protection logic guarding against return-to-user
attacks [25]. The diplomatic call results on Cycada show that standard function calls are obviously much
faster than system calls and diplomats. The additional prelude and postlude mechanisms introduced by
Cycada add little overhead over to diplomats without them, and the fully functional GLES prelude and
postlude cost roughly 100ns. A GLES diplomatic call costs approximately the same as three system calls.
We then used two app benchmarks that could be run on both Android and iOS: a web browser running
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SunSpider [19], and the PassMark [105; 106] app. SunSpider is a widely-used JavaScript benchmark that
stresses many aspects of the browser’s JavaScript engine including bit operations, cryptography, raytracing,
JSON input, and pure math. We ran SunSpider using Safari on Cycada and iOS, and Chrome, the default
Android browser, on Cycada and Android. PassMark is a freely available, cross-platform benchmark suite,
and we used its 2D and 3D tests to measure graphics performance. We ran the iOS PassMark app on Cycada
and iOS, and the Android PassMark app on Cycada and Android.
Figure 4.5a shows the SunSpider latency measurements normalized to the performance of the stock
Android browser on Android. Lower numbers are better. The Android browser on Cycada and Safari on
iOS perform similar to the stock Android browser on Android. However, Safari on Cycada is more than
four times slower overall, and over ten times slower for “access” and “bitops” tests. The majority of this
slow down results from a lack of Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation of JavaScript on Cycada due to a Mach VM
memory bug in our prototype that prevents JIT from working properly. For comparison, we also disabled
JIT for JavaScript on iOS, and we present the results, normalized to iOS performance, as the purple bar
in Figure 4.5a. Relative to standard iOS performance, disabling JIT results in a 4.2x slowdown on iOS.
This is approximately equal to the 4.4x slowdown on Cycada with the additional overhead resulting from
our unoptimized system call path (see Table 4.4). The high overhead of running SunSpider without JIT,
especially in the “regex” test, generally falls in line with measurements done by the WebKit team on the
first introduction of ARM JIT [130], and subsequent speedups introduced by the data flow graph (DFG)
JIT [53]. 4
Figure 4.5b shows a breakdown of the Android GLES functions called while running SunSpider in Sa-
fari on Cycada. Note that the SunSpider test itself does not invoke graphics functions, rather the WebKit
framework uses OpenGL ES to render the resulting dynamic HTML output. We show the percentage of
time consumed by each GLES function relative to the total time consumed by all GLES functions, with the
functions ordered in descending order based on how much total time they consume in running the bench-
mark. We show the top 14 functions, which consume over 90% of the total time. Function names starting
with gl correspond to direct, indirect, or data-dependent diplomats to Android GLES functions, names start-
4The Fourth Tier LLVM JIT optimizations referenced in the WebKit FTL JIT article [53] were not implemented in the version
of WebKit used in our measurements, however the article presents DFG JIT performance versus baseline JIT which indicates a
greater than 3x speedup versus baseline and 30x speedup versus non-JIT on at least one representative benchmark.
99








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(f) PassMark Average Time per Function
Figure 4.5: Cycada Application Benchmarks
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ing with egl correspond to multi diplomats to Android EGL functions, and names starting with aegl are
custom multi diplomats, located in libEGLbridge, supporting the Cycada EAGL implementation (see Sec-
tion 4.5 and Figure 4.3). Approximately 40% of the graphics-related time is spent in EAGL implementation
related functions such as aegl bridge draw fbo tex. Clearly there is room for improvement in our
unoptimized prototype.
Figure 4.5c shows average execution time per function call for the same GLES functions in Figure 4.5b.
Of the top 14 functions, only 1 costs less than 10µs, and the most time consuming functions take, on
average, over 300µs. Since Table 4.4 shows the cost of a diplomatic call is less than 1µs, the overhead due
to diplomats is small for most GLES functions, and certainly small for GLES functions that account for
most of the GLES execution time in running SunSpider in Safari. The dominant cost of Cycada is in the
actual graphics logic required to bridge between iOS and Android, not in the diplomat mechanism.
Figure 4.5d shows the PassMark 2D and 3D graphics measurements normalized to the performance of
the stock Android app on Android. Higher numbers are better. This measurement generally matches the
PassMark graphics measurements first reported in Section 3.5.3. However, through the enhanced graphics
support described in this chapter, and some preliminary optimizations of our prototype, Cycada now out-
performs Android in the GPU-intensive complex 3D test by more than 20% running on the same Nexus 7
tablet. Some of this performance increase could also be attributed to slight variations in how the 3D scenes
were rendered on each platform, or differences in the exact OpenGL ES calls made on either platform due
to differences in supported GLES extensions.
Similar to results found in Section 3.5.3, all the PassMark graphics measurements show that Cycada iOS
performance relative to Android is highly correlated to iOS performance relative to Android, even though
Cycada is running on the Nexus 7 while iOS is running on the iPad mini. For the 2D tests in which stock
iOS does significantly worse than stock Android, Cycada iOS also does significantly worse than Cycada
Android. In the complex vectors and 3D tests in which stock iOS does noticeably better than stock Android,
Cycada iOS also does noticeably better. The reason for this is that both Cycada and iOS use the same
frameworks and libraries, which in some cases have better performance than Android and in some cases are
worse. Comparing Cycada and iOS, we see that Cycada performs better than iOS on the 2D tests and worse
on the 3D tests. Because the 2D tests make heavier use of the CPU, Cycada outperforms iOS because it uses
the faster Nexus 7 CPU versus the slower iPad mini CPU. Because the 3D tests are highly GPU intensive,
they provide a better indicator of the graphics overhead of Cycada compared to iOS. The overhead is higher
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on the simple 3D test because that test is designed to maximize frame-rate and thus stresses our unoptimized
EAGL implementation which is responsible for moving rendered scenes onto the display. The complex 3D
tests involve more processing intensive GPU functions to render complex scenery, so since the GLES calls
used are more expensive, the overhead of Cycada is less.
Figures 4.5e and 4.5f show the percentage of total GLES execution time and average execution time per
GLES function, ordered from the function with the largest to the smallest total execution time. We show the
top 14 functions, which consume over 90% of the total time. The two most heavily used GLES functions are
glDrawArrays, which draws an array of vertices, and glClear, which clears the framebuffer. These
are both standard GLES functions, heavily used by the simple and complex 3D tests, called via direct
diplomats. Based on their average execution time shown in Figure 4.5f relative to the cost of diplomats
shown in Table 4.4, diplomat overhead is small. The primary overhead of Cycada is due to functions such
as aegl bridge draw fbo tex and aegl bridge copy tex buf, which consume roughly 20% of
the GLES execution time. These functions correspond to a highly optimized hardware supported path in iOS
on the iPad mini.
4.9.3 iOS Application List
We used many different real-world iOS applications to further test, debug, and benchmark Cycada. A
complete list of these applications can be found in Table 4.5. Note that each of these apps was downloaded
from the App Store, decrypted on an iOS device (described in Chapter 3 Section 3.5.1), and run on the
Cycada prototype. Table 4.5 lists the application name, the App Store category where it was found, and some
brief notes on how well the app performed while running on Cycada. Note that apps in the iPhone System
App and iPad System App category are applications that ship with iOS on an iPhone and iPad respectively.
These applications did not need to be decrypted, they were simply copied directly from a jailbroken iOS
device. In addition to full GUI applications, we also tested numerous command line utilities such as ioreg,
bash, and openssh. Nearly all command line utilities we ran worked without issue on Cycada.
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Table 4.5: iOS applications tested under Cycada
App Name Category Status
1 3D Benchmark Utilities Fully functional
2 Apple Remote Entertainment Fully functional
3 Calculator iPhone System App Fully functional
4 Calculator Pro Utilities Fully functional
5 Calendar iPad System App Fully functional
6 Clock iPhone System App Fully functional
7 Constitution Reference Fully functional
8 Holy Bible Reference Fully functional
9 iBenchmark Utilities Fully functional
10 Keynote Remote Utilities Fully functional
11 Mobile Mouse Utilities Fully functional
12 My Apps Lite Business Fully functional
13 Papers Productivity Fully functional
14 PerformanceTest Utilities Fully functional
15 RowmotePro Utilities Fully functional
16 Stocks iPhone System App Fully functional
17 SystemStatusLite Utilities Fully functional
18 UrbanDictionary Reference Fully functional
19 Yelp Travel Fully functional
20 AnTuTu Utilities Works, but GPU test crashes
21 Dark Sky Weather Works, but WebView overlay occludes UI
22 Google Translate Reference Works, but no audio
23 iBooks Reference Works, but can’t read encrypted (purchased) content
24 iReddit News Works, but can only load a single web page view
25 Padgram Utilities Works, but images fail to render in multiple WebView contexts
26 QuranMajeedLite Reference Works, but no audio
27 Safari iPad System App Works, but has some graphics glitches
28 TextPics Social Networking Works, but no copy/paste
29 Weather iPhone System App Works when emulating an iPhone
30 App Store iPad System App Loads with errors (missing daemons 5)
31 CNN app for iPhone News ACAccountStore/XPC error
32 Dropbox Productivity Partially works: current version uses hardcoded screen size, (no keyboard access)
33 Google Chrome Utilities Interface works, but won’t fetch url (after pressing enter)
34 iTunes iPad System App Loads with errors (missing daemons 6)
Continued on next page
5App 30: missing support for daemons: itunesstored
6App 34: missing support for daemons: itunesstored
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
App Name Category Status
35 Keynote Productivity Initial UI works, requires iCloud interaction
36 Mail iPad System App Interface works: says iCloud password is not provided
37 Maps (Apple) iPad System App Loads, but no map images on screen (MapKit)
38 Messages iPad System App Interface works, but cannot send an iMessage (missing daemons 7)
39 Music iPad System App Interface works (missing daemons 8)
40 Nook Books Loads
41 WhatsApp Social Networking “Your device is not supported:” (relies on cellular plan)
42 Wikipedia Reference Loads, but unable to fetch new pages
43 YouTube iPad System App Interface works, cannot connect to youtube (SSL errors)
44 Amazon Lifestyle Displays interface then crashes with SSL errors
45 Angry Birds: Star wars Games Loads, but crashes
46 Bible Reference Loads, but eventually hangs
47 candycrushsaga Games Loads, but hangs
48 Clash of Clans Games Loads, then hangs
49 Craigslist News Does not load
50 Dictionary.com Reference Loads, but hangs
51 Dolphin Browser Productivity Does not load
52 EAT24 Food & Drink Running process, but no window
53 eBay Lifestyle Does not load
54 Facebook Social Networking Running process, but no window
55 Facebook Messenger Social Networking Running process, but no window
56 Flashlight Utilities Running process, but no window
57 Geekbench Utilities Running process, but no window
58 Gmail Productivity Shows an empty dialog then crashes
59 Google Search Reference Loads, then crashes
60 Groupon Lifestyle Loads, then crashes with unhandled exception
61 iTunes U Education Running process, but no window
62 Kindle Books Loads main screen
63 LinkedIn Social Networking Loads, but freezes after a couple of seconds
64 Merriam Webster Dict Reference Loads, but crashes
65 Notes iPad System App Loads, but hangs after a few seconds
66 PayPal Finance Running process, but no window
67 Petting Zoo Games Loads, but crashes
68 Pokedex Reference Does not load
69 Starbucks Food & Drink Running process, but no window
7App 38: missing support for daemons: apsd
8App 39: missing support for daemons: itunesdaemon
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In total, 29 apps are either fully functional or work well-enough to be usable with minor bugs; 14
apps load and are interactive, but require services from currently unsupported libraries or daemons such as
MapKit or itunesstored; 26 apps either fail to load, crash or are otherwise unresponsive / unusable. The
iOS libraries, such as MapKit, which are currently unsupported in Cycada should only require engineering
effort to find and implement missing pieces of compatibility.
Many of the 28 non-functional applications tested on Cycada either hang or fail to load / work properly
due to missing or non-functional daemons or system services. Most of these daemons or system services
are not supported simply due to lack of time. Most of the work to support these daemons would fall into
two categories. First, daemons such as CommCenter communicate to proprietary hardware such as the
telephony, or cellular baseband, device. These devices (and daemons which use them) could be supported
using methods similar to those described in this chapter. Although not all of these devices have a standard-
ized interface, they at least have a documented interface used by the daemons. This should be sufficient to
construct diplomatic support libraries on Cycada which map functionality onto Android or Linux devices.
Second, many daemons and libraries utilize device-specific encryption or certificate based authentication
that communicates to Apple servers using previously activated SSL certificates. Decrypting existing con-
tent, such as iTunes purchases, requires using keys that are generated locally on an Apple devices and stored
in a secure location in Apple hardware. The initial entropy for these keys comes from device-specific param-
eters such as the BlueTooth MAC, the WiFi MAC, the IMEI, and other device-specific values. Much of this
data can be copied from a single Apple device, but supporting a generic mechanism to decrypt this content
on any device is cryptographically impossible. Similarly, certificates used in certain SSL transactions with
Apple computers requires device-specific entropy that’s been previously provided to Apple. Given enough
implementation time, these services could be made to work, but they could, at best, only emulate a single,
existing, previously activated, Apple device. Reverse engineering the activation protocols to generate new
device-specific keys and certificates is left to future work.
Finally, there are also many daemons that communicate with other daemons that require support in one or
both of the above categories. While these daemons may not have any additional compatibility requirements,
they still block application progress because they require other unsupported daemons.
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4.9.4 Prototype: Current State
The Cycada prototype has been demonstrated numerous times, including in a YouTube video 9. Although
the demonstration shows several useful and interesting iOS apps running on a Nexus 7 tablet, there are
pieces of the prototype which are incomplete, buggy, or missing.
There is a known bug in the duct tape implementation of XNU thread call APIs which uses Linux delayed
workqueues. In our current prototype, there is a race condition when adding an item to a workqueue which
may already be on an existing queue. Careful examination of the locking used in the Duct Tape function
thread call enter (the core of the thread call API implementation) should resolve this issue.
The networking support in the Cycada prototype properly supports most of the BSD sockets API, how-
ever there are some types of networking operations performed by iOS frameworks and applications which
are not currently supported. The two primary pieces of iOS networking which are unsupported are: traffic
classes, set through the SO TRAFFIC CLASS socket option, and XNU routing sockets. Traffic classes are
useful for applying different QoS policies to different types of network traffic. While this should not affect
correctness, it could affect network performance. Routing sockets are not used extensively in iOS 5.x, but
they are used in iOS 6. The Cycada prototype was able to demonstrate near complete networking support
on iOS 5.1, but in order to properly support iOS 6 and beyond, full routing socket support will be necessary.
Cycada supports most iOS OpenGL ES APIs through techniques described in this chapter, however
there are pieces of this API which are not supported due to lack of time, and, as Section 4.9.2 shows,
there is a sub-optimal mapping of some basic buffer and window management iOS APIs. A prime example
of missing OpenGL ES support in Cycada is Vertex Array Objects [31; 21] (VAOs). Unfortunately, the
OpenGL ES version and graphics hardware in the Cycada prototype do not support VAOs. To support
this feature, Cycada would need to either manually implement this functionality on top of Vertex Buffer
Objects [74], or port the prototype to a different platform which supports this feature. Vertex Array Objects
are used extensively in the OGRE [124] framework which is a cross-platform 3D graphics library used by
many games and benchmarks.
The iOS EAGL library uses proprietary interfaces to a closed-source device driver to optimize transfer
of final graphics memory buffers to the GPU and display. Unfortunately, due to an imperfect reverse-
engineering of the EAGL API and a sub-optimal buffer-swapping implementation, performance of the Cy-
9https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uaple0Ec1Dg
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cada prototype demonstrates high overhead as seen in Section 4.9.2. More specifically, without the help of a
proprietary interface for zero-copy transfer of off-screen render buffers onto the screen, Cycada must use a
combination of Android OpenGL ES and EGL functions to accomplish the same task. This adds significant
overhead in both performance and memory use - at least one extra memory copy of each frame is performed.
Finally, Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation of JavaScript in iOS applications does not work in the Cycada
prototype. Memory allocation and permissions setup by the JavaScriptCore iOS library have been
verified, and the library successfully generates code into the allocated memory. However, the iOS appli-
cation crashes soon after jumping into the JIT compiled JavaScript code. The root cause of this failure is
currently unknown, although two vectors of investigation have been identified. First, cache flushing and
interaction between icache and dcache could be the cause of the failure, and the efficacy of the cache flush-
ing mechanism mapped to the iOS cache flush operation should be investigated. Second, the output of the
JIT compiler could be encrypted, hashed, or otherwise code-signed by the iOS library under the assumption
that the XNU kernel can decrypt, unhash, or verify the executable memory segment. The Cycada prototype
assumes unencrypted binaries (see Section 3.5.1), and would be unable to decrypt dynamically generated
encrypted code.
4.10 Related Work
Section 3.7 discusses many different approaches to run applications from multiple OSes on the same hard-
ware [2; 55; 48; 49; 50; 39; 67; 92; 101; 99; 88; 68; 110; 29; 46]. However, as previously discussed in
Chapter 3, graphics support remains a key challenge. Various approaches rely on the assumed ubiquity
of X Windows, and assume that apps simply conform to the X Windows standard. This is insufficient to
support GPU-intensive apps that rely on a wide range of graphics support, and is not applicable to the ver-
tically integrated, proprietary graphics stacks common on mobile platforms in lieu of X. Wine, a Windows
API reimplementation project for Linux, provides incomplete support for Microsoft’s advanced graphics
API, DirectX, on top of Linux using desktop-class OpenGL functions. This is in contrast to Cycada which
leverages existing iOS frameworks and libraries instead of requiring a massive reimplementation effort.
Desktop virtualization solutions have developed several solutions that allow guest VMs to use GPU
acceleration through mediated access to host hardware resources and libraries. These solutions can be
grouped into four basic categories: API remoting or forwarding, device emulation, split-mode or mediated
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pass-through drivers, and direct pass-through. Desktop or server API remoting [116] (“indirect rendering”)
solutions, such as VirtualGL [122], rely on desktop windowing protocols such as GLX [139] to stream
OpenGL commands to a remote server for execution. Mobile OSes such as iOS discard abstractions such
as GLX in favor of custom APIs targeted for mobile usage patterns and low-latency direct hardware com-
munication. Similarly, API forwarding solutions rely on being able to forward API calls from one platform
to another because they share the same API. However, mobile OSes such as iOS use some standards, but
not others, and the ones they use, they may extend, such that there is no longer a complete, shared API to
forward from iOS to Android, making API forwarding or remoting problematic.
Device emulation is only used for simple, 2D hardware [30] due to the massive complexity of GPU
hardware. The approach is even more problematic on resource constrained mobile platforms such as iOS
with proprietary interfaces that would be difficult to reverse engineer and emulate.
Split-mode, or mediated pass-through, solutions such as VMGL [83], VMware’s vGPU [118; 47], and
XenGT [123], take a hybrid approach of forwarding some aspects of the guest API, direct mapping some
host GPU resources, and emulating other aspects of a graphics driver. The difficulty of emulation depends
in part on the API supported. For example, VMware’s approach focuses on Direct3D, which requires apps
to perform their own graphics resource management and lacks the additional challenges of support GLES
which requires EGL, or in the case of iOS, a proprietary EAGL.
Direct pass-through solutions, such as NVIDIA GRID [95], leverage traditional hardware virtualization
and require specialized hardware only recently available in desktop-class GPUs [94]. They rely on hardware
support not available in mobile platforms, and do not address the problems with providing graphics device
support in the context of mapping vertically integrated graphics stacks such as iOS to other platforms.
Although none of these previous approaches by themselves can support graphics device support across
mobile platforms such as iOS and Android, many facets of Cycada may be adapted and applied in the
context of these other approaches, for example to enable mobile graphics virtualization. For example, API
forwarding could leverage some of the mechanisms introduced by Cycada to provide similar graphics sup-
port for VMs. The primary difference in applying these techniques would be some of the performance costs.
For example, a hosted mobile graphics virtualization solution based on KVM for ARM [44] would require
a world-switch that at bare minimum costs 5000 cycles, in contrast to using diplomats to switch between
thread personas from iOS to Android at the much lower cost of a couple of system calls.
108
CHAPTER 4. CYCADA GRAPHICS
4.11 Conclusions
We have presented a graphics-focused study of Cycada, and extended its binary compatible graphics support
for running iOS apps on Android through three new OS compatibility mechanisms: (1) extended diplomat
construction and new diplomat usage patterns, direct, indirect, data-dependent, and multi, (2) thread im-
personation which allows one thread to temporarily assume the persona of another thread, and (3) dynamic
library replication which allows the linker to create separate loaded instances of a dynamic library. These
mechanisms proved essential to support our prototype in running widely used iOS apps, many of which
utilize WebKit and other frameworks that rely heavily on the GPU. We discussed our experiences with these
mechanisms in the context of GPU device support, and demonstrated their feasibility by using iOS’s Safari
on Cycada to visit popular websites and run browser benchmarks.
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Chapter 5
Cycada: Experiences and Lessons Learned
Building a binary compatibility solution able to run apps extracted from one of the world’s most closely
guarded mobile operating systems is a massive and ambitious undertaking. The paradigms, techniques, and
methodologies described in Chapters 3 and 4 construct a viable framework within which a project such
as Cycada can be developed, however, real world implementation of this project embodied an intricate
web of binary-level reverse engineering, humorously simple solutions, tedious hours of bit manipulation,
and obstinate debugging sessions worthy of a Greek hero. This chapter recounts our experiences building
Cycada through observation and anecdote, and identifies some key lessons learned along the way.
The process of running iOS apps on Android devices began by investigating a simple static binary
compiled on an iMac using the iOS toolchain and debugging facilities provided by Apple through their
Xcode IDE [24]. These tools are intended for use by Application developers, and include a full-featured
debugger with GUI integration and a complete set of binary utilities for manipulating and investigating
object files. So, with very little effort we built a working iOS app, ran it on an iPhone, and introspected
it. With only marginally more effort, we extended this support to command-line, statically linked iOS
programs: something not supported by default in Xcode, but only involved discovering the proper arguments
to pass to gcc/clang in a simple Makefile.
Xcode supports iOS development through an SDK which ships with the IDE. The iOS SDK that ships
with Xcode also contains all the source headers and object files necessary to build iOS apps. Interestingly,
the SDK contains full copies of nearly all the system libraries used on an iPhone or iPad. Although the
actual device uses the libraries in a pre-linked shared cache, the object files provided in the SDK contain
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the exact same compiled code which can be investigated by the iOS toolchain and binary utilities. In other
words, Apple actually ships fully-functional ARM binaries for almost all iOS libraries.
In addition to the libraries and framworks within the iOS SDK, Apple also releases the source code
for many libraries and daemons, as well as the XNU kernel, on the http://opensource.apple.
com/ website. However, the released source code has been at least partially sanitized of all iOS, ARM,
or embedded platform specific bits. For example, the XNU source released by Apple contains no platform
support for any iOS device, but it does compile for the x86 64 platform. We were able to leverage some of
the platform agnostic pieces of kernel source, as well as the sources of several other libraries. Section 3.3.2
describes how we took large portions of XNU source and compiled them into the Linux kernel. Outside
the kernel, we were also able to use projects such as libdispatch where we could compile a working iOS
version of the library and enable or disable features. Unfortunately, key pieces of code such as the ARM
XNU system call binary interface were missing.
Although the combination of open source code and working ARM libraries gave Cycada a jump start,
none of the nice iOS debugging tools and command line utilities shipped with Xcode work on Android
devices. Debugging a process, using a tool such as gdb, requires intimate coordination with the kernel
and low-level system libraries. You can’t use the iOS debugger to diagnose what went wrong when you
tried to run that same debugger on top of a Linux kernel, and the Android debugger only knows about
Android/Linux programs.
So, it was without a debugger, but with bits of source code and some working iOS libraries, that we
attempted to run our first statically linked iOS binary on an Android device. Of course, it failed miserably.
After many long hours of pouring over binary formats, ARM assembly, sparse documentation, and broken
tools, we were able to see the words “Hello World” printed by an iOS binary running on an Android device.
It was only the beginning.
With humble deference to Lampson’s hints for system design [84], we offer up several hints, or guide-
posts, for the reverse engineer, the binary compatibility hacker who may consider an endeavor similar to
our own. These guideposts will not exhaustively light the way to a complete binary compatibility solution,
nor will they necessarily apply more generally outside the scope of Cycada. As their name implies, they
construe a boundary to a particular problem space. They do not mark a path through that space.
We have organized these guideposts along three axes, or three sets of counter-balanced ideals: the axis
of work, the axis of tools, and the axis of human nature. On one side of each axis lie the three great virtues of
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Figure 5.1: Axes of Reverse Engineering
a programmer, laziness, impatience, and hubris, first described by Larry Wall [128]. These virtues provide
clarity and insight to the process of mapping one complex system onto another. Regrettably, virtue alone
could not run even a single, statically linked iOS binary on an Android device. No matter how much code we
reused, or how much work our tools performed for us, or how much leverage we gained from the collective
hubris of iOS developers, we found ourselves falling into what can only be described as vice. On the other
side of each axis lie the counter-balancing ideals of diligence, patience, and repudiation. We would often
require diligence to complete a brute-force implementation, or work through bugs arising from implicit
assumptions made about iOS hardware. A complete lack of tools required patience to carefully construct an
environment robust enough to debug an iOS binary on the Linux kernel. Finally, under extreme duress, the
vice-filled reverse engineer must repudiate first principles; they must know when a bit of duct tape, or a little
white lie will do the job better than a well-engineered, maintainable interface. Figure 5.1 depicts each of
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Axis of Work
Laziness Diligence
Force/reuse existing code paths: Standardized API tokens, different binary representation
avoid the “commpage” and dyld shared cache Subtle API variations




IDA scripts for automated binary analysis Debugging:
SDK-provided analysis tools and custom shell scripts in-kernel signal handlers for user space debugging
Enable all the logs custom log formatting / parsing
Axis of Human Nature
Hubris Repudiation
IOSurface reverse engineering Ignore the unnecessary: code signing / sandboxing
GLES Extension mapping Fake it: faux hardware names
Close enough: just overlay system call variants
Duct tape the code you don’t want to write
Table 5.1: Cycada Development Examples
the three axes that map out the three dimensional space illuminated by our reverse engineering guideposts.
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the various stories and experiences that fall under each guidepost.
We describe, in Section 5.1, the three axes of counter-balanced virtue and vice. Each virtue is described
through example, occasionally in gory detail. The chapter concludes, in Section 5.2, with a discussion of
porting Cycada to iOS 6 and beyond.
113
CHAPTER 5. CYCADA: EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED
5.1 Virtue and Vice
The Axis of Work
The first great virtue of a programmer according to Wall, laziness, characterizes the amount and type of
work performed by a programmer. Wall describes laziness as,
[t]he quality that makes you go to great effort to reduce overall energy expenditure. It makes
you write labor-saving programs that other people will find useful, and document what you
wrote so you don’t have to answer so many questions about it. Hence, the first great virtue of a
programmer.
As in most other programming endeavors, when writing a binary compatibility system the reverse engineer
should never write unnecessary code, and should never solve a problem that doesn’t really need solving.
Unlike other endeavors, a binary compatibility system maps one large body of code onto another large body
of code; the less new code introduced in this mapping the better. Thus, when presented with two possible
solutions, the reverse engineer should always choose the one that involves less code (or no code at all).
The virtue of laziness, however, does not completely cover the work a reverse engineer must do to build
a binary compatibility solution. Many problems or situations require a diligent, brute force approach. Often
this is either the only way to accomplish your goal, or it’s actually faster than planning a more elegant, but
eminently more complicated solution. Being in opposition to a virtue, one must call this vice.
5.1.1 Laziness
When building a binary compatibility solution, Wall’s notion of laziness can be extended to encompass all
of the foreign binaries being made to run on the host system. This means that not only should you strive
to reuse and document code that you write, it also means that you should look at the library or application
you’re trying to run to see if it already does what you need it to do. For example, the iOS dynamic linker,
dyld [9], and Libc library use variants of certain functions such as gettimeofday which use data
exported to user space in a shared memory region called the commpage. Exporting this dynamic data to iOS
user space from the Linux kernel would involve a time-consuming reverse engineering effort as the format
and exact bits of the iOS ARM commpage are not released. By inspection of the disassembly, we found
that each of the functions in question had a “slow” variant that called down into the kernel directly to obtain
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the necessary information. By modifying the TEXT segment of the dyld and Libc binaries, we forced
the code to invoke the non-commpage function variants thus reusing code that already existed in the iOS
binaries.
Another example of lazily reusing existing iOS code to solve a harder problem involves the iOS dyld
shared cache. In iOS and OS X, Apple uses a single-file representation for most system libraries. This file,
the shared cache, is an optimized concatenation of all constituent libraries. When the user space linker,
dyld, loads a library, either through explicit or implicit dependencies marked in the Mach-O binary format,
it first looks to see if that library exists in the shared cache. If so, the linker simply uses a pre-bound version
of the library from within the cache instead of opening, mapping, and binding the on-disk file. The shared
cache is mapped once for each process in the system resulting in a significant reduction in startup time, but
a significant increase in the complexity of the kernel loader necessary to support Cycada.
Through careful reading of the dyld documentation, and cross-referencing with the disassembled bi-
nary, we noticed that the binary also supported manually walking the file system to search for a given library.
Cycada uses environment variables and a small binary hack to dyld to force the linker to look for libraries
in the file system. While this avoids having to implement complicated support for shared caches, application
load time on Cycada suffers from having to locate, open, map, and bind every shared library. This is shown
in more detail in Figure 3.5 and Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.
In addition to reusing iOS code, Cycada also took a lazy approach to system call implementation. During
the initial development of Cycada, only system calls that were actually called during program execution
were implemented. This means that instead of laboriously pouring over the specification of each system
call and iteratively implementing each one, we simply put stubs, or place-holder functions, in every system
call slot which logged an error message whenever they were invoked. In this way, we focused our limited
programming resources on the exact bits of compatibility work that needed to be done. When a system call
was invoked, its functionality was determined, and a concerted effort was made to reuse as much existing
Linux functionality as possible. This allowed us to further reduce implementation time and effort.
5.1.2 Diligence
Not all binary compatibility problems can be solved with lazily written, well documented, reusable code.
In fact, many problems either require a brute force approach, or custom, narrowly–scoped, non-reusable
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code written for the specifics of the given problem. In Cycada, several problems of this nature arose from
differences in interpretation of a standard, or minor variations on well defined interfaces. For example, the
POSIX standardized flag to the open call which should create a file if it doesn’t exist is O CREAT. While
POSIX specifies this token name, it does not specify its underlying binary representation. In other words,
POSIX defines source-level compatibility, not a binary compatibility. In XNU, Apple’s iOS kernel, the
O CREAT flag is designated by the bit, 0x200, while in Linux this same token is designated by the bit,
0x100. Although both OSes are mostly POSIX compliant, they are not binary compatible. To support
these variations in implementation, Cycada uses a set of translation tables and inline functions which map
iOS binary tokens and structures to Linux tokens and structures. This work was, by far, the most tedious
and painstaking part of Cycada.
In addition to differences in the binary representation of standardized tokens, both Linux and iOS often
contain minor variations on a well-defined interface. These differences must be bridged either through a
brute force implementation of the iOS variation, or through emulation using existing mechanisms. For
example, iOS uses a networking stack derived from the FreeBSD kernel. Thus, it supports a socket option
named SO REUSEPORTwhich allows two sockets to bind to exactly the same IP:PORT combination. While
Android’s Linux kernel uses the BSD socket interface, support for SO REUSEPORT was not present until
Linux kernel v3.9, and very few Android devices support a kernel version that new. To support this iOS
networking feature, used by several daemons, we manually back-ported the SO REUSEPORT support found
in Linux 3.9 to the kernel versions that support the Android devices used for running Cycada.
A brute force implementation was also necessary to support the iOS syscall return path. In iOS, the
return from a syscall is always a 64-bit value, even on 32-bit architectures. In Android, the syscall return
path is a single register which is 32-bits or 64-bits depending on the platform. On 32-bit platforms this
means that we only return half the number of bits an iOS syscall expects. The Android syscall entry and
exit paths comprise a collection of hand-coded, heavily optimized assembly functions. The return value
from a syscall handler is, by default, stored in a single register which is carefully preserved by the exit
path assembly as user space state is restored. To support 64-bit iOS syscall return values on 32-bit Android
devices in Cycada, we refactored all of the hand-coded assembly functions invoked on the syscall exit path
to preserve two register return values instead of just one.
Another fascinating problem space that required non-reusable, often tedious and brute force, solutions
involves assumptions made by user space code. A user space environment assumes many different things
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about its underlying kernel, and some of these assumptions can foil even the most carefully crafted com-
patibility interfaces. Occasionally these assumptions are documented, but many times they are not. Undoc-
umented implicit assumptions about libraries, frameworks, or the underlying kernel can cause very subtle
failures in seemingly disparate parts of the system. Here are several of the most interesting implicit assump-
tion bugs that we encountered while developing Cycada.
First, the Mach timer interface was straightforward to implement using Linux kernel timers (and the
duct taped Mach IPC code). For the majority of the time, this simplistic solution worked. However, there is
an implicit assumption in the CoreFoundation library, which uses Mach timers as part of the CFRunLoop
implementation, that a timer will never fire early. Within the CoreFoundation code that handles timer events,
a timer that appears to fire early is treated an invalid, the error is silently squashed, and the timer is never
re-armed. Mach timers in XNU are designed never to fire before their specified deadline or timeout. Linux
timers, on the other hand, are by default sloppy, and are free to fire before the specified deadline or timeout
period has completely expired. In iOS user space, a timer that fires before its anticipated deadline is treated
as invalid, disregarded, and never rearmed or serviced. In Cycada, this resulted in applications which
appeared to hang at seemingly random points in their execution because one or more timers had stopped
firing. Cycada handles this implicit assumption by wrapping the Linux kernel timer API. If a Linux kernel
timer fires early, it is re-armed for the amount of remaining time (or shortest possible timer duration). Thus
Cycada ensures that a Mach timer event will never be generated until after the specified deadline.
Another interesting implicit assumption was made by code that called the getattrlist syscall to
obtain extended attributes of a file or directory. Initially, Cycada simply returned an error indicating that
certain attributes were unsupported. However, the user space code assumed that this call would always
succeed, and proceeded to use the invalid contents of an uninitialized file system attribute structure. This
lead to SEGFAULTs or stack corruptions at various points in the code depending on exactly where the invalid
attribute had been propagated. The only solution to this problem was to do a brute force implementation
of the missing attributes, or return dummy values for attributes that simply don’t exist on the Android file
system.
The BSD socket API, implemented by both iOS and Android, allows a server process to create a non-
blocking socket file descriptor, and then invoke the accept socket API call on it. If there are no con-
nections ready to be accepted, both systems return EWOULDBLOCK (or EAGAIN). However, on iOS (and
on some BSD variants) if a client connection is successfully created and returned from an accept call
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made on a non-blocking socket, the resulting file descriptor is also marked as non-blocking. In other words,
the O NONBLOCK socket option on the server accept socket is inherited by the client socket. This is
not the case in Linux. User space iOS code assumed the resulting file descriptor was non-blocking and
proceeded to perform otherwise blocking calls such as read on the client descriptor expecting them to
return EWOULDBLOCK. Cycada need to manually propagate the non-blocking state from the accept file
descriptor to client file descriptor.
Finally, assumptions in iOS user space about how the XNU scheduler would select threads and processes
to run would occasionally lead to busy loops and deadlocks in user space. In iOS, many locking primitives
rely on tight integration with the XNU scheduler which can re-prioritize threads holding a resource when a
high-priority thread requests it. Under this assumption, it is safe for a high priority thread to repeatedly call
syscalls such as sched yield or switch pri in the slow (or contended) path of iOS user space locking
primitives. The Cycada mapping of these CPU yielding functions called Linux near-equivalent functions,
but the Android Linux scheduler has no integration with locking primitives. Occasionally, a high-priority
iOS thread would begin a tight loop in user space making repeated calls to sched yield or switch -
pri expecting the scheduler to push directly on the thread holding the contended resource. Unfortunately,
the Linux scheduler would continue to pick the high priority thread to run impeding further user space
progress. We attempted to mitigate these scheduling differences by either forcing the current thread to
sleep, or attempting to direclty yield to another runnable thread.
The Axis of Tools
The second great virtue of a programmer, impatience, describes a programmer’s desire and need for great
tools. Impatience arises from,
[t]he anger you feel when the computer is being lazy. This makes you write programs that don’t
just react to your needs, but actually anticipate them. Or at least pretend to. Hence, the second
great virtue of a programmer.
Perhaps even more than the average programmer, a reverse engineer must leverage great tools to accomplish
great tasks. There are amazing binary introspection and debugging tools available, and a successful binary
compatibility system requires extensive use of these tools. There will be times when writing an IDA [64]
python module to tease out an interface from the disassembly of a proprietary library will be the only way
to continue.
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Other times, however, will require custom tools or ad-hoc techniques. In all likelihood, the reverse
engineer must chart unknown waters, going where debuggers and integrated development environments
have never gone before. For this work, the vice of patience sustains the programmer through countless
hours of tedious debugging and custom tool building.
5.1.3 Impatience
The reverse engineer must insist on the computer doing as much work as possible. When creating a binary
compatibility system, that work generally takes the form of disassembly, static analysis, and debugging. The
Interactive DisAssembler, IDA, from Hex-Rays [64] integrates all three of these capabilities into a single,
powerful program that includes an extensible scripting interface. Cycada leveraged the power and capability
of IDA’s static analysis, disassembly, and scripting interface. Unfortunately, IDA’s debugger could not be
used due to incompatibilities discussed in Section 5.1.4.
Many hours were spent pouring over disassembly and graphs output by IDA, but the virtue of impatience
is best exemplified through plugin scripts written against IDA’s python APIs. For example, Apple does not
release any ARM or iOS–specific code for their kernel, XNU. This means that there was no complete map of
system call numbers used on iOS devices. Fortunately, most system calls use wrapper functions contained in
the libsystem kernel.dylib library. Using IDA’s python APIs, we wrote a small script that would
iterate through all exported functions in a library, and, for each function, parse the disassembly looking
for the SVC instruction. When found, the script would inspect the register state, and output the name of
the current function and the value of a particular register. 1The resulting script output served as an easily
parsable system call table.
In a similar example, we used an IDA script to analyze the nearly indecipherable OpenGL ES binary,
and output the GL dispatch table – an internal table used to dispatch GL ES functions. This allowed us to
wrap up the iOS GL ES library interface in user space using diplomats (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). We
also used IDA scripts to discover MIG (Mach Interface Generator) [15] and IOKit interfaces in proprietary
libraries and applications such as IOSurface, SpringBoard, and mediaserverd.
1In iOS, the system all number is passed in one of three different registers depending on type of system call:
If ip (r12) == 0x80000000 then the syscall number is in r3. If ip < 0 then the system call is a Mach trap and the trap number
is −ip. If ip == 0 then the system call is syscall and the actual system call number is in r0. Otherwise, the system call number
is ip.
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Although powerful and extensible, IDA is not always practical for tasks ideally embedded in a shell
script, or run on a mobile device. The iOS SDK ships with a complete set of binary utilities for linking,
inspecting, and debugging iOS binaries. Even though the GUI IDE, Xcode, doesn’t easily allow creation
or compilation of command line utilities, other tools in the SDK can easily be used to create and inspect
command line tools, libraries and applications. Using SDK and system tools, such as otool, dwarfdump,
lipo, and gdb, we wrote a shell script to wrap an entire Mach-O library with diplomats. We also modified
a widely used script [125] to decrypt iOS applications. Creating a library with a set of diplomats that reflect
functionality from Android into iOS is tedious work that the computer is perfectly capable of doing. Our
shell script takes as input the iOS dylib and a set of directories containing Android ELF libraries. The script
finds all exported entry points in the iOS library, and either matches them to a corresponding ELF entry point
in an Android library or writes a small stub function in C. We used this script to create the initial OpenGL
ES wrapper library that was later extended with diplomat usage patterns (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4).
As described in Chapter 3 Section 3.5.1, a script, named DCrypt.sh, runs on any iPhone or iPad,
discovers the ASLR slide of an iOS application, uses gdb to decrypt the TEXT segment, and then re-
packages the application for easy installation on and Android device. This script provided the primary
mechanism for obtaining iOS applications from the App Store.
One final area where the virtue of impatience guided Cycada development was logging. Log processing
in Cycada was two-fold. First, we developed a specially formatted log output that was sent, by the Linux
kernel, directly to an in-memory file. Our logging facility uses an in-kernel ring buffer that is read out from
user space using a special file on a ramfs. Log lines are formatted, through a preprocessor macro, to allow
easy post-processing through scripts or editor macros. Log entries are easy to add throughout the Cycada
kernel using this macro. We developed a custom vim highlighting scheme and several log parsing scripts to
perform tasks such as highlight error conditions, and aid in reconstruction of multi-process communication.
Second, we not only parsed our own logs, we collated and parsed system and app-specific logs. Us-
ing environment variables and program arguments, we enabled as much logging in each application and
framework as was reasonable. We collected all of these logs in a single directory, and rotated the direc-
tory on reboot or relaunch of an application. We wrote several scripts to either comb these logs for useful
information, or simply aggregate them and display them concurrently with application execution.
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5.1.4 Patience
Shiny disassemblers and shell scripts are excellent tools for static analysis, but most bugs a reverse engineer
encounters while building a binary compatibility system occur at runtime. For these bugs, a debugger is
needed. Unfortunately, debugging a running process is highly system specific. The iOS debugger does not
use the standard Linux debugging interface, ptrace. Instead, it uses iOS–specific Mach IPC APIs such as
task exception ports, thread register state, and Mach VM memory flags, for thread and process introspection
and control. Enabling the iOS gdb binary on an Android devices would have involved implementation
of many different complex Mach IPC interfaces that are sparsely documented, and not used by any other
app or library. These facilities, in aggregate, would require nearly as much effort to develop as the rest of
the Cycada system. Subtle bugs introduced in these complex interfaces would also lead to compounding
difficulty, and time lost debugging iOS apps on Android devices.
In a valiant attempt to maintain virtue, Cycada attempted to reuse the Android debugger, gdb, to debug
iOS apps and libraries. Unfortunately, the Android gdb variant has no support for Mach-O binaries or dyld
library loading. Without knowledge of the binary format, or proper OS support, debugging iOS apps with
Android’s gdb on Cycada lacks symbols, and requires a-priori knowledge of where libraries are loaded and
which ARM variant (Thumb or ARM) was to encode the instructions being debugged. This makes even the
most basic debugging operations such as setting a breakpoint and single stepping over instructions extremely
difficult. Even if proper gdb support was readily available, attempting to debug a system like iOS, where
user space daemons rely on each other in an indecipherable spiderweb of Mach IPC, is rarely as easy as
attaching to the current process and taking a backtrace.
If impatience is the anger you feel when the computer is being lazy, then patience is the sadness you
feel when the computer fails you. Debugging on Cycada embraces the vice of patience. Unable to force
either iOS or Android debugging tools to work properly, we assembled an ad-hoc collection of techniques
for rudimentary debugging of iOS apps and basic analysis of complex IPC dependencies.
To debug running applications, Cycada uses a tool, such as IDA or a simple hex editor, to insert an
illegal instruction sequence into the TEXT segment of an application or library by replacing an existing
instruction. When program execution would naturally execute the replaced instruction, a SIGILL signal is
generated instead. Simply receiving this signal indicates that the particular code path was taken, however
using an in-kernel signal handler we can glean even more information and potentially even restore the
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original instruction(s) to continue execution. From an in-kernel SIGILL handler, we can further inspect
user space register state, and even walk user space frames to generate a back-trace. When cross-referenced
with loaded library offsets from /proc/PID/maps and basic disassembler output, this SIGILL can be
translated into a symbolic backtrace of the user space path taken to reach the given point in a library or
application. While significantly slower than a traditional debugger, this process allows basic debugging of
iOS apps, libraries, and frameworks running on Cycada.
In addition to the in-kernel SIGILL handler, Cycada also handles other signals sent to iOS apps such
as SEGFAULT. For memory related signals, such as SEGFAULT, the Cycada handler can not only generate
a user space backtrace, but can also dump out the user space page of memory on which the process faulted.
The stack traces and memory dumps can be symbolicated post-mortem using a combination of iOS binary
tools such as otool, and a disassembler such as IDA.
To debug complex user space interdependencies without support from a formal debugger, Cycada uses
the specially formatted kernel log output, described in Section 5.1.3, through a custom logging macro. Log
entries are easy to add throughout the Cycada kernel using this macro. The resulting logs present a more
complete picture of system activity by tagging each line with the PID, kernel function name, and timestamp.
We used these logs extensively to reconstruct complicated Mach IPC communication paths, and pinpoint
issues such as missing files or unresponsive daemons. While some of the log parsing was done through
scripts in an impatient manner, reconstructing IPC communication and following the interaction of multiple
processes was a manual process that required extreme amounts of patience.
The Axis of Human Nature
The third great virtue of a programmer, hubris, speaks to a desire deep within the programmer to write not
only functional, but also beautiful, maintainable, and laudable code. Hubris is,
[e]xcessive pride, the sort of thing Zeus zaps you for. Also the quality that makes you write (and
maintain) programs that other people won’t want to say bad things about. Hence, the third
great virtue of a programmer.
Countless hours of patiently staring at disassembled binaries led us to a key insight: seemingly indecipher-
able assembly code was actually generated by real programmers who, presumably, must write and maintain
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the binary using some higher-level code 2. This meant that we were not staring at a random collection of
instructions. Even though partially obscured by optimizing compilers and linkers, there was structure and
order that could be extracted by following clues, such as function names and calling conventions, left by
hubris–filled iOS developers.
Lamentably, the reverse engineer cannot be so filled with hubris (or the hubris of others) that they miss
short cuts, hacks, and otherwise deplorable code that make the job of binary compatibility feasible. A
reverse engineer must be willing to repudiate first principles, know when to fake it, and must not be afraid
of a little duct tape. Although related to laziness, the vice of repudiation never involves well–documented,
reusable code. It involves sneaky pre-processor macros that switch in-and-out ugly static inline functions
for mapping one API onto another. It involves blindly returning success from an unimplemented function.
5.1.5 Hubris
The IOSurface iOS framework is a private interface that communicates directly to a proprietary driver
in Apple’s XNU kernel. THe XNU IOSurface driver implements zero-copy inter-process graphics mem-
ory transfer and management. Both the user space APIs and kernel interfaces used by IOSurface are
private and undocumented. However, IOSurface objects are used as the backing-store for almost all
graphics related memory management in iOS. Both library and kernel module code that implement a feature
as complicated as zero-copy inter-process memory transfer can be nearly impossible to re-construct from
constituent assembler instructions.
A reasonable first-order solution to enable a library, such as IOSurface, to run on Cycada might be
to instrument the Android kernel and observe access patterns and input data. However, this approach is
insufficient when the kernel API itself is nothing more than a conduit for opaque data blobs being passed
between a proprietary user space library and a proprietary kernel module. The IOSurface user space
library uses a MIG interface to communicate to an XNU kernel module. The IPC messages passed to the
kernel use undocumented structures and opaque data types (such as void *) which are interpreted by the
proprietary kernel module.
A better solution to enabling the IOSurface APIs on Cycada leverages the hubris embedded into the
proprietary library by iOS engineers. By exploring the disassembler output, applying higher-level semantic
2Although apparent in hindsight, this insight cost us many sleepless nights and more than a few gray hairs!
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reasoning, and using readily-available developer tools for debugging user space applications, we were able
to reconstruct both the user space MIG interface and the kernel functionality of the IOSurface API.
A disassembled view of the user space IOSurface library reveals that there is a single point of entry
into the kernel: IOConnectCallMethod (or its asynchronous variant). This function can be found in the
open source IOKitUser library [14], and its implementation crosses the user-kernel boundary using Mach
IPC to a kernel I/O Kit driver. Instrumenting the Mach IPC path is not particularly enlightening because
the interface from user space to the kernel is defined by data packed into the messages by the proprietary
code on either end. However, looking again at the disassembly output of the IOSurface library, there
are several intermediate function calls between exported library functions and IOConnectCallMethod.
These intermediate functions represent the MIG interface to the kernel module. Unfortunately, manual
inspection the assembly for each of these functions would be time consuming and ultimately infeasible for
a single grad student.
The iOS SDK ships with ARM variants of most libraries and frameworks, and most of these contain
some level of debugging symbols. Using the insight that real, hubris–filled iOS programmers wrote the code
that was compiled into the IOSurface binary, the available symbols from the SDK and the symbol names
of the intermediate functions used to invoke IOConnectCallMethod disclose quite a bit about the nature
of their higher-level function. Further, repeated patterns in the disassembly inform a basic re-construction
of function arguments. With a carefully crafted regular expression, we were able to re-construct the MIG
interface to IOSurface, and enable further investigation into kernel functionality and API data structures
from even higher level tools.
In addition to writing the code that compiles into the IOSurface library, iOS programmers wrote and
used debugging tools that are also available in the iOS SDK. Although the ultimate goal of Cycada is to
run iOS apps on Android devices, those same iOS apps can be debugged on an iOS device using all of the
fancy features provided by the SDK and IDE. In other words, we can write a custom application to exercise
private APIs, and debug the app on an iOS device where we can single-step through all of user space, and
even inspect memory and register contents. To further investigate the IOSurface API, we wrote a custom
iOS app that linked against (or directly called into) private IOSurfaceAPIs. In the absence of header files,
local C-style extern prototypes gleaned from the SDK symbols and libraries worked quite well. We then
used the XCode IDE to debug our own app on an iPhone and iPad. This custom application used standard
security and reverse engineering techniques, such as input fuzzing and memory inspection, to reconstruct
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the data structures used by the IOSurface kernel module. Correlating this debugging output with the
higher-level intuition gained from symbols in the SDK, we were able to reverse engineer IOSurface data
structures, and implement necessary pieces of the kernel logic to enable the user space iOS library to run
without modification on Cycada.
Another example of leveraging the hubris of other developers is Cycada’s mapping of iOS OpenGL ES
extensions to Android OpenGL ES extensions. Table 4.1 shows a rather bleak picture of the discrepancy
between iOS extensions and Android extensions. Less than 50% of implemented GL ES extensions on
either platform overlapped with the other. While some iOS extensions did require a diligent, brute-force
implementation effort, some of them could be mapped onto extensions provided by Android’s Open GL
ES implementation. By realizing that Apple engineers were working under similar constraints and solving
similar problems to Android engineers, we were able to find either a directly corresponding Android GL
ES extension, or a set of Android GL functions that could implement the iOS GL ES extension. For ex-
ample, as described in Section 4.4, iOS uses the APPLE fence extension which is not present in Android.
However, both iOS and Android developers needed a way to synchronize their rendering pipelines based on
the completion of previous GL ES commands. Using this knowledge, we found that the NV fence exten-
sion implemented on Android provides identical functionality to the APPLE fence extension. Using a small
amount of glue logic, in the form of indirect diplomats, we were able to support the iOS APPLE fence API
using the Android NV fence API.
5.1.6 Repudiation
Binary compatibility work can be messy. While a good reverse engineer should strive to be lazy through
nicely packaged reusable code, many problems will have one-off, bedraggled solutions that you won’t ever
want to share with your colleagues. Other problems could potentially be solved using a proper framework
or diligent brute force enablement, but at a cost of man-months or years. The vice of repudiation frees the
reverse engineer to think creatively, hack freely, and dismiss formalism with prejudice. This methodology
almost always comes with an associated cost in either efficiency, security, or isolation. This is not code that
wins you the Turing award. It’s code that gets the job done, and occasionally makes for a great story. What
follows are a few of those stories from the Cycada development.
Binaries run on iOS can be both encrypted and cryptographically signed. Encryption ensures that the
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contents of the binary are only used by authorized devices. All apps downloaded from Apple’s App Store
are encrypted, and Cycada used a jailbroken iOS device to decrypt the binary contents (see Section 3.5.1).
From Apple’s documentation [22], cryptographic signing of applications, or code signing,
. . . is a security technique that can be used to ensure code integrity, to determine who developed
a piece of code, and to determine the purposes for which a developer intended a piece of code
to be used.
Code signing uses a collection of checksums or hashes of the various pieces of the binary or application, a
digital signature, and a unique identifier. Nearly all binaries in iOS are code signed, and the code signature
is verified by the kernel binary loader before execution. While it may be technically possible to write an
entire code signature verification engine out of reusable hashing and decryption modules, the effort would
be monumental and the gain minimal.
Because Cycada provides its own Linux kernel Mach-O loader, we simply skip code signature veri-
fication altogether by instructing the Cycada loader to return success for all code signing queries. While
skipping code signature verification of binaries allows Cycada to run application, library, and framework
code, it also means that it does not perform any actual verification of the code signatures.
Application sandboxing [34] is another example of a complex iOS subsystem that would take many
man–months or years to fully implement. Sandboxing is Apple’s method of restricting the data and system
features an app may use. This includes restrictions on both file system paths, and use of certain syscalls.
The iOS sandbox is a kernel feature, and thus can be easily bypassed in Cycada. When user space attempts
to enter a given application into a sandbox, the Cycada kernel simply returns success indicating that the
app is now in a sandbox. Handling the iOS sandbox in this way allows Cycada to run iOS binaries, but
obviously does not afford them the same security. We rely on Android’s model of user and process isolation
to implement security, and thus cannot give the same guarantees. Further compatibility between the Android
and iOS security models is left for future research.
Sometimes, supporting an iOS feature or kernel subsystem can be as easy as re-directing or renaming
an existing Android or Linux feature. In other words, occasionally binary compatibility is really as easy
as just pretending to be iOS. For example, in iOS the default network adaptor name is expected to be en0
while in Android it is eth0. By putting a small translation table in network adaptor functions, we easily
translate between the two naming schemes and convince iOS user space it has a network adaptor with the
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correct name. In similar fashion, when iOS user space queries the current device or hardware on which it is
running, via a sysctl, Cycada just returns a predetermined string such as “iPhone2,1” or “iPad2,4”.
Some iOS user space code iterates over all available I/O Kit devices looking for devices with par-
ticular names or classes. In some cases this code isn’t used to interact with the device, but rather to
gate the execution of another piece of code. For example, the configd daemon is responsible for at-
taching a name to a particular network interface. To do this, it first waits for an I/O Kit service named
IONetworkStack. When it sees this service, it then watches I/O Kit for any device that conforms to the
IONetworkInterface class.
In order for iOS user space to properly discover resources and devices mapped from Android to iOS, the
names of devices and their supporting driver instances in the Cycada I/O Kit implementation must match
what is expected by user space. Often these devices use the same, or similar, hardware on both iOS and
Android, but have significantly different names. The iOS driver framework, I/O Kit uses a special flattened
device tree to initialize and load drivers. Cycada hooks into the Linux device add function and calls out
into a small support function that translates Linux device names into valid iOS names, and inserts a node
into the Cycada I/O Kit device tree. Using a small I/O Kit driver class that matches the translated name and
leverages existing Linux driver code, Cycada can support iOS user space libraries looking for devices with
specific, non-Linux names. More details can be found in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.
Several iOS system calls that have a corresponding Linux implementation, such as open and read,
also have iOS–specific variants that are not present in Linux. For example, the nocancel postfix was added
to many different system calls resulting in two variants, e.g., read and read nocancel. In all cases we
encountered, the postfixed variant of a previously defined system call either bracketed the original system
call with an invariant, or used an ancillary security mechanism such as an opaque token that was associated
with each subsequent interaction with the returned resource. Calls postfixed with nocancel were used
to enable in-kernel pthread cancellation support. Because Cycada uses Linux-style threads (light weight
processes created via clone), the nocancel system call variants were simply mapped to their standard
counterpart.
The other postfix we encountered, guarded, added a parameter to the original system call which func-
tioned as a security token. The guard parameter was generated by the kernel, and verified on subsequent use
of the returned resource. For example, open guarded returns an opaque kernel–generated token to user
space. The resulting file descriptor can only be used with the corresponding read guarded, write -
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guarded, and close guarded system calls. The kernel verifies the security token passed from user
space, and guarantees that an invalid security token will not be able to operate on the given file descriptor.
This guards against malicious (or buggy) user space code from closing or hijacking a file descriptor. Cycada
ignores these guard parameters and simply calls the appropriate existing system call. By doing this Cycada
can support the guarded interface, but it cannot guard against file descriptor hijacking.
Finally, implementation of the Cycada duct tape code-adaptation layer often required messy, one-off
hacks that would vex a virtuous programmer’s desire to reuse and brag about their code. While we were able
to develop a set of design principles, discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2, the nitty gritty implementation
would do things such as define a static inline function in multiple ways depending on how certain pre-
processor macros were set. We would also use similar tricks to hide, redefine, or redirect symbols that
appeared in both XNU and Linux kernel code.
5.2 The Future: Forward-Porting Cycada
Every new release of iOS brings with it new functionality not only at the user-visible level, but also at the
kernel level. Our Cycada prototype is based on iOS 5.1, but we began an initial port of Cycada to iOS 6.
The implementation is incomplete, but our experience indicates that the hints, virtues, and vices described
in Section 5.1 can guide a successful forward-port of Cycada to iOS 6 and beyond. The remainder of this
section describes our initial porting effort, and exemplifies our use of the hints, virtues, and vices.
The porting effort began by simply fixing a large number of bugs in the existing Cycada prototype
implementation. Many of these bugs were exposed due to OS behavior or features exercised in iOS 6, but
unused in iOS 5.1. Beyond initial bug fixing, porting Cycada to iOS 6 was guided by the hints, virtues, and
vices described in Section 5.1. Identifying key virtues or vices that may aid in the binary compatible support
of a new iOS feature greatly reduces the effort required to support it. While the port is still incomplete,
there have not been any fundamentally limiting problems, and we expect it is feasible, given enough time, to
forward port Cycada to the latest version of iOS. In fact, many issues were solved by simply applying patches
from Apple’s open source software to their duct taped counterparts in Cycada (Section 3.4.1 describes
patching iokit to a newer version).
New additions to launchd and launchctl in iOS 6 disallow unsigned startup scripts (plist files) to
be run on boot. An immutable set of plist files was put into the shared cache and code-signed. The signature
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is verified by launchd before running any startup jobs. At first glance this problem appears complicated and
untenable, however, both launchd and launchctl are open source, and a quick inspection of the code
revealed a simple solution. Before verifying the code signature and location of startup plist files, launchd
checks the XNU boot arguments for a particular string. By providing this particular string in Cycada’s faux
boot arguments, we were able to bypass this new feature completely.
Other features added to iOS 6 were variations on existing compatibility solutions already in place in
Cycada. For example, the kevent syscall added a 64-bit variant with a new structure, and the pthread -
workqueue interface was refactored. Both of these interfaces are supported by the XNU kernel, but
Cycada implements both as user space libraries. Adding support for both of these new features involved
refactoring the existing Cycada kevent and pthread workqueue libraries to support the new inter-
faces.
Another addition to the kevent interface was the ability to receive a Mach message simltaneously with
kevent delivery. A new flag, MACH RCV MSG, was added to the kevent interface, and Cycada was able
to support this feature in our user space libkqueue implementation through a single additional function
that called mach msg when a kevent was delivered with this flag.
There were also new features in iOS 6 for which either more re-direction and mis-information, or an
adjustment of previous mis-information resolved the missing support. For example, Apple’s sandbox inter-
face was slightly adjusted. Previously, the function which requested that an app be moved into a sandbox
required a couple bytes to be set in a user space structure by the kernel sandbox syscall. The new version of
iOS slightly adjusted the position of those bytes in the user space structure.
Finally, there were some new assumptions made by launchd and notifyd which Cycada had to deal
with. The iOS “init” program, launchd, can output a lot of extremely helpful debugging logs, however,
the thread that outputs these logs waits for a kevent of type EVFILT FS to indicate that /var/log
has been mounted. Previous versions of iOS had made the same kevent call, but never depended on the
output to initiate logging. We had to implement basic EVFILT FS support in the Cycada libkqueue
implementation in order to enable iOS launchd logging in iOS 6.
The notifyd daemon is a critical part of the iOS ecosystem - it’s the process that delivers asynchronous
notifications of system or custom events. Upon receiving or sending its first message, notifyd implic-
itly assumes that timezone, TZ, information has been properly bootstrapped. This occurs as a result of a
cycle in the message handling code where the message reception function invokes either localtime or
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strftime. Both of these functions attempt to set TZ information. If the TZ information has not been set,
the function sets it and then attempts to send out a notification that the time zone changed. In order to send
out the timezone change notification, the code calls into libnotify, the client library for communicating
to notifyd. Beacuse the code is already synchronously handling a client request (the one that generated
a call to localtime or strftime) this call from client-side libnotify to the notifyd server dead-
locks! By properly bootstrapping the timezone data, we were able to get the iOS 6 version of notifyd
fully functional.
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Chapter 6
Teaching OS Using Android
6.1 Introduction
Hands-on learning through programming projects plays a key role in computer science education, and hands-
on kernel programming projects are especially important in the area of operating systems (OS). Many ap-
proaches to designing these kernel programming projects have been proposed and implemented. Several
pedagogical OSes exist [107; 119; 41] where students fill in or build missing subsystems. In recent years,
many institutions have also begun using Linux to teach OS [3; 91; 63]. All these solutions focus primarily
on desktop or server environments, whether physical or virtual.
The computing landscape, however, is shifting. The dominant computing platform is becoming the
mobile device [45; 132]. The real-world constraints and operating environment of mobile devices are quite
different from traditional desktop or server computers. It is important for students to learn in this new
environment, and its prevalence and popularity can be used to create engaging programming projects.
We present our work using Android to teach OS through hands-on kernel programming projects. We
chose Android for several reasons. First, as a production system it enables students to learn about real-world
OS issues which are hard to glean from simplified pedagogical projects. Second, since Android is based
on the open-source Linux kernel, students can leverage a wealth of Linux tools and documentation. Third,
Android’s use of the Linux kernel provides a familiar transition path from courses already using Linux
to teach OS. Fourth, Android is the fastest growing mobile platform to date, and its popularity makes it
of tremendous interest to students. Fifth, Android is open-source which allows exploration of a complete
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production system including the OS kernel, user space libraries, and a graphical user environment written
in Java. Sixth, as a commercial platform, Android continues to be developed and improved which naturally
evolves the platform as a pedagogical tool, enabling students to learn in a modern context. Finally, as a
commercial platform, there is no need for us to maintain or update Android or any of its development tools.
This allows us to focus limited resources on teaching rather than time consuming in-house OS development.
To facilitate our use of Android to teach OS, we created an Android virtual lab where students learn about
operating systems using both emulated and physical mobile devices. We manage the complexity of device
cross-compilation and production kernel development tools by providing a virtual appliance pre-configured
with all the software tools necessary to develop an Android Linux kernel. A virtual appliance can be readily
deployed, downloaded and used by students without the installation or configuration necessary to deploy
Android development tools natively on their personal computers. Additionally, our Android virtual lab uses
a distributed version control system and live demonstration infrastructure to develop, distribute, submit and
grade homework projects. Our use of the Android emulator in conjunction with this infrastructure allows
remote and distance learning students to take full advantage of our Android virtual lab, while also facilitating
close collaboration with on-campus students using physical mobile devices.
Students work in groups to complete five Android Linux kernel programming projects. These projects
require students to read and understand core Android Linux components, and then either modify or add
components as required. The projects build in complexity, and cover various important OS topics: (1)
system calls and processes based on the unique process hierarchy of an Android device, (2) synchronization
where a global resource such as the orientation sensor is shared amongst many processes, (3) scheduling by
exploiting Android’s single-application usage model to increase device responsiveness, (4) virtual memory
and the exact size and nature of Android’s inter-process shared memory, and (5) file systems with automatic
geo-tagging using Android sensors.
We successfully used Android in a 100 student introductory OS course at Columbia University. Over
80% of students surveyed enjoyed applying OS concepts to the Android platform, and the majority of
students preferred Android over traditional desktop development.
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6.2 Android Virtual Lab
Central to any OS development lab is universal access to proper development tools for all students. Our
Android virtual lab provides each student with a pre-configured VMware virtual appliance containing all
the Android and Linux development tools necessary to complete each programming project. The set of
tools includes all tools necessary to boot and test a real device as well as the Android SDK comprising the
Android emulator, a tool to create virtual devices, and a device debug GUI tool. We also include a cross-
compilation toolchain, Android’s Bionic C library, and several shell scripts to mitigate the complexity of
embedded development.
Although Android development tools are available for a wide variety of platforms, we provide a pre-
configured virtual appliance for four important reasons. First, we avoid mistakes or incompatibilities in
development tool installation. For example, when the course was offered, the Android development tools
did not support Mac OS 10.6, Mac OS versions prior to 10.4, or Linux distributions other than Ubuntu.
Students may also use non-standard PC configurations which would put unnecessary management burden
on the instructional staff. Second, the virtual appliance can be used as a safety net for students who corrupt
their development tool installation or experience complete system failure. The VMware Workstation snap-
shot feature can be used to make incremental backups of student work and any changes they make to the
development environment. A snapshot is also an easy way for students to begin a homework assignment
from a known good configuration. Third, by pre-configuring all of the development tools, we avoid com-
plicated cross-compilation setup by providing simple, standard Makefiles and shell scripts for both kernel
and user-level development. The Android SDK is designed primarily for GUI application development not
kernel development, so some configuration of the compiler and Android runtime libraries is necessary. A
standardized environment allows us to provide simple Makefile examples for user-level test programs and
simple Linux kernel cross-compilation instructions. Finally, the virtual appliance gives us freedom to cus-
tomize both the tools and the Android user space. Customizing the Android user space allows us to create
more engaging projects as well as to overcome deficiencies in development tools. We use a customized
version of the Android emulator which enables students to use the Sensor Simulator program from Open-
Intents [98] to inject orientation and acceleration data into the emulator by interacting with a 3D model of
a phone instead of manually entering numbers into a shell prompt. We also use a custom device drawing
library to support the kernel scheduling project described in Section 6.3.3.
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To manage homework project preparation, distribution, submission and grading, we use the Git dis-
tributed version control system, already used by Android and Linux for source code version control. Each
homework assignment consists of a single Git repository that typically contains a complete Linux kernel
tree, template user-space projects as necessary, any additional tools needed to complete the assignment, and
a Makefile used to prepare the student’s emulator or device for project development. Instructional staff pre-
pare each project repository and push it to a central Git server. The repository is then replicated such that all
student groups are given access to their own private repository on the Git server. The central Git server also
facilitates distributed group collaboration even when one or more students are remote or distance learning
students.
To maximize grading efficiency, we extend the previously developed concept of live demonstrations [81].
Three or four student groups are assigned an hour long demo time slot. During the first 20-30 minutes, all
student groups perform a complete clone of their homework submission Git repository, cross-compile the
Linux kernel for their mobile device, and install and boot the new kernel. In the last 30-40 minutes, the
staff meets individually with each group. During this time, groups demonstrate functionality required by
the homework, further explain their solution methodology, and participate in a basic code review. This time
helps instructional staff to better understand the group’s submission, correct common mistakes, and see
how group members contributed to an assignment. Live demos also provide opportunities for instructional
staff to explain solutions which can facilitate a more complete understanding of difficult and challenging
assignments.
Our Android virtual lab is designed to support remote or distance learning students, though such students
may only have access to the emulator and not a real Android device. These students can still participate in
demonstrations using freely available screen-sharing applications such as Skype, join.me or VNC.
6.3 Kernel Projects
Using our Android virtual lab, students work in groups to complete five kernel programming projects. These
projects require students to read, understand, and modify core Linux components. While some projects re-
quire writing a simple user space test program, students are never required to compile the entire Android
code base or write any GUI applications. The five projects focus on five important OS concepts, and in-
fuse Android or mobile device specific investigation into the assignment. The five areas covered by the
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assignments are: system calls and processes, synchronization, scheduling, virtual memory, and file systems.
Corresponding Android-related topics incorporated in these areas are: the zygote process and Java worker
threads, device sensors, display-prioritized scheduling, multi-process working set via copy-on-write shared
memory, and location aware file systems.
The assignments progress in complexity, building not only on OS principles learned in earlier assign-
ments, but also on Android specific knowledge gained. For example, the first assignment requires students to
investigate the Android process tree and note how all GUI programs are children of a process named zygote.
In a subsequent homework, they investigate the cross-process memory sharing method used by the zygote to
save system RAM. We formalize each project’s Android and mobile device investigation by asking students
to answer a small number of questions designed to make them reflect on how the particular OS concept was
applied in the context of an Android or mobile device.
All assignments are intended to keep students focused on the OS principles being taught, and designed
such that a group of two or three students can complete them with no prior kernel or Android experience. We
provide detailed step-by-step instructions on cross-compiling and device or emulator use. Android specific
aspects of the assignments are presented as practical application of the core principle, and most of the Linux
kernel modifications necessary to complete the assignments are contained in architecture independent code.
Thus, the solution complexity remains manageable and homework setup and prerequisite topic knowledge
is kept to a minimum, yet students engage with a complex, real-world system.
6.3.1 System Calls and Processes
The first project lays the groundwork for future projects as students investigate the primary application ab-
straction, the process, and its primary interface into the kernel, the system call. Our focus in this assignment
is process creation, termination, properties, and relationships in the context of a mobile device. In complet-
ing this assignment, students also gain an understanding of kernel data structures, such as linked lists, and
their APIs. All subsequent assignments require students to be intimately familiar with these concepts.
Students write a new system call which returns the system process tree in DFS order. This involves mod-
ifying architecture specific system call entry points, manipulating and traversing the kernel data structures
representing processes and threads, and managing data transfer to and from the kernel. To test the system
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call, they write a simple user space application to invoke this new system call and print out the process tree
similar to the UNIX ps utility.
The system call allows students to examine Android’s process tree and application startup method, which
provide insight into a key system design that drives the entire Java-based user environment. Java applications
are interpreted in the Dalvik virtual machine, and are represented in the OS as processes which are children
of a special process called the zygote. The Dalvik virtual machine starts several worker threads for each
application to handle things like input events and garbage collection. Thus, the process tree of Android
devices shows not only the relationship between the init process and its children, but also the relationship
that all Java applications have to the zygote and the symmetry of their component threads.
Students investigate the zygote process using their test program, and are asked to reason why an em-
bedded or mobile system might use such a process. This reflection is designed to connect the pedagogical
concept of process creation using copy-on-write memory to a real-world mobile device with memory and
disk constraints. Benefits of the zygote include faster application startup time, and cross-process memory
sharing of core library code and static data.
The Android emulator enables remote or distance learning students taking the class to complete this
assignment without a physical device. The Android emulator provides a complete machine emulation in
which a standard version of the Android runtime is installed and run. Thus, remote or distance learning
students can investigate the Android process tree using the emulator in the same way on-campus students
use real devices.
6.3.2 Synchronization
The second project focuses on synchronization, a critical aspect of a modern multi-tasking OS. The wealth of
sensors available on modern mobile devices provides an excellent pedagogical vehicle to demonstrate real-
world applications of synchronizing concurrent or interleaved access to a single resource. In completing
this assignment, students also gain an appreciation for manipulating and interacting with embedded system
sensors.
Students implement a novel synchronization primitive, the orientation event, which allows multiple
processes to block until the mobile device has been put into a particular orientation. For example, a process
can block until the phone is placed face down on a table. To accomplish this, they first write a user space
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daemon which reads device orientation through a standard Android hardware abstraction library, and then
passes the data into the kernel through a new system call. The orientation event interface is implemented
as a set of three new system calls: orientevt open, orientevt close, and orientevt wait.
The daemon process passing device orientation into the kernel functions as the signal which wakes up any
blocked process. Students test this new interface by writing several small test programs. Each test program
forks multiple children, and each child process blocks on an orientation event opened by its parent. When
the device is moved within the range of the desired orientation, all child processes should be unblocked.
Orientation and acceleration sensors are an integral part of the mobile device experience, and incorporat-
ing them into a synchronization project gives students an experience that desktop or server machines cannot
provide. The ability for multiple processes to wait for a device to enter a particular orientation or acceler-
ation profile has many possibilities in real-world user applications and system services such as interactive
game controls and pre-fall system shutdown.
As students investigate sensor-based synchronization on Android, they are also exposed to real device
interaction using a hardware abstraction layer. This interaction necessarily includes basic understanding
and manipulation of sensor data. We provide several helper functions to keep the students focused on the
primary topic of synchronization, however the exposure to real-world device data is a valuable experience
which can be directly applied in the workforce.
The Android emulator provides the ability for remote or distance learning students to complete this
assignment without a physical device. We provide a modified version of the Android emulator, a daemon
process to run on the emulator, and a Java-based host application which simulates [98] a mobile device using
a 3D wire-frame model. As students manipulate the model in the Java application, orientation information
is sent to the daemon process which updates emulator state. The Android hardware abstraction layer reads
this emulator state. In this way, remote students can have a similar experience to on-campus students
6.3.3 Scheduling
The third project focuses on scheduling. Mobile devices generally operate as a single user environment, and
thus have significantly different scheduling requirements from desktop or server machines. For example,
Android users typically view a single application at a time, not multiple applications in multiple windows.
In what is one of the most challenging projects, students write a new scheduling policy for the Linux
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kernel. This is the first assignment which requires students to manipulate a substantial portion of core Linux
kernel code. To mitigate the daunting task of implementing a new scheduler, we leverage the modular
scheduling framework in Linux which provides several examples of self-contained schedulers. We encour-
age students to use these existing schedulers as templates. The new scheduling policy trades fairness and
throughput for responsiveness, a key metric in mobile devices. We call our new scheduler, “Display Boosted
Multi-level Container” (DBMC) scheduling, and the primary objective of this scheduler is to “boost” the
priority of foreground applications. Since mobile devices typically display a single application at at time,
boosting the priority of this single, foreground, application decreases its execution time and increases the
apparent device responsiveness.
To support DBMC scheduling, we made a small (15 line) change to the Android user space environ-
ment that leverages the Android application usage and security model. In contrast with desktop Linux
systems, Android only allows a single application to use the display at a time. While multiple appli-
cations can run simultaneously, only one draws on the screen. When an application is installed onto an
Android device, a unique user ID is generated and assigned to the application. The application is always
run using these unique credentials. We wrote a simple, 15-line patch to a core Android drawing library,
libsurfaceflinger.so, which informs the kernel of the process ID of the application currently draw-
ing on the screen. Students use the unique user ID associated with the process to easily assign the associated
threads and processes to a single scheduling entity, the container. The container is used for scheduling so
that the priority boost is applied to all of the threads and processes of the foreground application.
Students are asked to run Android using their new scheduler and consider what qualitative impact there
is on system performance compared to the existing Linux scheduler. A correct solution implemented on
the Google ADP1 booted the GUI 5–10 seconds faster than the standard Linux kernel, but initialized the
network and cellular connections significantly slower. Students are also asked to reflect on this scheduler’s
impact on graphics-intensive games where process starvation can occur and overall game play can suffer.
The Android emulator provides a similarly satisfying experience for remote and distance learning stu-
dents. The same modified drawing library is used in the emulator. A correct solution implemented on the
emulator booted the GUI faster, and made the entire UI qualitatively more usable and responsive.
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6.3.4 Virtual Memory
The fourth project explores memory management, a critical aspect of mobile device OSes, with a focus
on virtual memory and paging Using a mobile device to investigate virtual memory and paging highlights
real-world system constraints and provides a unique platform to investigate creative solutions in memory
sharing and allocation.
Students write a new monitoring mechanism to track the working set of specified processes, and a new
system call to extract the recorded data. The working set is defined as the set of pages accessed (read or
write) by a process during some time period. To test this mechanism, students add a set of processes to the
monitoring mechanism, and then write a user space program that invokes the new system call and displays
usage information for each process.
Here we follow up the investigation of the zygote process seen in the first project as discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.1. This process loads several libraries and Java classes, pre-initializes Dalvik virtual machine state,
and listens on a socket for connections from a client. To start a Java application, Android connects to the zy-
gote socket and requests that the process fork. The child begins executing Java code at a particular method of
a specified class, and the parent resumes listening on the socket. When the child forks, all memory mapped
by the parent is shared copy-on-write with the child. This includes all loaded libraries and initialized Dalvik
virtual machine state. This is drastically different from a traditional desktop or server where processes are
spawned from a shell or init process that has little or nothing in common with the application being started.
Students use their working set monitor to investigate the cross-process shared memory of the zygote
and its children. We define the set of pages originally mapped by the zygote as the, “Android working set.”
Students use their user space utility to calculate the intersection of the Android working set with the working
set of each zygote child process. For simplicity, we assume that no process un-maps or re-maps a region of
memory originally mapped by the zygote; this allows us to use the virtual addresses returned by our new
system call without needing a more complicated virtual to physical address mapping. By investigating the
unique implementation of a zygote process, students gain an appreciation for the memory constraints of a
real device and can measure the effectiveness of Android’s zygote solution for reducing memory usage.
The Android emulator provides the ability for remote or distance learning students to complete this
assignment without a physical device. The assignment does not require the use of any physical device
features.
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6.3.5 File Systems
The final project focuses on file systems. Similar to virtual memory, file systems tend to be large and
complex pieces of code, so we have students implement extensions to an existing file system code base.
This assignment requires students to gain practical understanding of how the virtual file system (VFS)
infrastructure is designed, which is the key file system abstraction layer that every file system designer
needs to understand. In addition to the file abstraction, students are exposed to issues that arise in real-world
systems, such as the endian-ness of permanent data storage, data consistency and reliability, and embedded
data retrieval.
Students modify an existing disk-based file system to automatically include GPS information so that
this information can be used by any application. We refer to this as the geo-tagged file system. All files
and directories in a geo-tagged file system include embedded location information in the form of latitude
and longitude values. Students write a new system call and user-level daemon to inform the kernel of the
current device location, which is retrieved from the GPS sensor via the Android hardware abstraction library
similar to the one used in the second project discussed in Section 6.3.2. Students then modify the ext2 file
system to retrieve the last known location data and update a file or directory every time it is created or
modified. Students test the geo-tagged file system by writing a second system call to retrieve the embedded
location data for a given pathname. This assignment brings together several topics from earlier homework
assignments including system calls, synchronization, and sensor data management. As a more advanced
challenge, students can implement VFS layer interfaces which would allow any disk-based file system to
implement the geo-tagging.
While it is possible to use a GPS sensor with a desktop or laptop system, the integration of location
services in a mobile device is much more engaging, and exposes the student to real-world issues of sensor
data reliability and permanent storage. In addition to the actual device location returned by the hardware
abstraction layer, we also ask students to store the relative “age” of the location data (the number of seconds
since the location was last updated in the kernel). This provides a basic confidence metric that can be used
when later retrieving a file’s location.
Students discover the practicality of their solution as they create a file system image which contains at
least three files with unique location data. Students can have fun visiting different places while keeping
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track of exactly where they were with a simple shell command on their phone such as: echo "HERE" >
`date +"%s"`.txt.
The Android emulator provides an emulated GPS sensor, allowing remote and distance learning students
to fully participate in the assignment. The emulated location is accessed using the same hardware abstraction
layer library used on the real device, and can be updated using the emulator’s debug interface. The Android
development tools also provide a graphical utility which can update the emulator’s location by reading
.kml files generated in Google Earth. Thus remote and distance learning students can take a virtual trip
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Figure 6.1: OS Course Survey Results
We used Android as the homework project platform in an introductory course on operating systems at
Columbia University in Fall 2010. This was the first time we taught the entire course using Android devices
and Android-kernel projects. Despite our mistakes and mis-steps, the overall response from students was
overwhelmingly positive. Approximately one hundred students enrolled in the course, and we asked all of
them to complete evaluation surveys at the end of the course. Sixty percent of the students completed the
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survey. Figure 6.1 shows the results. Of those students who completed the survey, 80% said they enjoyed
using Android in the course. Most students who completed the survey said Android was both helpful in
learning OS concepts and more fun than traditional desktop development; students preferred Android to
traditional desktop development by a ratio of 3 to 1. In addition, not more than 21% of the students actively
disagreed with any given survey question.
Students were also asked to comment on what they enjoyed the most and what they enjoyed the least
about the course. Students found the Android kernel projects fun, exciting, engaging and educational. They
also appreciated the practical skills gained from their experience. When asked the question, “What did you
like best about using Android for this course?” students responded with:
• “The practicality of it,”
• “More fun and exciting,”
• “It’s more like real work, not just homework,”
• “Increased curiosity about mobile platforms,”
• “Using a modern system,”
• “All sensor related assignments were fun.”
Negative feedback was concentrated around the speed of the emulator and debugging of the embedded
systems (emulator and mobile device). Students felt that the emulator was too slow, and that debugging an
embedded kernel was overly complicated. Unfortunately, the speed of the emulator is directly correlated
to the speed of the laptop on which it is run, and because the mobile device uses an ARM processor the
instruction set must be emulated which is a slow process. In the future, as SMP support for ARM is inte-
grated into QEMU, and as laptop processor speeds increase, it should be possible to speed up the emulator.
Debugging an embedded system is an inherently complicated task, and simplifying the process is not easy.
One approach to this problem is to create more explicit and detailed instructions on the use of Android
and kernel level debugging techniques. such as the use of /proc/last kmsg which stores the kernel
log message buffer of the last booted kernel and can be used to diagnose the previous kernel crash. It also
may be possible to provide hardware-modified devices that expose either a JTAG connection for low-level
142
CHAPTER 6. TEACHING OS USING ANDROID
debugging, or a serial port for simplified kernel debugging. The Google ADP1, for example, exposes serial
RX/TX pins on its ExtUSB connector.
Finally, although students had some difficulty with device debugging, the overall experience using An-
droid as the homework project platform in our introductory OS course was positive. Students not only
learned the OS principles being taught, but also gained valuable real-world skills such as practical device
debugging and embedded code development. We have already heard from students who were able to directly
apply the skills they learned in this course to a professional job or internship opportunity.
6.5 Related Work
In recent years, courses using the Linux kernel for OS programming projects have become increasingly pop-
ular [3; 63; 91; 82]. However, these approaches focus primarily on Linux desktop and server environments
and provide no hands-on experience with mobile platforms. Lawson et al [85] describe a single program-
ming project where students modify a Linux kernel designed to run on an iPod. However, this single project
does not incorporate any mobile device specific pedagogy and does not provide a rigorous, project-based
curriculum for understanding OS principles in the context of mobile platforms. The BabyOS [86] and
embedded XINU [36] projects focus on embedded systems, but lack the real-world applicability of a pro-
duction Linux kernel. Furthermore, because Android is based on the Linux kernel, our approach provides a
straightforward transition path for courses that already use the Linux kernel to incorporate the mobile and
embedded concepts embodied in our Android projects. Our approach provides a mapping of structured
Linux kernel programming projects onto the Android platform where students gain insight into real-world
systems and learn practical skills immediately applicable in today’s job market.
Various pedagogical OSes have also been developed [107; 119; 41], but none of them offer students
practical experience or insight into modern mobile platforms. Atkin et al [27] developed a pedagogical OS
focused on portability and mobility. However, all programming projects are done at user level in a simulator,
and do not offer the engaging, real-world experience of using a popular, mobile computing platform such as
Android on real mobile devices.
Several institutions offer courses in mobile application development [134] . These courses focus on
mobile application APIs, and do not teach OS concepts. They offer no insight into the lower-level software
infrastructure of mobile platforms on which applications run. In contrast, our method of using Android to
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teach OS provides students with a real understanding of how things work under the covers as embodied by
the unique OS environment created by the Linux kernel running on a mobile device.
6.6 Conclusions
We have developed a series of hands-on Android Linux kernel programming projects designed to immerse
students in a mobile computing environment while simultaneously teaching core OS principles. The projects
progressively introduce OS principles and mobile computing, and implicitly teach students about real-world
embedded device development. We use key aspects of modern mobile devices, such as orientation sensors,
to enrich the hands-on experience and increase student engagement.
We created an Android virtual lab where both on campus and remote students complete Android Linux
kernel programming projects using an emulator or mobile device. We also leverage a distributed version
control system and live demonstration infrastructure for homework design, distribution, submission, and
grading. Our experience with 100 students using Android to teach OS demonstrates that students enjoy
using mobile devices while learning OS principles, and appreciate the practical skills they gain.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
My research has demonstrated, through two key systems, that lightweight mechanisms can be added to com-
modity operating systems to enable multiple virtual phones or tablets to run at the same time on a physical
smartphone or tablet device, and to enable apps from multiple mobile platforms, such as iOS and Android, to
run together on the same physical device, all while maintaining the low-latency and responsiveness expected
of modern mobile devices.
First, we presented Cells, the first OS virtualization solution for mobile devices that enables a single
mobile device to use multiple personas through isolated and secure virtual instances of a mobile operating
system. Cells does this through two new virtualization mechanisms, device namespaces and device names-
pace proxies, that leverage a foreground-background usage model to isolate and multiplex mobile device
hardware with near zero overhead. Device namespaces provide a kernel-level abstraction that is used to vir-
tualize critical hardware devices such as the framebuffer and GPU, as well as Android’s complicated power
management framework resulting in fully accelerated graphics in all personas and almost no extra power
consumption for Cells compared to stock Android. Cells device namespace proxies provide a mechanism to
virtualize closed and proprietary device infrastructure such as the telephony radio stack.
Second, we presented Cycada, the first system that can run unmodified iOS applications on non-Apple
devices allowing users to maximize the benefit of iOS and Android on the same mobile device. Cycada
accomplishes this through a novel combination of binary compatibility techniques including four new oper-
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ating system compatibility mechanisms: duct tape, diplomatic functions, thread impersonation, and dynamic
library replication.
Duct tape allows source code from a foreign kernel to be compiled, without modification, into a domestic
kernel. This avoids the difficult, tedious, and error prone process of porting or implementing new foreign
kernel subsystems.
Diplomatic functions leverage per-thread personas, and mediate foreign function calls into domestic
libraries. This enables Cycada to support foreign libraries that are closely tied to foreign hardware by
replacing library function calls with diplomats that utilize domestic libraries and hardware. From our in-
depth study of iOS and Android graphics, we also presented four diplomat usage patterns: direct, indirect,
data-dependent, and multi. Similar to the Gang of Four’s design patterns, our diplomat usage patterns allow
Cycada to quickly identify recurring solutions to binary compatibility problems. Diplomatic functions, and
their systematic usage through our defined patterns, is essential on mobile devices to support graphics.
Thread impersonation allows thread-specific context to be shared amongst multiple threads enabling
one thread to temporarily assume the persona of another thread. Cycada thread impersonation presents a
generalized mechanism to impersonate a thread across all personas in which the thread may execute. In
each of these personas, a subset of thread-specific data may be used or shared by the impersonating thread.
This is key to supporting multi-threaded iOS graphics rendering on Android devices.
Dynamic library replication allows a dynamic linker to load multiple, independent instances of a sin-
gle dynamic library. Each instance, or replica, is linked to its own independent set of dependent library
replicas. Dynamic library replication allows Cycada to bypass arbitrary restrictions in proprietary libraries
that require singleton instances of key system components. This is key to supporting iOS graphics window
management on Android devices.
Finally, because mobile computing has become increasingly important, we presented a series of hands-
on Android Linux kernel programming projects designed to immerse students in a mobile computing envi-
ronment while simultaneously teaching core OS principles. The projects progressively introduce OS princi-
ples and mobile computing, and implicitly teach students about real-world embedded device development.
We use key aspects of modern mobile devices, such as orientation sensors, to enrich the hands-on experience
and increase student engagement.
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7.2 Future Work
My research has demonstrated the feasibility of lightweight multi-persona mobile computing, however, there
are still important areas of research which should be explored in future work. First, Cycada OS compatibility
does not present a complete security solution. Because mobile devices are an extremely personal method
of computing, users have begun to keep immense amounts of private data on their smartphones and tablets.
Further research is necessary to map the security semantics provided by iOS onto the security semantics
provided by Android.
Second, while Cells allows users to maintain multiple virtual phones on the same device, it requires
each of these phones to use the same OS kernel. By combining Cells lightweight OS virtualization with
Cycada OS compatibility, a user could securely run an entire isolated, virtual iOS device on their Android
smartphone or tablet. This avenue of research would further integrate these two mobile platforms, and
potentially give future mobile device users a more intuitive way of interacting with multiple personas on
their single mobile device by maintaining UI-consistency within a virtual phone or virtual tablet.
Finally, my work on the Cycada project revealed that despite the fact that OSes maintain similar con-
ceptual functionality, their implementations can be radically different, often with surprising performance
implications. Modern mobile operating systems are not only vertically integrated in user space software, but
this vertical integration also extends into the kernel. Opaque, proprietary kernel devices, drivers, and whole
subsystems are common on both iOS and Android. This trend is in direct opposition to the vision state-
ment of the OpenGroup, “Boundaryless Information Flow TM achieved through global interoperability in a
secure, reliable and timely manner.” To achieve their vision, the OpenGroup has many different standards
including the POSIX standard operating system interface. It should be clear that proprietary OS interfaces,
especially those communicating to proprietary hardware, fall outside the scope of the POSIX standard. In
order to better characterize how modern mobile platforms actually define and use the operating system in-
terface, I propose a detailed study of the use of the POSIX API on both Android and iOS. This would be the
first step in a broader investigation which would attempt to more closely align the design patterns and usage
model of real-world mobile platforms with standard operating system interfaces.
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7.3 Final Thoughts
My work has studied two mobile platforms: iOS and Android. Both platforms provide users with ubiqui-
tous, convenient computing platforms on which they increasingly depend. Both platforms provide arguably
similar user interfaces and manage similar hardware resources. However, the design and implementation of
both platforms is wildly different. The vertically integrated nature of iOS has allowed its OS designers to
freely move functionality in and out of the kernel, and optimize user experience metrics through targetted
low-level features and subsystems such as pthread workqueues (Grand Central Dispatch), kqueue Mach IPC
message reception, and IOSurface memory management (see Section 5.2. Although iOS maintains POSIX
compliance, it is clear through the proliferation of user space daemons and extensive use of non-standard
OS mechanisms such as Mach IPC, that a standardized OS interface has taken a lower priority to user
experience, and raw performance.
Following the development of Android in particular, it has been fascinating to watch the drift away from
interpreted code. For various reasons, Google chose to use Java as the primary platform on which to build
Android, but as the project and platform has matured it has drifted decidedly away from Java principles.
More and more native code is put into JNI accessible functions for performance reasons, and the advent
of Google’s successor to Dalvik, ART (the Android RunTime), completely bypasses the virtual machine in
favor of direct compilation to native code.
Android chose to leverage the Linux kernel while still attempting to provide third party vendors with
enough security to promulgate the platform into near ubiquity. While this allows vendors to develop an
entire platform relatively quickly, it has led to different challenges at the OS level. Specifically, the interface
to the Linux kernel is much more rigid than Apple’s XNU interface. While Google is free to add or remove
functionality as they see fit, if they want to maintain good standing in the Linux community and continue
to leverage the massive open source development effort surrounding the kernel, they need to respect the
processes set in place by the community. Coding standards and review practices for submitting patches to
the upstream Linux Kernel are rigorous, time consuming, and potentially political. High profile examples
such as suspend blockers (wake locks), and Binder IPC, show that being nimble in the mobile Linux kernel
world is difficult. The results of this are two fold: Android kernel development is completely fragmented -
each device manufacturer maintains their own development tree, Google maintains some kernel repositories,
and bugifxes and patches from upstream may only partially make their way into any given branch / repo /
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tree. Second, maintaining a hybrid open source / proprietary development model has lead to avoidable
headaches and inefficiencies at the OS level. Specifically subsystems such as graphics, wifi, and GPS
where manufacturers provide binary blobs that are read by carefully crafted bits of GPL code inserted into
the Linux kernel. Simple things such as reading acclerometer data or passing touch input coordinates to
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